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PrefaoG»
The title indicates the two main positions to he e 
established in this thesis* Episteraological Realism is the 
doctrine that the experiencing suhjeot experiences reals 
external helxigs which lie he^rond his o\ra axlstencoo 
Metaphysical Plm*alism is the doctrine that in the unlvex^se 
there are many enbstantlal beingsm
Bpistexnologlcal Realism and MetaphyBical Pluralism are 
both plausible p hecaiise they are in accordance with natural 
common sense beliefs^ We naturally believe that we 
experience external ‘beingB* And although the distinction 
between substances ; attributes of substances g and aggregates 
of substances is not explicit at the level of common sense g 
it is natural to suppose that one is oneself a real unit of 
existeneop more real than any of the qualities one possesses, 
and more real than any group in which one may be included* 
Since one also believes that there are external things, it 
follows that one is supposing that there is a plurality of 
ultimate units of existence*
These corrmion sense beliefs are the main evidence in 
favour of Bpistemological Realism and Metaphysical Pluralisme 
For common sense beliefs are the natural expression and verbal 
articulation of experience « CoBimon sense belief b are not, 
however, beyond erltleism* Philosophical reflection may
p.ll*
disclose consicleratloBB which show that the conmion sense 
deBoription of experience must be inaccurate* Therefore, 
if one wifâhes to rely on these commn sense 'beliefs, one must 
answer any philoBOphioal criticisms of them^
Our first task is to answer the objection that the
Buhjedt does not experience external objects, since the contents 
presented to ennseiouBneae are not real qualities of external 
he Inga* Then we must reply to the objection that Metaphysical
Pluralism must be false, since a plurality of indepondent 
substances is impossible*
But we wish to do more than reach the bare conclusion that there 
are many substances and that the subject experiences external 
objects* We wish to give a more detailed account of the 
general structure of the universe* The remainder of the 
thesis is devoted to an attempt to construct a coherent system 
which fits the facts of experience and, in particular, to 
suggest an explanation of the subject’a awareness of external 
objecte in terns of this general metaphyaical syatem*
Our purpose is to attempt a general deaeription of the
universe in which we live on the basis of the evidence of 
experienceV We accept the universe of finite beings as a 
given fact: we are not attempting to discover either the
reason for its peculiar character or the reason for its 
existence* The existence of fi:aite beings pOBOB a problem 
vdiieh may or may not be genuine, but the examination of this 
problem is beyond the scope of the present discussion^
p.lll*
fills thesis has, of course, been Influoncadè positively 
or lie gat lively, by the writings of many philosophers who have 
dealt with the problems dlsoussad, hut the chief debt is 
probably due to AoH* Whitehead® There are certain similarities 
between the eystem wliiah we defend and the system elaborated 
hy Whitehead In Process and Reality* For instance, substance« 
as we interpret it, Is similar to Whitehead’s "actual entity", 
and the fondamental relation which we suppose to connect 
independent substances is not unlike Whitehead’s "prehension"®
But we are making an Independent investigation of the problem, 
and v/e are not relying in any xmj on what Whitehead claims to 
have established®
The first chapter is preliminary to the main argument*
It is an attempt to clarify the notion of "substance", which 
plays such an important part In the discussion, and to explain 
the controversy between Moniste and Pluraliste«
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OHAPTER lo THE ORIg AHD THE MAEY* 1-16
That Reality Is both one and many mist be admit ted, 1^9* 
Wittgenstein denies the One, 8 -6 * Par.menid.ee denies the 
Many, 6-4* The unity of Reality la not incompatible with 
its imiltiplieity, 4-5# The issue is whether Reality ie 
one or many substances, 5* Aristotelian conception of 
îîour(^  îî^ 5-6* Preliminary clarification of "substance",
6-8# But fto exact definition of substance la universally 
aeoeptedj, 8-9, e*g* the independence of substance is 
understood in different, ways by MonistB and Pluraliste, 9-10* 
Pluralism is initially in a strong position, hut there are 
formidable Monist objections which must he answered, 10-3.5*
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GHAPTER II* m i V E  14-45*
I* The evidence that the content of experience is 
subjective does not refute the view that there is an 
immediate awareness of external beings, 14-15* Halve 
Realism: its essential error 1 b the confusion of the eont^e^
and the external object of experience, 15-1?*
II0 The given content cannot be more than a part of a 
physical object, 18-19# Halve Realism holds that the 
experience of an external object is an immediate and 
unconditioned apprehension, 3.9* But there are physlologleal 
and physical conditions, 19* That these are mediating 
conditions is proved by the "time-lag" argument, 80-81* 
Moreover, these conditions of experience are likely to affect 
the content presented to consciousness, 81-24®
III® A direct examination of experienced contents reveals 
that they cannot be parts of external objects, 84-85» 
Hallucinations9 85-86* Unreal and illusory contents have
the same status as th€) contente of veridical perceptions,
86-2?o The Halve Realist can deal with psychologie al 
illusions, S?-30, but not with physiological and physical 
illusions, 50-55® The distortions of i3.1iiBions confirm 
that the physical and physiological conditions are mediating 
GonditioBB, 55-54® That contents are distorted by the 
perspective of the subject proves that they are not objectively 
real, 54-58, and that they are not replicas of objectively 
real Qualities, 58-59*
IV$ The above facts do not refute the common sense belief 
In an external world, 59-40® The physiologioal evidence 
does not disprove, but even implies an awareness of external 
beings, 40-42® Although contents are not replicas^ of 
objective qualities, a knowledge of the nature of the external 
world is not necessarily Impossible, 42-4#®
OHAPTER III, OARTBBIAHiam» aOLIPBIBM; AM) 40-101
I® Although the subjectivity of the experienced content 
is compatible with an experience of external objectsPhenomen­
alism is a possible view and mist be examined, 40-48*
The simplicity of Phenomenalism is a minor advantage, and is 
in any case only apparent, 48-49»
II® Dasearteg® Reasons for discussing the Cartesian
viewp 49-80* Distinction between ideas and material things, 
80-61$ Method of Doubt, #1-62. Reasons for doubting 
the existence of sensible thlngs, 82-54* Oogito, ergo sim, 
64—66» Descartes’ proofs of the exlstenoe^'of abd™re^not ' 
suooesBful, #6 -6 ?* Olreularlty of Oartesian argument 
diBeuBBed, 68-00* Defects of the Oartesian method, 60-62*
The 0artesian proof of the existence of material things is 
unnecessary, If the Method of Doubt is abandoned, 62-65»
0 ocl is really irrelevant to the 0 artesian proof, 05-66* 
Orltle%ns of Descartes’ argument, 6 8 -6 ?«
III* Solipsism: a bpecleg of Phenomena11sm, 6 ?-6 8 »
The Solipsist can give his own. account of the empirieal 
facts, 68-690 But he cannot come to terms with the common 
sense belief in an external world, 09-70. And his assumption 
that aemse-data are mental is unwarranted, ?1—72»
Phenomenalism Is in a stronger position, 72-75»
IV» Phenomenal!sm# The nature of sense-data, 75-76. 
Material objects are more than aetual sense-data, 76-77, 
and cannot be equated with a group'^bf JROb bII^^ sense-data, 
?7*-T8o Hypothetical statements about obtainable senae-*data 
either presuppose categorical material object statements,
78-80, or else are not equivalent to euah statements, 80-81* 
phenomenal1 stB cannot provide translations which will 
necessarily have the same truth value a® the sentences 
translated, 81-85# Professor Ayer’e view considered, 85-86»
A "met©^physical" Phenomenal 1st can answer the arguments which 
Ayer accepts, if the arguments which Ayer rejects are not 
valid, 6 6 -W ®  Orltioism of the theory suggested by 
Professor Price, 91-95*
V* Bxperlence is ‘basically not the contemplation of sense- 
data, but judgment, 95-94® This indicates a fundamental 
awareness of external objects * 94-98* Jud#$ent ia primary, 
98-9?* Summary, 9?-98o Phenomenalism endorsee the 
mistaken assumption of Halve Realism, 93» Oon:fusion between 
"appearing to see an obgeot" and "seeing an appearance", 
98-100»
Ho tes "Is it J-CLgieiilîjr possible to doubt the existence of 
an external realltyf^ lOÔ-lOl»
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CHAPTER IV BRADLEY 102-144
Ie We have not yet proved that there are many independent 
substance8 : Bradley’ 8 theory must be answered, 102-105 $ 
Bradley’s view conflicts with common sense, 105-104»
Assessment of the authority of common sense, 104-103*
Positive importance of this examination of Bradley, 106»
II» Bradley assumes that what la not self-consistent is 
Intellectually unsatisfactory, 103-10?# The self-consistent
1b unconditioned and does not contradict itself, 10?»
All judgments which claim to be unconditioned inevitably 
contradict themselves, 107-108* Oontradictlon is the 
unification of differences without a ground of union and 
distinction, 108-109# Ho ground of union and distinction 
is internal to thought, 109-111, nor can this ground be given
from outsidep 111-112® But a judgment which does not claim
to be imeondltionad is not necessarily self-contradictory, 
112-114* Buoh a judgment, however, is not intellectually 
satisfactory, 114-116* Objection: Bradley’a criterion of
what will satisfy the intellect is too stringent, and his 
thesis can be reduced to the obvious truth that reality is 
more than thought, 116-119* Answers Bradley maintains 
that thought does not satisfy its own criteria, in order to 
explain how one can assert a reality beyond thought, 119-121*
III* Thought’s criteriapyield a positive knowledge of the 
general nature of reality, 121-129* Reality is one substance, 
since external relations between independent beings are 
Impossible@ 122-134* Reality includes and harmonises a
diversity, and it Is a whole of experience, 124-126#
IV0 Objection: William James believes that the limitations
of disaursive thought do not require the postulation of an 
Absolutep that reality is given isa immediate experience,
126-198» Bradley recognises the importance of Immediate 
experience, and, in general, accepts James’b description.
126-16lé But Bradley denies the reality of what Is given 
in feeling, because the given content is finite, 151-105® 
à finite content la not consistent with its own existence, 
134-105* This explains and is confirmed, by the existence 
of discursive thought, 155-156* But feeling provides an
Important clue to the nature of the Absolute, 156*107* .
¥* Bradley’s argumenta must he answered hy the 
Metaphysical Pluralist, 108-109® He must explain how one 
can thlnlc about a reality beyond thought, 139-141® He must 
answer Bradley’s contention that real relations must be 
Internal, explaining how an asymmetrical internal-external 
relation# is possible, 141*140* Immediate experience
has a eubjeot-object structure, 143-144®
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CHAPTER V THE miQUEHE 8 8  0 ? BEIHOB 146*196
I. In the previous chapters, we defended our assumption 
that there are many substances in the world: we shall now
examine the consequences of this assumption, 146-146»
Two main Implications : one Is that every substance ie unique,
146* Substances may be distinguished because they differ 
in quality, or in spatio-temporal position, 146*148»
IIo Does the quality or position of a being distinguish 
it from every other being? 148* To exhibit a one-to-one 
correspondence between substantial beings and particular 
positions in space and time is not to prove that the 
spatio-temporal contlmmm Is the principle of individuation, 
148-149* A principle of individuation must be metaphysically 
prior to the beings which it individuates, 149*150»
Discussion of metaphysical priority: this notion is best
elucidated by referring to a particular case, the priority 
of substance to secondary modes of being, 150*153* Are 
space and time metaphysledl,. ly prior to the things in space 
and time? Oommon sense does nèt give an unequivocal answer, 
155-154o Oommon sense metaphors which suggest that space 
and time are prior may be safely disregarded, 154*155»
The common sense belief that spatlo-temporal beings are 
substantial whereas space and time are not is important, 
but not conclusive, 155-156» Examination of the view that 
space and time are derivative aspects of a substance prior 
to the beings in space and time, 156-158®
IIlo Kant’8 arguments in favour of the priority of space 
and time, 158* Argument from the transcendental exposition, 
169-160» This argument also suggests that space and time
F.vlli.
are not objectively real, 160* Spatio-temporal objecte are 
also, perhaps, Imown by an a priori intuition, 160-161#
One may question Kant’ b assumption that mathematical 
propositions are synthetic a ^priori @ 161—166» Arguments 
from the metaphysical exposition: the first argument Is
insufficient ‘by itself@ 166-16?» The second argument ;la 
that one can thinic of an empty space and an empty time, but 
not of objects not in space and time, 16?—168® Although 
one can form an abstract conception of an empty time, one 
cannot suppose the real existence of time without supposing 
the existence of temporal beings, 168-170» The third 
argument 1b that an infinite space and an infinite time are 
prior to and presupposed by every determinate part of space 
and tifiiep 170-178» This argument also proves that space 
and time are not fully real, 1?2*1?6® The argument is to 
be answered in Chapter VI, 174® Summary, 174-176#
IVQ Does the spécifie universal character of a being 
determine its unlguenesa? l?6*l?6e One must prove that the 
system of the universe prohibitb the repetition of the total 
character of any being, l?6-l??o Illegitimacy of assuming 
a Principle of the Identity of Indiscernible^, 1??-1?0«
Oan one conceive of the possible duplication of the character 
of a being, even if this character includes spécifie spatial 
and temporal relations to other beings? 176-3.80» Every
being must b§ related to every other being, 180» Duplication
is possible, if two beings may be s'orne trio ally related,
180-182® And even if all beings are asymmetrically related, 
duplication is still possible, 182—185® Moreover, ais 
BUbstance ie metaphysically prior to its universal, character, 
185*184® Beings are themselves responsible for their 
uniqueness (unless there is reason to believe in the existence 
of a transcendent God) 184-185*
V® The problem of expressing in thoughljand language the 
uniqueness of beings, 185-186o Language ie not concerned 
solely with uni versais, but may involve a reference to uniçpe 
individual subjects, 186-18?» How cen the universal 
"uniqueness" be used to refer to the unique existence of 
things? 18?« Similar problem in connection with "existence", 
18?*188# Defence of the view that there 1b ^universal
character "existence", 186-191® The universal "existence" 
may refer to its instantiations, the "existing" of particular 
beingse 191-195o Similar solution in the case of the 
universal "unlquenesB", 195# Relevance of the above diecuesion 
to the problem of thought and reality, 195-195»
Botes Examination of the structure of a second type of 
proposition about matters of fact, 195-196#
P.ix»
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X« The problem of reconciling the interrelations of beings 
with their substantial Independence, 197*199# Two levels 
In Bradley’s attack on Metaphysical Pluralism distinguished, 
109-200® Wo shall deal here with Bradley’s second 
arguments that real relations between independent substances 
are Impossible, 200*201«
lifl The answer is that the direct relations between 
Bubstances are tran©temporal, aeyiimetrlcalg internal-external 
relations, 801-202# The transtemporal relation
between past and present Is internal to the present and external 
to the past® 808*803® When present, a being has a moment 
of independence, depending on neither past nor future, 805*805* 
Objections direct transtemporal relations cannot be real,
since their terms are not co-preeeifStl, 805*806» We cannot
claim that our view Is simpler than any alternative, 806*80?# 
Answers the terms of a transtemporal relation are temporally 
contiguous, the contiguity being derivative from the relation 
and not vice versa , 807*809* Mediate temporal relations, 
809-810o licroeoBmlc process: reasons for assuming an
internal transition within every substantial being, 810-811*
All stages in this internal transition must be co-present, 
811—8180 The present has a duration: arguments against
an instantaneous present, 818-813» When examining this 
hypothesis, one must not assume the priority of space and time, 
which the hypothesis explicitly denies, 813—814# Restatement 
of the hypothesis: (a) the internal transition within a
substance determines the present, 814*816* (b) The
transition from substance to substance generates the temporal 
continuum, 816*818® Indirect relation© between contemporary 
substances, 818-880® These indirect relations often depend 
on a common link In the distant past, 880*888* Summary, 
888-885*
III* Reconsideration of Kant’s doctrine that space and time
are infinite given nmgnltudes, 883-884* The empirical cm 
evidence is not conclusiv© in Kant’s favour, 884*885* The 
infinite divisibility of space and time will also be examined, 
885* The ideal construction of the various infinite series
is certainly possible, 285-286* One may grant the infinity 
of the real series of time to come, 886* But a finite 
quantum of space or time cannot be infinitely divisible, the 
real regression of past time cannot be infinite, and space 
cannot be infinite In magnitude, 887—838# Objection: the
above argumente depend on proving the impossibility of tenets 
which are not true contradictories of the positions defended, 
838-833* In spite of a superficial similarity, the situation 
is not exactly the same as the situation in Kant’s first and
second antinomies, 806-950® The arguments against 
indivisible spatio-temporal quanta ami against the llmilatlon 
of space anJitime may be answered, if one maintains the 
priority of substantial beings, 236-23B* The beginning of 
time, 238-940 0 Kant’s answer to Leibniz Ian objections, 
240-242® fhie answer depend© on the argument of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, which 1b not cogent, 248-245»
There are ultimate mgsterles in every system, 243-944»
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OHAPTER VII 0AU8AL OOmEOTION 945-999
I® The Imuedlate physical relations between different 
substances are eaueal relations, 945» The relations identified 
are both Internal-external relations, 945-946# The advantage©
of this Identification, 946-247® Examination of the objection 
that there may be causal relations between contemporary beings, 
947«*960® A second objection i© that the tranetemporal 
relation depends on the activity of the subsequent being, 
whereas causai connection, according; to the common sense view, 
depends on the activity of the antecedent being, 950-251# 
Refutation of the conmon sense belief that it is the cause 
which Is active and not the effect, 251—953* Proof of the
principle of Oausality, 953-254® The Principle of Causality 
does not lay down that the nature of an effects is completely 
determined by its causes, 954-965*
II Two Influential versions of a supplementary Law of 
Causality, 255® The Arsltotellan version and its defects, 
955-856. The version of modern science, 968» Two source© 
of evidence concerning the nature of causality distinguished, 
258-959» A being can be affected by what is in Its past, 
only if the past persists in the %)resent, 959-961® But a 
past being, as such, cannot persist, 261—269® The persistent 
element is the definiteness of the past being, 268-863.
This argument h^ e^ established the existence of uni versai 
characters, showing that universal© are eeseAAlally implicated 
in causal connection, 265-265* Empirical evidence reveals 
that the character of an effect is not always Identical with 
the character of its cause, 266-966. The persistent character 
of the cause is modified when incorporated in the effect, 960»
An effect has usually several causes, and the contributions 
of the various causes may be altered when combined in a novel 
synthetic unity, 266-969* It is difficult to comprehend 
the nature of a persistent element which maintains its identity 
in spite of modifIcation, 269-870®
III. The examination of the general conceptb used in 
thought and language shows that a similar sort of identity
in Bpite of difference 1b preeupposed by determinable concepts, 
270-873® There xb an alternative theory which maintains 
that unanalyshM)© relations of similarity, and not uni.versai 
identities, constitute the objective ground which justifies 
the use of general concepts, 873-870* The theory of univeroalf: 
is to be preferred, mainly because It is capable of explaining 
other facts of experience, 876-878»
IV» The fact that an effect may have several distinct 
causes is confirmation of the activity of the effect, 878* 
Although the Aristotelian theory contains an element of truth, 
it is of little practical use, 878-879# Scientific 
Determinism, 879® Oausal connection is not to be assimilated 
to logical implication, 879-880* Because causal connection 
depends on the activity of the effect, Determinism imy be 
false, 880-881# The main evidence in favour of Determinism 
ie the de facto regularity of nature, but this regularity is 
neither necessary nor complete, 881-888* The main evidence 
in favour of Incletarininism is the freedom of the human will, 
868-884» Resolution of the controversy between Determinism 
and Indeterminism, 884-885* This theory of causality makes 
possible a plausible account of human action, 885-887*
The theory is also compatible with the de-facto regularity 
of miture, if one admits that the degree of Bj^ntaneity 
exercised is different in the case of high and low grade 
entities, 887-889*
Vs We imst use causal connection to explain the persistent 
identities, which other views can interpret as permanent 
substances, 869-891» Univcrsals must have whatever 
concreteness is required to perform their various functions, 
891-898&*
CHAPTER VIII EXPERIENCE 2
I* The exDistemologieal problem, 893» The relation of 
experiencing is identical with the fundamental relation connect­
ing independent substances, 893-895* The relations of 
causality and experiencing are both internal-external relations, 
895, and in spite of the appearances, there are no fundamental 
differences between them, S95-300o
II0 The identification of causality and experiencing makes 
possible an inference from the effects in GonseiousneoB to 
the causes which have .px’^oduced them, 300-303« We do not know 
the intrinsic qualities of external things, but only their 
powers, 303-304® We accept the causal theory of perception, 
305o Our position is proof against the arguraent which
P.xll»
refutes Locke’s version of the causal theory, 305-306.
The extensive and detailed knowledge of the world which we 
normally assume would be impossible without the regularity 
of nature, 307-808» It ie reasonable to assume the
regularity of nature, and the truth of the assumption ie ■ 
confirmed by the suceoes of the system based upon it, 808-811*
III. The analysis of common sense statements about the world, 
811-812o The nature of this analysis, 818. Should the
qualities attributed' to external beings be interpreted as 
spécifié powers? 818-818* The analysis of statements about
enduring material objects, 818-810# The analysis of statements 
about the world which makes use of the conception of "power"
is not accurate, 818-817# l| straightforward analysis ie
possible, if the systematic ambiggiity of predicate concepts 
is recognised, 817-810# We can assert no more than the 
identity of certain (unlcnown) oharacteristics possessed by 
various external beings, 819««8Slo Revised analysis of 
statements with complex predicates, 821-822« The epeeifioation 
of the subjects of empirical propositions, 822-824* The 
construction of the spatio-temporal system in which one locates 
external beings, 82&**825o
IV. Errors due to hallucinations, 825-826. Ho?/ can one 
Identify the external beings responsible for the effects 
produced In consciousness? 826. Digression concerning the 
relations between mind, body, and external objecte proper, 
327-829® The causal antecedents of a given emnse-content 
are extremely complicated, 529-880. But changea in the given 
sense-oontents can usually be attributed to changée in material 
objects, 880. Ohangee are sometimes due to other factors, 
and we may be misled, 380-888, lost empirical mistakes 
occur in cases where there is an inference based on past 
experience, 883-884, Many mistakes can be corrected by 
further observations, although we can never be absolutely sure 
that we are right, 884-886,
Vo We knov/ what other things are really like, only if we 
know that they are similar to some element given in conscious- 
nesB, 856-587o All beings in the v/orld are similar in their 
fundamental character, 887-5894, On this principle depends
the belief in indirect temporal and causal relations, 589-540$
Our view is not anthropomorphic, 840® We share more 
specialised charaoterlstlos ?dtli some other beings, 540-841*
The similarity of past and presenT*states of the self, 841-345* 
Memory depends on the subject’s experience of the |>reàeding 
state of the self, 848-845$ The knowledge of the order of 
past events, 545-846$ The retention in memory of what is 
not before eonseiousnees, 546-847« Our knowledge of the
existence of other minds, 547-852. There is good reason
to believe that we often know the detàlled nature of other
people’© experience, but there Is a eign:lfleant risk of 
error, 868-356o
¥1» Summary of the argument of the thesis, 556-859. 
Defects of the thesis, 359-861$ The coharene© of the 
system, 861-568$
OHAPTEH ONE#
THE ONE AND THE MANY#
Metaphysical Pluralism is one of the two main positions 
which v/e wish to defend in this work. We are suhscrihing 
to the proposition that there are many beings and we a:t*e rejecting 
Metaphysical Monism, the doctrine that there is only one real 
being. This means that one of the fundamental questions 
which we have to decide is the age-old problem of the One and 
the Many. Is reality one single being, or are there many 
real beings?
This is at first sight a peculiarly puîsz.ling question, 
because although it seems plausible to maintain that the real 
must be either one or many and not both, yet experience appears 
to forbid the denial of either the unity or plurality of being.
In experience we so obviously encounter a manifold; and on the 
other hand we do not doubt but that everything we experience 
exists in the one world. And as a matter of fact, very few 
philosophers have been prepared to go so far as to deny outright 
the existence of either the One or the Many. To find examples 
of an extreme Pluralist who will deny the One and of an extreme 
Monist who will deny the Many, one has to take philosophers 
so widely separated in time as Wittgenstein and Parmenides.
These extreme positions cannot simply be ignored, but there 
are very simple objections against both views which seem
P.Q.
sufficiently conclusive#
We shall take first the representative of extreme 
Pluralism, the doctrine propounded hy Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philoeophicus. Wittgenstein argues that 
the only ultimate realities are what he calls "atomic facts". 
The opening proposition of his hook is indeed, "The world is 
the totality of atomic facts", hut hy the end of his work 
he has made quite clear that for him there is no such thing 
as a single totality of all atomic facts and that the 
conception of a world is a strictly meaningless notion which 
refers to nothing real. He makes use of this notion only 
in order to bring the reader to an understanding of his 
position. Once this understanding is achieved, the reader 
will realise that the notion is without any literal 
, significance#
But how is it possible to have a theory which cannot 
permit its own statement and which must in the end withdraw 
the propositions which are required in order to convey v/hat 
is intended? This is a question to which Wittgenstein has 
given no satisfactory answer. And our natural distrust 
of Wittgenstein’s unusual procedure is intensified when we 
suspect that the reason why Wittgenstein employs so mysterious 
a method is that he hopes in this way to evade an objection 
which is otherwise fatal to any form of radical pluralism. 
Wittgenstein wishes to assert the reality of many entities, 
the atomic facts, while denying the reality of any unity of
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these entities. But this is not possible. As Bradley has 
pointed out,* it is impossible to assert the reality of many 
beings without at the same time admitting the reality of the 
totality of these many beings. One cannot even form any 
conception of a plurality without at the same time conceiving 
the unity of that plurality. Abstract the unity, and you 
are left hot with the plurality, but at best with mere being.
This is the basic objection against any attempt to dispense 
with the unity of the world.
‘ Thus, Wittgenstein has an ambiguous attitude towards a 
proposition like "The world is the totality of atomic facts", 
because, Although he requires some such proposition in order 
to maintain the plurality of atomic facts, he wishes to evade 
the implication that there is a single real world. In the end, 
Wittgenstein takes refuge in silence**, but it now seems that 
this silence is imposed not because the ultimate nature of 
reality is impenetrable to thought and language, but because 
Wittgenstein wishes to defend a view which cannot even be 
consistently expressed.
The theory of Parmenides is at the other extreme. He 
denies all plurality and all distinction within the One.
But how can one deny outright the existence and reality of that 
diversity and multiplicity which is so clearly present in 
experience? The Many may perhaps be degraded to the level
* cf. Appearance and Reality. 4th impression, p.141.
** "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent".
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7*
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of mere appearances, but they may not be oomipletely deprived 
of existence. Appearances.certainly exist, and they must be 
granted some degree of reality: they are not nonentities and 
they must be accounted for. It is quite illegimiîate for a 
philosophical theory to rule out dogmatically the element of 
multiplicity in reality*
One cannot solve the problem, then, by refusing to 
recognise either the One or the Many: the reality of both must
be afMitted. Therefore, one must question the contention 
that the real cannot be both one and many* When this 
contention Is subjected to critical scrutiny, it is seen to be 
quite unwarranted, to be, in fact, mere sophistry. What is 
there to prevent one from assenting to the natural view that 
there is one world which exists and which contains a plurality 
of elements which also exist? The claim is that one may not 
attribute to the real the contradictory predicates, unity and 
plurality. But is it in fact a contradiction to assert that 
reality is both one and many? It is indeed a contradiction 
to assert both that there is but one chair in a certain room 
and that there are many chairs in the room. This is because 
there is no ambiguity about w'lat is to count as a unity in the 
case of chairs. But in the case of reality, there is no 
established convention which determines what is to count as 
a unit: the real cannot be unambiguously enumerated. One
may take as a unity reality as a whole: or one may take as
a unit each distinguishable element in reality. In order
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to do justice to the nature of the real, we must take account 
of both these alternative modes of enumeration. The fact that 
reality may be counted in these different ways is what permits 
us and indeed requires us to say that reality is both one and 
many.
Nov/, if the existence of both the One and the Many must
be admitted, what can be at stake in the debate between Monism
and Pluralism? Is the solution to this ancient controversy
simply that both parties are right in what they affirm and wrong
in what they deny? But apart from extremists such as 
P
Parmenides and Wittgenstein, Monists and Pluraliste alike are 
perfectly agreed That both the One and the Many are, in some 
sense. What the Monists are concerned to maintain is that 
there is a special sense of being according to which the One is 
and the Many are not; whereas the Pluralist© hold that according 
to this special sense of being each of the Many is and the One, 
their unity, is not. This means that in order to understand 
the issue between Monism and Pluralism, one must distinguish 
different senses of being.
Plato recognised, the significance of the fact that being 
has several senses, but Aristotle vms the first to .attempt a 
systematic classification. The various senses of being 
distinguished by Aristotle are not all on the same level.
There is one type of being which has a special position* 
Aristotle calls this kind of being " ovf i;, is
being in the primary sense. " is primary because it
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ejcists absolutely nnfl Independently. All other types of
> /-
being are essentially relative to some " ov/'tA which is 
responsible for their existence* "Not one of them by nature
has an independent existence or can be separated from its
? /1 0 V f IA
» is usually translated "substance", although 
some have seriously questioned the a|)pr opr lateness of this 
translation* Mrs Ellen Stone Haring favours a transliteration 
of the Greek, because "substance" suggests something standing 
under something else, which is nearest in meaning to the Greek 
M u n 0 K  ^ not to the much more comprehensive " "#**
Father Owens, after a very detailed and scholarly discussion, 
decides for "entity" **4 But "substance" is the term which 
has been traditionally used to denote being in the primary sense, 
and we see no reason to object to this term provided that one 
is careful not to take for granted any of the various special 
meanings which the term has acquired throughout the history 
of philosophy. For example, one must not assume with Kant 
that substance is the permanent substratum of change
It is being in the sense of substance which Monists affirm 
to be one and which Pluralists affirm to be many. The Monists 
maintain that the One is the only substance and that the Many
* Aristotle, Metaphysics 2 1, 1088a 80-84, translated by
H. Tredennick.
** Substantial Form in Aristotle*s Metaphysics z. Review of 
^tqphysics. Vol. X,^  No.8, p.308.
*+ The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics.
++ ^f* Critique of pure Reason, First Analogy of Experience.
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are mere parts of substance, elements of substance, aspects 
of substance, qualities of substance, modes of substance, or 
adjectives of substance* The Pluraliste hold that there are 
many substantl&l beings and that the aggregate constituted by 
these beings is no substance, but depends for its reality upon 
its substantial components*
Most philosophers would be willing to admit the existence 
and the philosophical importance of a primary type of being 
such as is described above, even if some would be reluctant 
to call it "substance"* But those who are prepared to 
recognise the concept of substance are by no means all agreed 
about its exact definition* There are, however, certain 
features of substance which are fairly generally acknowledged*
If we can point out these features, this will serve as a 
preliminary description and clarification of this very 
fundamental notion.
Most philosophers would agree with Aristotle that 
substance is primary in reality, that it exists absolutely 
and separately, and that it does not depend on anything else 
in the way in which its attributes depend upon it— a substance 
is a self-existent being®
Another characteristic which would usually be attributed 
to substance is indivisibility— a substance is an indivisible 
unity® This does not mean that a substance is absolutely 
simple and without parts— it means only that a substance cannot 
be divided into parts which are themselves substances*
P.S*
Since a substance is a definite unit, it follows that substances 
may be unambiguously enumerated, so that Monism and Pluralism 
are exclusive alternatives: there must be either one substance,
or else many substances* Moreover, the indivisibility of 
substances rules out a type of Pluralism which is in effect 
a compromise between Monism and Pluralism* This type of 
Pluralism would maintain that there are many substances, one 
of which is in a special position, since it is a whole comprising 
all the others. But since substance is indivisible, if a 
whole is substance its parts cannot be substances, and parts 
which are substances cannot make up a substantial whole.
Most philosophers would also agree that substances are 
particular and concrete and that each substance is a unique 
individual which can never be repeated* What is abstract 
cannot be substance; for the abstract is posterior to the 
concrete from which it has been abstracted, whereas substance 
is prior to all other kinds of being. These features are not, 
however, peculiar to substance, since certain attributes of 
substance are also concrete, unique, and particular.
But although many philosophers would be prepared to 
subscribe to the above account of substance, they would notxiic 
all mean precisely the same thing by the terms employed, end 
the underlying differences of opinion would be revealed as 
soon as one attempted to give a more exact definition.
In particular, Monists and Pluralist© would diverge widely 
in their inte:ç»pretation of the above description. This fact
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coraplicatee the debate between the two parties; Indeed, the 
different answers given by Monists and Pluralist© to the 
question, "Is substance one or many?", seem to depend in large 
measure on the different meanings of substance which are 
assumed.
To illustrate this point, let mmm ub take the character­
istic of independence; Moniete and Pluraliste alike are agreed 
that substantial beings have some sort of independence.
But Monists understand the independence of substance in such 
a way that it follows that there can be only one substantial 
being. They argue that a substance must have an absolute^ 
independence which is incompatible with its relation to 
anything beyond itself. But unless one is prepared to 
undertake a defence of Leibnis’s windowlesB monads, one must 
admit that the many beings in the world which a Pluralist 
would consider to be substances are related to one another. 
Therefore, Pluralists must attempt to give an account of 
substantial independence which makes clear that the independence 
of substances is not incompatible with their interrelationships. 
This is not an easy task.
The celebrated Cartesian definition that a substance is 
" a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of 
nothing beyond itself in order to its existence"»*' will not do. 
Descartes himself was immediately compelled to modify this
Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy» Part I, LI, 
translated by^feiteh»
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definition: the criteria were eo stringent that only God eould
satisfy them. He therefore admitted substances of a second 
type, defined as "things which, in order to their existence, 
stand in need of nothing but the concourse of God".^ But 
Pluraliste cannot accept even the revised Carteeian definition. 
For it is difficult to deny that the many beings in the world 
which a Pluralist would wish to call substantial require and 
depend upon one another. Human beings are surely substances,
if any finite beings are, yet they obviously require for their 
existence many things beyond themselves.
Therefore, a Pluralist must show in some other way how 
the Independence of substances is to be reconciled with their 
relations to one another. In a later chapter,^»*' we shall
endeavour to do this by making use of the temporality of the 
beings in the world.
The difference between Monism and the type of Pluralism 
we wish to recommend is, however, even more radical than that 
the opposed views employ different definitions of substance.
There is a fundamental difference in approach. The usual 
method of the Monists is to assume a certain definition of 
substance, and then to show that according to this definition 
a plurality of substances is impossible* The definition 
assumed by the Moniste ie not, of course^ arbitrary: it is
based on a supposed rational insight into the nature of substance.
m ibid. 5 Part I, LII.
Chapter VI
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We may call the approach used by the Monlsts a Rationalist 
approach.
The proper approach for a Pluralist is* on the other 
hand, an empirical one. The case for Pluralism rests not 
on a rational intuition of the nature of substance, but on 
a certain experience* This experience is the fundamental 
awareness of every subject that he is a substantial being 
existing in a vmrld of other substantial beings. The claim 
is that it 1b one’s awareness of the nature of one’s own being 
and of the beings which surround one which provides the notion 
of substance, that substance is to be defined ostenslvely by 
referring to the many beings which we discern in this fundamental 
experience.
If this claim were absolutely incontestable, then Monism 
could be ruled out without further discussion. If substance 
must be ostenslvely defined in a situation in which we see that 
there are many substances, then any verbal definition which 
cannot allow that there are many substances must be mistaken 
and is automatically excluded*
This fundamental experience of the plurality of substances 
does not, however, have that clarity and self-evidence which 
would allow one to discount in advance all possible criticisms 
of Metaphysical Pluralism. Therefore, Pluraliste must be 
prepared to give a specific reply to any criticisms which their 
opponents might make. Pluraliste, however, are initially
in a strong position. One may not have an infallible
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intuition of the plurality of eubstanceB, but there is a certain 
primitive awareness that there are many substantial beings 
which It is not easy to disregard. It requires, indeed, 
an effort of abstraction and philosophical reflection to 
formulate an explicit proposition such as *'There are many 
substantial beings*', but an awareness of many substances is 
rarely, if ever, absent from conscious experience* The plain 
man’s instinctive support of Pluralism against Monism testifies 
to the prevalence' of an intuition of the plurality of substantial 
beings, in however inarticulate a form.
Therefore, since it is the Monistic theory which is at 
variance with the apparent facts, it must bear the oni^ s of proof* 
The Monist must prove that the apparent plurality of substances 
is an illusion. But so long as no objections are brought 
against hie fundamental assertion that there are many substances, 
the Pluralist is free to devote hie energies to articulating, 
developing, and elucidating the fundamental experience on which 
his position depends*
There are, however, certain forceful objections which 
make it impossible for the Pluralist to take for granted hie 
fundamental thesis. There is an extremely radical objection 
which denies that a subject can experience beings beyond himself. 
The argument leads one to a very implausible version of Monism, 
vis. Solipsism, but it is an argument sufficiently well grounded 
in the undeniable fact of the subjectivity of experience to 
warrant careful examination*
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A less radical but more formidable criticism of 
Metaphysical Pluralism is prepared to admit that a subject 
experiences a reality which extends beyond himself. But 
what the argument denies is that the self and any other beings 
which one identifies beyond the self are substances. We have 
seen that it is impossible to conceive of a plurality of beings 
which do not somehov; form a unity. The Monistic argument is 
that this unity is prior to its constituents, so that it is the 
unity which is substantial and not its many components.
The most satisfactory reply to this criticism is to 
develop a system of Metaphysical Pluralism which, will show how 
the unity of the world is derived from the many beings in the 
world in such a way that it is posterior and not prior to them.
The problem is essentially the same as a problem which we have
already noticed— the problem of reconciling the relatedness and 
the independence of the beings in the world.
But a brief reply to these criticisms is impossible, and 
it will be necessary to devote a large part of this thesis to 
their refutation. We shall begin by attempting to establish 
the second main position which we are defending in this thesis,
Epistemological Realism. In this v/ay, we shall ansv/er
objections against Metaphysical Pluralism from the side of 
Solipsism. Then, we must try to deal with the objection 
that the experiencing subject and the things which he experiences 
beyond himself are not ultimate substances.
OHAPTim TWO.
NAIVE REALISM.
I. Now that the various senses of being have been
distinguished, the central contention of Metsiphysical Pluralism 
may be restated as follows; "There are many substantial beings." 
We have seen that this contention depends for support almost 
entirely upon comon sense and ordinary experience— -the 
experience of every subject that he exists and that other beings 
exist in a vmrld external to him. But as we noted towards 
the end of the last chapter, the validity of this experience 
may be questioned.
There is good evidence that what is actually given in 
experience is not at all what we ordinarily believe. A 
critical examination of experience reveals that what is 
presented to the subject is such that it cannot be even a 
part or constituent of the external objects assumed by common 
sense. But we shall attempt to show that the arguments which 
break down bo much of the common sense picture of the world 
do not touch man’s fundamental awareness of a reality beyond 
himself. One may identify in experience certain elements
which do not have the objective reality which the plain man 
would unthinkingly aocribe to them; but it does not follow 
from this that no' experience of an external world is possible.
In the present chapter, we shall work through the main arguments
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which have been used to prove that what Is given in experience 
Is subjective. We shall agree that perceptual errors, the 
distortions of perspective, and so on show that there is an 
element in experience which cannot be a property of an external 
reality. This element may be called the "content" of experience* 
But we shall contend that none of these arguments compels one 
to adjiiit that a percipient subject can have no experience 
whatsoever of an external and objective reality.
The arguments which establish the subjectivity of the 
content of experience are often developed as a criticism of 
the episternological theory called Naive Realism. We shall 
follow the normal procedure and take Halve Realism as the 
focus of our discussion. Naive Realism is not a view which 
any reputable philosopher would defend. Indeed, the defects 
of this theory are so obvious that one could hardly state it 
with any precision without becoming conacioue of its Bhortcomlnge. 
But it is a useful starting point, and by a criticism of this 
position, one may gradually unfold the considerations which 
lead one to deny that the content of experience is objectively 
real.
Naive Realism is often considered to be the epistemologioal 
theory accepted by the plain man. But one may question the 
propriety of attributing to the plain man any particular 
epistemologioal view. The plain man, by definition, does not 
reflect; he is satisfied with ordinary experience; and ordinary 
experience would appear to be the neutral datum of epistemology
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which all theoretical explanations must take account of and 
which does not imply any special epistemologioal theory—  
certainly not a false one. To attribute t Naive Realism to 
the plain man is to damage without justification the RagpmmtlBi 
reputation of common sense and ordinary experience; and since 
our metaphysical theory depends so largely on common sense, 
we must take time to defend Its reputation.
It is, however, a natural mistake to suppose that Naive 
Realism is the epistemological theory of the plain man* The 
plain man as such has no theory of knowledg;e, but the plain man 
who turns philosopher is naturally drawn to Naive Realism, 
because of its simplicity, although he is not likely to remain 
long in this position v^ fithout recognising its Inadequacy.
The fundamental mistake of Naive Realism is that this 
theory fails to make a clear distinction between the content 
of experience and its external object* This confusion of 
content and external object leads the Naive Realist to mis­
understand both the status of the content and the structure 
of the experience of external objecte* The Naive Realist 
attributes to the content of experience the objective 
ontological status which can be legitimately assigned only 
to the external being which is the object of experience.
And the Naive Realist maintains that the experience of an 
external object, like the avmrenesB of a given content, is 
an immediate and unconditioned apprehension.
Before undertaking a detailed criticism of Naive
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Realism, we shall attempt a preliminary clarification of the 
two fundamental notions which we have distinguished, via. the 
content and the external object of experience. By the 
"content" of experience, we mean what has been variously called 
sense-data, appearances, presentations, phenomena, and so on*
We mean such things as a patch of colour as it appears in 
visual perception, a sound as it is heard by a listener, and 
80 on: we mean whatever qualities are immediately present
to the experiencing subject*
By the external "object" of experience, wo mean a real' 
physical being independent of experience, which exists in a 
public world beyond the experiencing subject* Some
philosophers— Berkeley is perhaps the most notorious— would 
question the existence of any such beings. But we shall not 
hesitate to assume the reality of beings in an external world 
throughout the discussion of the present chapter* The 
existence of external beings is never doubted by common sense, 
and should not be doubted by philosophers without very good 
cause* In this chapter, we shall show that one can account 
for the failings of Naive Realism without abandoning the Naivê 
Realist belief in an external physical world. In the next
chapter, we shall deal with the theory which attempts to escape 
the difficulties of Naive ‘Realism by sacrificing the external 
world*
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II* There are various versions of the Naive Realist
position, some of which are more extreme than others* Sinoe 
we are not attempting to give an accurate representation of 
the views of some actual school of philosophy, we may select 
as our starting point the version of Naive Realism v/hioh we 
find most convenient for dialectical purposes* The most 
extreme form of Naive Realism would maintain the absolute 
identity of the content and the external object of experience*
This theory is so obviously mistaken that it can hardly be 
seriously entertained, but it is best to begin with the most 
extreme view and to introduce modifications as required*
A simple example will be enough to prove that one cannot 
completely
identify the content and the external object of experience* 
When one sees a penny, the content of one’s experience is not 
the penny as such* For neither the back nor the interior 
of the penny are presented in the visual perception* What 
is presented is no more than a part of the penny, namely its 
front surface, Thus, the content of experience is not 
by .itself a physical thing in the external world. Oommon 
sense material objects are not presented bodily and in full*
But this argument does not damage any essential tenet 
of Naive Realism. It does not compel the Naive Realist to 
withdraw his view that the content of experience is objectively 
real. ■ It shows that a content given in experience can be 
no more than a part or property of an external being. But 
a part of an external being has surely the same objective
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reality as the being itself*
That the content of experience is ohjeotively real is 
the first of the two principles of Naive Realism mentioned 
above. We shall postpone criticism of this principle until 
we have dealt with the second main contention of Naive Realism, 
that the experience of an external object is an immediate 
and unconditioned apprehension*
The Naive Realist believes that an experience is 
conditioned by two things only— an experiencing mind, and a 
physical being which is experienced. Moreover, the Naive 
Realist would keep the contributions of these two kinds of 
condition carefully segregated; the mind provides the subject 
of experience and the physical thing provides the object.
But an empirical investigation reveals other conditions of 
experience. These other conditions are of two distinct kinds. 
There are physiological conditions: sense perceptions are
possible only if the appropriate sense organs are functioning: 
the blind do not see, nor do the deaf hear* Theresi are also 
physical conditions. The perception of an external object 
is possible only if the object Is brought into contact with the 
sense organs or, in the case of the senses of sight, hearing, 
and smell, which function at a distance, if the nature of the 
physical reality intervening between the body and the perceived 
object is such as to permit the occurrence of the perception.
One cannot see through a brick wall; one cannot hear across a 
vacuum; and if one is upwind from an object, one cannot smell it.
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It is clear, then, that the oecurrence of an experience 
depends on a variety of conditions. But these considerations 
cannot he taken to provide a conclusive refutation of.
the doctrine that the experience of an external object is an 
immédiate apprehension* . And it is this doctrine which is 
really vital to the Halve Realist position. It does not 
follow from the fact that an experience cannot occur without 
the co-operation of certain conditione that the experience, 
when it does occur, is other than an immediate grasp of the 
external object by the mind. It is not out of the question 
that the physical and physiological conditions of j-jercaption 
are mei»ely what make possible a flash of Intuition directly 
connecting the mind, and an external being. In other words, 
these conditions of experience are not necessarily mediating 
cohditions which bridge an otherwise insuperable gap between 
the mind and its object.
It is, however, much more plausible to suggest that the 
physical and physiological conditions operate by transmitting 
the quality of the external object to the mind, rather than by 
enabling the mind to lay hold of its object directly. And 
there is an argument which effectively closes the loop^-holo 
through which the Halve Realist might otherwise escape. The 
evidence of science is that when there is a perception of some 
occurrence in the physical world, one can detect a definite 
route of activity leading from the external object to the brain.
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For example, in the case of a flash of light, one can detect 
light rays leading from the source of light to the bxxi eye, 
and nerve impulses leading along the optic nerve to the brain.
Mow this route of activity connecting the mind and the external 
object is a process which it takes time to enact. Nerve 
impulses require time to travel along the nerves; even the 
transfer of light is not instantaneous. This means that the 
event which is supposed to be perceived must be in the past of 
the perceiving of it. And in the case of a very distant event, 
e.g. the explosion of a p supernova, the event has occurred 
many millions of years before it is perceived. But how could 
the mind have an immediate access to what has happened in the 
remote past? For the past does not exist and what does not
exist cannot be present to the mind. Therefore, the mind can 
have no dii'ect intuition of the objects which it is supposed 
to perceive. For a knowledge of external objects, it is
dependent on physical and physiological conditions which will 
transmit a communication from them.
If this argument is valid, the position of the Naive 
Realist is completely destroyed. For the refi^tation of the 
second principle, of Naive Realism entrains the fall of the 
first principl.eo If the external object is not directly 
intuited, then the content presented in experience is not even 
a part of that object. For this content directly intuited; 
and it is contemporary with the experience, not in its past.
But although one must admit a distinction between the
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content of exporioneo of which the subject is immediately 
aware .and any part of an external object which in not directly 
Intuited, yet one might save something from the wreck if one 
could maintain that in spite of the distinction, there Is a 
certain identity "between the immédiate content of experience 
and mi element in some external object* By admitting a 
distinction between the content of experience and its external 
objecte one shifts one’s position from Halve Realism to a 
version of the Theory of Reprcsenta11vo Perception. ■ But one 
will preserve a good deal of what the Halve Realist is most 
concerned to defend If one can màlntain that the qualities 
presented in immediate experience are, in some sense, the name 
as the qualities w^hlch are constituents of external beings, 
although these qualities are directly experienced not as they 
ex6st in the external beings but only as they exist in the mind 
after having been transmitted from the external reality via 
an appropria te route of traviDmicîBion. There are two posBibl© 
w^ ays In which the qualities of external things might be 
transmitted to the mind® One might take nuallties to he 
ent;ltieo which may persist through the lapse of time and amid 
changing circumstances, in mi oh the same way as the traditional 
substances* Then one might claim that these qualities may bo 
transported to the mind, the physical and physiological 
conditions of perception being, an it %mre@ the.vehicles which 
convey tho quality from the external object. Alternatively, 
one may take qualities to be universal bhoracteristiCB wbich
may make their appearanoe on a nWber of different oeoaelone.
The content of experience reproduoee the universal quality of 
an external object, the physical and physiological conditions 
forming a chain, each link of which re-enact@ the universal 
quality of its predeoeeoor. The second alteimatlve eeemo 
to give a much more plausible account, but whichever alternative 
io accepted, the result is about the same. Although it is 
possible that a chain of conditions transmits faithfully the 
qualities of external things, It is also possible that the 
members of this chain transmute and distort the qualities which 
they convey or re-enact.
One consideration which compels one to doubt seriously 
whether what emerges at the terminus of a route of transmission 
is ever the same as what was at its origin, is that the members 
of the chain are so radically different In nature. For 
example, when one perceives tho redness of a tomato, at the 
origin of the chain of transmission there is the coloured 
surface of the physical thing, then the quality is taken up 
by a light ray of a certain frequency, then by the eye and the 
optic nerve and certain areas of the brain and it emerges as 
the redness which ie directly present to consciousness # How
could a quality survive unchanged through such vicissitudes?
How could one entity reproduce exactly the universal character 
enacted by another radically different? To take a fairly 
mild example, how could light rays re-enact the character of 
the surface of a physical object? This argument may not prove
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conetoBlvely that the quality Immediately presented lo in no 
way the same as a quality of an external object, but It Is 
novGrtheleBB extTOmely powerful*
We have taken the line of arguraont wiiloh begins with 
tho revelation that expariene© ie subject to various condition© 
about as far as it will go# It is now time to conBider the 
second main argiiment against Halve Bealiem which attempts to 
show, by a detailed examination of the content of ©xperlenee, 
that this content cannot be a part of an external object.
Ill It is generally admitted that perceptions are
©ometimes mistaken# How the existence of 'perceptual errors 
proves conclusively that in some oaeo© at least the content 
of a perception is no feature of tho external being to which it 
is attributed* Whether or not a true perception is an 
intuition of an objective quality of a physical thing, it is 
certain that a false perception is not. This fact dieposoB 
of an extreme Halve Realism which maintains that all experienoefl 
contents without exception are parts of external beings#
But it ie not difficult for a lees extreme Halve Realist to 
modify this position by dietingulGhlng true from false 
perceptions, maintaining Miat although the content of a true 
perception :le part of an external being, the content of a false 
perception is not, and that this, indeed, is the criterion 
irhich diBtlnguishes perceptions from misperceptions.
An investigation of the content of experience does not
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provide bo easy a refutation of this modified version of Naive 
2 Reallorn. Of course, the argument baaed on the conditioning
of experience has the same force against this as against the 
more extreme 3?orm, and tho diseuBSion to follow will turn up 
considerations which will strengthen this argument# The main 
purpose of what follows, however, will be to conetract independent 
arguments against Naive Realism# If an Independent approach 
confirme tho concluelon of our first argument, it will provide 
very valuable suppox*t# Moreover, an examination of the content 
of experience will do much to refute the simple form of tho 
Theory of Hepreeentative Perception which the first argument 
could not completely dismiss#
It Is certain that In oome cases the content of experience 
is not a property of an external being# We shall attem%)t to 
show by a detailed Investigation that It Is very unlikely that 
the experienced content is ever objectively real. This 
coneluBion Is to be supported by an indirect argument to the 
effect that the contenta of all experiences are fundamentally 
alike, so that one content cannot have an objective ontological 
statue if another content is merely subjective#
Hallucinationa are the most extreme class of perceptual 
mistakes* But the Halve Beallat is not seriously disconcerted 
by their existence* Halluelnations do indeed prove that the 
content of experience is not always objectively real, but this 
ie also shown by oommoner phenomena, each as dreams. And it 
does not follow from thio that the content of perceptions
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is not objectively real; for a hallucination is not a perception# 
Hallucinations occur v/hen, in unusual ciroumstanoes, a subject 
takes to be presented in perception what he has, in fact, 
imagined# Now imagination is sufficiently different from 
perception to make it quite plausible to attribute a different 
ontological status to the contents of these two types of 
experience (using experience In a broad sense)# It ie 
reasonable to maintain that what is imagined is merely a 
subjective creation of the mind, whereas what is perceived is 
an objective feature of reality# It requires a serious 
breakdown of rationality, e.g. in cases of intoxication or 
insanity, before there is any risk of confusing the products 
of imagination and perception.
The existence of illusions creates a more serious
/
difficulty for the Naive Realist# Again he may claim that 
an Illusion Is not a genuine perception and that the subjectivity 
of the contents of 1Hueions is not incompatible with the 
objectivity of the contents of perceptions# But it is much 
less plausible to attribute a different oncological status 
to the contents of veridical and illuGory experiences* For 
illusions are not produced by a confusion between imagination 
and perception, but in some other way. Therefore, there is 
not the same justification as there is in the case of hallucin­
ations for making a radical distinction in ontolog^ical statue 
between the contents of illusions and the contents of veridical 
perceptions# There seems to be an inherent difference
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between what we imagine and what we perceive— a difference 
which is obvious on introsnection— but there is no evidence of 
a similar intrinsic difference between the contents of accurate 
and illusory perceptions.
There seem to be three distinct classes of illusions, 
which may be called respectively psychological, physiological, 
and physical illusion©.
The Halve .Realist can explain away psychological illusions 
more easily than illusions of the other two kinds. In the 
first place, the Halve Realist may claim that some of the 
illusions which are due to x^sychological factors are really 
partial hallucinations. In ordinary life, we call an 
experience a hallucination when the normal contribution of the 
senses is blocked out and a spontaneously generated figment 
of imagination substituted, or at least when the contribution 
of sensation is very slight and the imaginative eui>plementation 
extensive and unreasonable. But an experience is strictly 
a hallucination if any imaginary element is unwittingly 
introduced into the content before the mind# When the 
conditions of observation are not good, there is a tendency 
to see what is not there in order to make the apparent facts 
fit one’s preconceived ideas of what is likely to be there.
When the product of imagination is not extensive and is ssm 
smoothly blended into a non-illusory context, it does not seem 
so plausible to suggest that the imagined content has a different 
ontological status from the other contents presented to
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consclouBneBS, but there is really no difference in principle 
between this case and the hallxicinations of the madman.
Secondly, the Halve Realist may argue that in many other 
cases where perceptual errors are to be attributed to the 
influence of the mind, the errors are not due to the presentation 
of illusory contents, but to mistaken judgments which go beyond 
the observed data. We often jum%) to conclusions on the basis 
of insufficient evidence and introduce a risk of error, even 
when the given contents are above suspicion. We may imagine 
that we have been decéived by an illusion, because we suppose 
that we have actually observed what we have, in fact, inferred 
from a few shreds of evidence.
There are, however, a few exceptional cases whidh cannot 
be dealt with in either old the above ways. ' This is best
brought out by taking a particular example* A frog has such 
good camouflage that in certain Burroxnidings, if it la quite 
> still, one may look straight at it and see only stones and
leaves. Then suddenly, one catehee the outline of the frog 
and the illusion is brokeii. Now there is surely a significant 
difference between this example and a case where one is deceived 
by a mistaken judgment* Descartes, looking from his window, 
sees hats end cloaks passing in the street below, and judges 
that these articles of clothing are covering human beings.
But on reflection, he recognises that the hats and cloakê 
 ^ might perhaps cover "artificial machines,ii whose motions might
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be determined by s p r i n g s " . H o w  the immediate content before 
him is the same whatever judgment he accepts* But in the 
example of the frog, the content presented is quite different 
when one actually sees the, frog from what it is when one sees 
only stones and leaves^ Mow, if the Immediately presented 
content changes v/iMiout a corresi^onding change in the external 
world, then it would seem that both contents cannot be genuine 
characters of objective reality* If one wishes to a maintain 
that the frog-like appearance is a true character of reality, 
then one must admit that the appearance of stones and leaves 
is illusoryo
But the Naive Realist can maintain his position, if in 
this special case, he appeals to a "selective" theory of 
perception* At different times, a subject may have presented 
different contents which are both objectively real, even 
although no change has occurred in the real world; for the 
subject never observes the whole of reality, and at different 
times may be contemplating different parts of the real world. 
This is clear enough when a subject changes the boundaries of 
his visual field. But one may overlook this possibility 
in a case like that of the camouflaged frog,whore the subject 
does not change the field which he is observing* A visual 
perception is not, however, like a photograph: it is not a
neutral and automatic recording of every element in the field 
of view* One emphasises certain elements and neglects others.
Méditations, II,translated by Veitch,
Everyman’s Library, p.98.
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One grasps patterns,and at different times one may grasp 
different patterns which are nevertheless all permanenli 
features of the objective reality. To return to the example, 
at one time, certain lines are emphasised which present a 
pattern of stones and leaves* At another time, without any 
change in the physical reality, one sees the outline of a frog* 
Both patterns aî?e objective features of the external world, 
although only one at a time is selected by the mind. Neither
pattern is illusory, although one happens to be more helpful 
in suggesting the true nature of the external beings* We 
mistake the frog for stones and. leaves because we are misled 
by the outline emphasised in the content of our experience: 
we correct our mistake when a different pattern is emphasised* 
But even if the Halve Realist can explain away psycholog- 
leal illus:?one, he cannot deal so easily with physical and 
physiological illusions. To give an example of an illusion
due to physiological conditionss let us# take the case of an 
after-image. If a man focusses his eyes for some time on à 
bright light, whan he turns away, he sees on the surface in 
front of his eyes a spot which was not there before. There
cannot now be a spot where there was no spot previously, unless 
the surface has changed its character. But no physical 
reason for such a change can be found, nor is the change 
observed by anyone else. Moreover, the spot appears wherever
he turns hie eyes, and if he shuts his eyes it is all the more 
vivid. And those phenomena occur after the man has looked
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at a light and at no other time* The obvious conelusion is 
that the content of his perception Is illusory; that the 
physiological conditions of visual perception are responsible 
for the experience of a spot which ie not objectively real.
The physiological mechanism, overstimulated by the bright light 
to which it has just been exposed, has Introduced a distortion 
into the content of experience*
A straight stick, partially immersed in water, appears
/
to be bent* This is a good example of the distortion of the 
content of an experience by its physical conditions. The 
stick looks different from what it does when the physical medium 
between the stick and the eyes is simply air* But the shape 
of a stick is not altered when it is put in water; one can 
verify by touch that it still feels the same shape. Therefore, 
the apparent shape of the stick must be due to a distortion 
produced by the nature of the physical reality intervening 
between the mind and the external object*
The contents of perceptual experiences, then, are 
sometimes distorted by their physical and physiological conditions 
But this does not entail that the contents of experiences are 
always altered by their conditions* Indeed, it would seem 
that Yire distinguish certain perceptions as illusory only 
because we haye other perceptions which we take to present 
without distortion the real nature of external beings* We 
dismiss the bent appearance of the stick in water as an illusion, 
because we have at other times an undistorted experience of
p. 83.
the real straightness of* the stick* But it is not difficult 
to restate the argument in a way which avoids the implication 
that the contents of at least some perceptions are not altered 
by their conditions:- It is not possible that normal and 
illusory perceptions both present an undietorted picture of 
external reality. In normal circumstances, a certain stick 
appears straight, but when It ie half submerged in water it 
appears bent^ Now the same stick cannot be both bent and
straight unless it has changed, and there is no evidence of 
Buch a Change* Therefore, at least one of these incompatible 
characters cannot be a feature of the stick as it is in itself* 
This argument does not assume that the content of the so-called 
normal experience Is an objective and undistorted feature of 
the external being. The apparent straightness and the 
apparent bentness of the stick may both be affected by the 
physical and physiological conditions of the experiences*
Also, it is possible to justify calling the one perception 
normal and the other illusory without having to claim that 
the content of a normal perception is an unaltered feature of 
objective reality*
But although it ie possible that the contents of both 
normal and illusory perceptions are altered by their physical
y 5
and phwiological conditions, it has certainly nbt been proved 
that this is in fact the case. It vmuld, however, be 
important to prove this, only if one wished to refute the 
Representative Theory that the given contents are true copies
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of the qualities of external beings* What we have established 
is practically fatal to Naive Realism, which maintains a 
physical identity between the presented contents and the 
external qualities* It is difficult to deny that all 
perceived contents have, as we remarked above, the same 
ontological statue— that they have all the same position in 
the universe and the same kind of existence— bo that If some 
i&lusory contents are shown to be merely subjective, no given 
contents can be supposed to be, as such, real qualities of 
external beings* The Naive Realist can escape only by making 
an implausible hoc distinction, which, unlike the distinction 
between contents of imagination and contents of perception, 
possible in the case of hallucinations, is supported by no 
independent evidence.
Moreover, the fact that the content of experience is 
sometimes distorted by its conditions confirms a conclusion 
which was reached above on the basis of the "time-lag" argument, 
that the physical and physiological conditions of experience 
are mediating MHttss conditions. If these indispensable 
conditions mediate the subject’s experience of the external 
world, then the subject had no immediate perception of the 
character of the external reality, and Naive Realism is refuted. 
A condition which distorts the character of an external object 
must be a mediating condition of the experience of that object# 
The condition must, as it were, gain pOBsesslon of a property 
of the external being, if it is to tamper with it* A
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condition which Y/as required only in order to permit the 
occurrence of a flash of intuition directly connecting the 
mind and its external object could not possibly affect the 
content Immediately before the mind. Therefore, the existence 
of illusions proves that at least in some cases the physiological 
and physical conditions of experience are mediating conditions. 
This does not exclude the possibility that there are other 
cases in Y/hioh they are not mediating conditions. But this 
is most unlikely. The physical and physiological conditions 
of experience can be expected to operate in much the same ?my 
in all cases.
We must now consider the evidence that the content 
produced by an external object varies when there is a variation 
in the perspective viewpoint of the experiencing subject.
The same object looks big when it is near, and small when it 
is far away. And the apparent shape of the surgace of an 
object varies with the angle from which it is viewed. The 
loudness of a sound varies with its remoteness, and a distant 
light gets brighter as one approaches it. This evidence is 
by far.the most important proof of the subjective conditioning 
of the content of experience and it is effective against both 
Naive Realism and the Theory of .Representative Perception.
Now, although the experience of an object in the 
external world from a particular point of view is not usually 
considered an Illusion, the perspective of a subject may distort 
the content of his experience as radically as do the physio-
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logical or physical condition© in th© case of an illusion*
To take but one example, the sun, ninety three million miles 
away, and a sixpernce, a yard from one’s nose, appear to have 
the same sise, whereas the actual discrepancy in si«e is 
colossal. Surely?|i this experience involves at least as great
a distortion of reality as does the experience of a stick, 
bent when immersed in water. The distortion caused by the 
perspective of the subject is not called an illusion, only 
because v/e have learned to make allowances, so that it does not 
mislead us. And since most people are not taken in by simple
Illusions, a more important reason for the distinction, perhaps, 
is that the distortion of perspective is a constant factor in 
experience and obeys a regular set of laws, whereas illusions 
are unusual and infrequent and occur only in special circujiistances 
There are two reasons why it is even more difficult for 
the Naive Realist to reconcile with his theory the distortions 
in the given content which are due to the subject’s perspective, 
than the distortions which are produced by physical and 
physiological illusions. In the first place, it is always 
possible to claim, in a case where an illusory content clashes 
Yirith the content normally experienced, that the normal content 
is in a special position and that ifc may be a real quality of 
the external being even if the illusory content is not. There 
is9 as we have seen, no evidence to corroborate this claim, but 
the claim can be made. At least, when one is called upon 
to exclude as unreal one of the tvm conflicting contentf one
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has no difficulty in deciding which to choose# But of the 
infinite number of incompatible perspective views of the same 
object, there is none which is in a specially privileged 
position* There are, indeed, some which seem to give a 
better picture of the external reality than others* The 
circular appearance, presented when the surface of a penny 
is viewed from one angle at a distance of a foot, wo\jild seem 
to be closer to the real nature of the penny than the smaller 
elliptical appearance presented when the penny is viewed from 
another angle at a distance of five feet. But is the content 
of experience ever identical with a real surface of an external 
object? The apparent sise of an object always varies with 
its distance from the eye, so that the apparent sise could 
coincide with the real si^e of the object only at one very 
precitee distance.'^ Do we see the real surface of the penny 
when it is four inches away? Or three inches awayŸ One, 
at most, out of the incompatible perspective views of the same 
surface of the same object can be a true representation of 
reality. We have no reason for preferring any one of a 
large number of different views. Therefore, it is not 
likely that any view reveals the true nature of the external
* Professor H.H. Price would challenge this assumption: he
argues that there is a **Zone of perfect stereoscopy*' within 
which" the re is no increase of sensible' si ko w^ith decrease of 
depth". (Perception, pp. 820-231.) But one can easily show 
that oven a slight variation in the distance of a penny from 
the eye may malte the difference between the partial and total 
e&lipse of another object whose apparent sl^e, we may assume, 
remains constant.
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object. • And even If there were an experience which did not 
distort the character of reality, it would differ so slightly 
from certain other experiences that it would be incredible if 
its content had a radically different ontological status.
The second reason is that, whereas illusions are abnormal 
and occasional occurrences, the content experience^by a subject 
rarely escapee the t influence of his particular perspective 
standpoint. All contents derived from the senses of sight, 
hearing and smell are partially determined by the perspective 
of the subject: only perceptions which depend on the senses
of touch and taste have the posBibility of revealing directly 
objective reality. But these perceptions escape the distortions 
of perspective, only because they are contact senses and there 
is no possibility of varying physical conditions. (In the 
case of eight and hearing, the variations in content due m to 
the perspective of the subject may be classed as distortions 
due to the physical conditions of experience.) And in the 
case of touch and taste, there are variations of content due 
to a variation in physiological conditions, which closely 
parallel the variations due to perspective. One* s sensations 
of touch change with the amount of pressure one exerts.
Immediately after eating certain other foods, a dish may not 
taste the same as it usually does. And one*s sense of 
temperature is affected by the condition of one* s body* If 
one hand is plunged into hot and the other into cold water, and 
then both are put in a bowl of lukewarm water, to the one hand
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the wateï* feels hot, and to the other, the same water feels cold# 
The apparent temperature of the water varies with the condition 
of the hand* Have we, then, any reason to believe that any 
one of the many different states of the somatic organism is a 
normal state, which permits am unaffected awareness of objective 
qualities? It is very difficult to believe that touch and 
taste can achieve what sight and hearing cannot— an undistorted 
intuition of the properties of beings in the external world#
Thus, the Naive Realist cannot deal with the influence 
on the perceived content of the particular perspective of the 
subject, because all contents are liable to vary with a change . 
in the subject* s point of view, and because it is impossible to 
suggest that there is a difference in ontological status between 
the contents perceived from different perspectives. Moreover, 
the difference in the contents observed from different positions 
is a fact which cannot be easily reconciled even with the Theory 
of Representative Perception. This theory is not troubled by 
the existence of illusions. It is quite natural to maintain 
that normal contents truly represent the qualities of external 
beings whereas Illusory contents do not. But it is most 
implausible to claim that one and only one out of the almost 
infinite number of incompatible contents which may be presented 
to obeervers in different positions is a replica of a real 
quality of the external object.
The importance of this argument should not be underrated, 
as it may be if one supposes that it is a sufficient refutation
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of the Theory of Representative Perception to point out that 
one 1 b never in a position to compare the presented, content and 
the quality of the external being, so that there can be no 
empirical evidence of the similarity of the two elements.
For this ar^^ment merély proves that the belief in Representative 
Perception is unfounded and is not based on any direct evidence: 
it does not prove that the theory is definitely false. So 
the two positive arguments against Representative Perception 
which we have examined in th&s chapter are by no means 
superfluous.
XV. In the present chapter, we have been arguing against
the view that the contents given in experience may be, as such, 
real qualities of external beings, and also against the view 
that these contents may be precise representations of external 
qualities. Our arguments are not intended to prove that 
there are no beings in an external world, or that one can have 
no knowledge of the existence or nature of such external beings* 
Indeed, throughout the whole course of the discussion, we have 
been assuming that there are real beings outside and independent 
of conscious experience. And wC have even assumed some 
knov/ledge of the nature of these external beings. For example, 
we have assumed that there are incompatible characters which 
an object cannot reconcile— the same surface of the same penny
The other argument (above, p.23) is that the mediating 
conditions of perception probably always modify the qualities 
they transmit.
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cannot be both round and. elliptical, unless it has changed*
And we accepted the validity of the scientific evidence which 
proves that the real surface of the penny does not change its 
shape when one changes one* s point of view.
But even although our arguments were not designed to 
show that the conscious subject has no awareness of external 
beings and that there are no grounds for believing in the 
existence of such things, perhaps we have unwittingly committed 
ourselves to this conclusion. Our purpose has been to correct 
the mistakes of Naive Realism without giving up the fundamental 
conviction of the Naive Realist that there are external beings. 
But perhaps the consideratione which we have adduced in order . 
to prove that the content of immediate experience is not a 
objectively real will compel us, when their ImplicationB are 
fully developed, to admit that we are out off from any knowledge 
of an objective reality. We must now attempt to show that 
this is not the case— that none of the arguments we have employM 
damages one* s natural belief in the existence of an external 
world.
The most troublesome argument is the argument that one* 8 
experience of an external object is mediated by physical and. 
physiological conditions. If this is b o ,  then there can be 
no direct experience of common sense external objects such as 
trees and tables. Noyit, is there evidence strong enough 
to permit an inference to what is not directly experienced?
If one's direct experience is strictly confined to the contents
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of one* 8 mind, then the answer is surely in the negative*
There is nothing about the content of experience, as such, 
which would lead one to postulate a reality beydnd,from which 
it is derived. But the physiological evidence does not rule 
out completely the direct experience of other beings by the 
mind. It reveals that when one seems to see a chair, the 
chair is not directly experienced* But it does not prove 
that no direct av/qrenees of external beings is possible; for 
there is no reason why the subject should not directly experience 
for example, the beings in the brain which are the last messengeri 
in the route of transmission leading from the chair to conscious- 
ness* And even with bo restricted an experience of the 
external \yorld as this, the case is quite different from what 
it would be if we had no direct experience of external reality 
whatsoever. If we can only escape from the circle of 
consciousness, we have a secure basis, which may justify the 
construction of the whole external world* Within the circle 
of consciousness, one can discover no idea of causality which 
will justify the assumption of a source outside consciousness 
which is responsible for the production of its content. But 
if one has a direct experience of even one external being, 
thi^ experience may yield a notion of causality which will 
allow one to assume an indefinite series of more remote causes*
In our final chapter, when we discuss experience in more 
detail, we shall try to show that it is in fact legitimate 
to infer the existence of common sense material objects in
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the way we have suggested. In the same chapter, we shall 
also argue that there is an essential identity between causal 
connection and the relation of experiencing. If this is so, 
if a being necessarily experiences the things by which it is 
causally affected, v/e may argue that the physiological evidence, 
far from proving that no experience of an external reality is 
possible, actually implies that some external beings are directly 
experienced by the conscious subject, viss, the beings which are 
Immediately responsible for the contents produced in the mind.
There is another argument to the effect that the 
phyBiological evidence cannot be used to question the experience 
of an external world, since this evidence presupposes the 
validity of the observations on v4iich the science of physiology 
depends. But this argument has force only as an argumentum 
ad hominem against all persons ivho are unwilling to doubt the 
objective validity of physiology. It has no weight against 
a sophisticated Solipsist whox is using a reduotio ad xbsmi 
absurdum argument, assuming an experience of external beings 
and the validity of physiology, only in order to exhibit the 
contradictory consequences which he believes to flow from this 
assumption. It is no criticism of an argument to show that 
it assumes what it seta out to disprove.
Thus, a knowledge of the existence of an external world 
is not ruled o*t by the above arguments. We must now 
consider whether these arguments make impossible a knowledge 
of the nature of the external world. It is difficult.
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perhaps impossible, to maintain the existence of something 
I know not What"$
The positions disproved in this chapter are Halve Realj^sm 
and an extreme form of the Theory of Eepreeentative Perception*
We have shown that it is very unlikely that the contents 
presented in immediate experience are ever even replicas of ‘ 
eeal qualities of external beings. But we have not shown 
that no knowledge is possible of the .qualities of the common 
sense mat € rial objects in which v/e are principally interested: 
we have not even shown that there is no degree of similarity 
between the given contents and the qualities of these external 
beings.
Our common sense beliefs about the vmrld are not open 
to the criticisms levelled against the immediate content of 
experience. For we have learned to detect illusions and 
to make allowances for the distortions due to our particular 
perspective standpoint. Certainly, we are still liable to make 
mistakes, but this does hot mean that our ordinary beliefs ' 
are not, in the main, accurate and reliable.
A good way to illustrate this point is to consider the 
spatial characteristics of the things in the woi?]Lc%. Clearly, 
the immediate contents of experience do not truly represent 
the shap^es, siges and positions of external beings. 8ometiraes, 
there are distortions due to abnormal conditions, and there are 
always distortions due to the particular perspective of the 
subject. But our ordinary empirical beliefs overcome the
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distortions of perceptual illusions. We do not have to 
accept that a straight stick becomes bent when it is dipped 
Into water: - we do not have to ‘suppose that behind a m&rror  ^
there are objects which duplicate the objects in front of Its , 
and we can explain the generation of the misleading appearances. 
Moreover, bur empirical knom^ledge escapes the perspectival 
diatortidne which ax*e inevitable in immediate experience#
By comparing perceptions from diffex^ent positions and by ' 
relying bn techniques of measurement, we can abstract from all 
particular <*points of view, and we ban put forward an objective 
description Of the spatial characteristics of external beings 
in terms of a universally valid, geometrical system# Moreover, 
this geometrical system positions within itself all private 
viewpoints, and it reconciles and harmonises what is observed 
from different points of view by explaining the systematic 
principles in virtuij^ e of which what one observes from different 
positions differs in the way it does.
But OUT empirical knowledge necessarily depends on the 
evidence of what is revealed in sense perception; it 1b the 
product of the comparison and co-ordination of our immediate 
perceptions# Even objective measurement techniques ultimately 
depend on a perception of the equivalence of the thing measured 
and the measuring rod^ How, then, can our empirical knowledge 
claim a greater validity than,the immediate perceptions on 
which it is based?
We have shown that the contents given in experience
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are not replicas of the characters of common sense material 
objects and that other factors make a contribution to the nature 
of the sense pro senta t ions * But we have not shown that 
external material objecte make no contribution whatsoever 
to the contente usually attributed to them* There Is no 
reason why one should not accept the natural belief that 
external material ob jects do have some influence on what ..appears 
to oonsciousnesB* How, if a content of immediate experience 
is a synthesis of factors contributed by a certain material 
object and' the various oonditione of the experience, it may be 
possible to isolate the contribution of the material object and 
to remove the distortions introduced by other factors* If 
this can be done, an abstract empirical knowledge may provide 
a more accurate picture of reality than the sense presentations 
on which it depends. We must, however, postpone a detailed 
examination of the nature and extent of our empirical knowledge 
until the final chapter of this work* At present, we are 
simply concerned to maintain that the arguments which are 
effective against Halve Realism and the Theory of Representative 
Perception do not necessarily invalidate our ordinary empirical 
knowledge.
OHAPTTim THREE .
0ARTE8IANI8M, SOLIPSISM, AND PHENOMMALISM#
I. In the last chapter, me to,ok for granted the existence
of the independent, external beings accepted by oonmon sense*
We discovered that the features immediately presented to 
conBciousneBB— patches of colour and the like— could not be 
real properties of the external beings to which they are usually 
attributed. Therefore, we distinguished two very different 
types of awareness which we took to be present in experience—  
an awareness of ivhat we called the content of experience and 
an awareness of real objective beings beyond and independent 
of the experiencing subject. We argued that the Naive Realist 
Is embarrassed by the evidence that the nature and situation 
of the peroiipient subject Influences what is given In experience, 
because he fails to distinguish these two kinds of awareness. 
When they are distinguished, one can reconcile the subjective 
conditioning of the content of experience with the independenote 
of its external object*
In Chapter Two, we did not elaborate the epietemological 
theory which we suggested* An adequate account of experience 
and knowledge must be based on a general metaphysical theory 
which explains the nature and interne 1 a11 onshipg of the beings 
in the world, and we cannot hope to provide a detailed and 
Bystematio eplstemology until the final chapter of this work.
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It was, however, necessary to answer certain objections to our 
fundamental assumption of an awareness of external beings 
beyond the presented sense-contents. We showed that the
arguments which establish the subjectivity of eense-contents 
do not prove that no awareness of the existence or nature of 
an external reality is possible.
This means that it is not necessary to admit that our 
experience is confined to the contents Immediately present 
to consciousness,or to subscribe to some version of Phenomenalism. 
But we have not shown that Phenomenalism is an impossible view.
We have shown that if we assime a direct awareness of external 
beings, we encounter no insuperable difficulties, but we have 
not shown that it is necessary to make such an assumption. 
Philosophers have been prepared to accept Phenomenalism, mainly 
because they have believed that there is no evidence that men 
experience anything beyond the "sense-data" immediately before 
the mind. We shall argue, towards the end of the present 
chapter,'!* that a careful and unprejudicod examination of 
experience strongly suggests that men do experience external 
beings distinct from the sense-data recognised by Phenomenaliste. 
But the subject matter of eplstemology— experience— is very 
obscure, and it is possible that we are mistaken. We cannot 
claim that we have an infallible intuition that men are directly 
aware of things other than sense-data* Therefore, phenomenalism 
although implausible, is a possible view, and it must be
[ * below, Section V.
/
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examined In detail*
One a%)parent advantage of the Phenomenalist doctrine 
that a subject has only one kind of immediate awareness is that 
it is simpler* On© is inclined to argue that the simpler 
of two views, if only it be adequate to explain the facts, 
ought to be preferred, although it is difficult to justify 
on reflection the principle which lays down that the more 
complex view, even if it is not Incoherent, is less acceptable. 
But nevertheless, it does seem a good msthodologieal rule that 
one should not make unnecessary assumptions« If a theory 
could be constructed which assumed only one kind of direct 
awareness and which was adequate to the facts of experience, 
it would be in a very strong position. But adequacy is a 
much more iinportant requirement than simplicity. Phenomenalism 
will not be saved by its simplicity if it is inadequate. And 
if it is to be adequate. Phenomenalism must show how it is 
possible to infer from the data immediately presented in 
experience tcjthe material objects which the plain man believes 
to exist, or at least to something very like them. Our 
natural belief in the existence of external physical beings 
would have to give way, if a philosopher could show that it 
was impossible either to have a direct experience of such 
beings, or else to infer their existence. But, as we have 
seen, a direct experience of other beings is not Impossible* 
Therefor©, an adequate epistemolSfgioal theory must come
to terms with the plain man's belief. It can no longer demand
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unconditional surrender* Our ordinary belief in the existence 
of an external world is so strong that it should not be abandoned 
unie8G this is absolutely necessary* And since it is possible 
to construct a theory which respects our ordinary belief in 
the external v/orld. Phenomenalism must also respect this belief 
if it is to be considered as a possible alternative.
But is it true that the Phenomenal1st hypothesis is, 
in the important sense of making fewer basic assumptions, the 
simpler view? It would seem that the Phenomena1ists make but 
one assumption, and that an assumption Y/hieh can hardly be 
questioned, namely that a subject experiences a certain content 
which is immediately presented to his consciousness * The  ^
alternative view grants the phenomenalist assumption and makes 
in addition an assumption which may be disputed, that a subject 
has a diredt awareness of other beings distinct from the 
presented eense-contents. But strictly, the Phenomenalist 
is also making two assumptions. For he is assuming that the 
subject has m  direct experience of beings distinct from sense- 
data. And this is an assumption which is surely open to 
question.
II, Before we enter on a detailed discussion of
Phenomenalism, we must consider the Gartesian view. BescarteB 
agreed with the Phenomenalists that an experiencing subject- 
has no direct awareness of anything except the ideas or sense«* 
data which are immediatôtyely present to consciousness. But
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unlike the Phenomenallats whd attempt to deal with the plain 
man’s external world, by reducing it to sense-data, by explaining 
it as a lègical construction out of sense-data, Descartes 
believed that it was possible to infer to a real substance 
distinct from senoe-data and to demonstz*ate the existence of 
a material world* If Descartes is right, if it is possible 
to argue from the content presented in experience to an external 
reality of a radically different nature, then the Phenomenal1st 
reduction of external things to sense-data would be illegitimate 
and a detailed examination of Phenomenalism would be merely 
an academic exercise. But as a matter of fact. Phenomenalism 
and other similar views have been put forward by philosophers 
who have become convinced that the . Cartesian "Proof of the 
Existence of Material Things" is invalid* However, this is
in itself a good reason for discussing Descartes before 
tackling Phenomenalism* Descartes may be justly regarded 
as the Founder of Modern Epistemology, and most subsequent 
epietemological theories exhibit the influence of Cartesian 
thought* The ancestry of Phenomenalism may be traced basks 
back to Descartes by way of Hume, Berkeli^y, Locke and Malebranche.
Descartes* most important contribution to epistemology 
ie that he emphasised.the clean-cut distinction between the 
contents or ideas present in conscioijsness and the physical 
objects which exist in an external world* Descartes'
distinction between ideas and external objects was closely 
connected with his rigid mind-matter dualism, but it is
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possible to accept this distinction without admitting that 
conscious subjects are so completely different from the beings 
in the physical world as Descartes would have \m believe,
Mowp this distinction between ideas and external objects 
introduces into philosophy problems which it is not easy 
to solve; and it might be argued that in making this distinction, 
modern epistemology has gone» off on a wrong track. But one 
should not abandon a distinction which, as we argued in the 
previous chapter, makes possible a common sense explanation 
of the facts of experience by which Naive Realism is refuted,
For the mistaken assumption which is responsible for the 
difficulties of modern epistemology is the assumption that 
the experiencing subject has no direct awareness of external 
beings distinct from the sense-preBentations.
Descartes introduced into philosophy a new method— the 
celebrated Method of Doubt, Descartes believed that in 
accordance with this method he could construct a system in 
which was demonstrated, among other things, the existence of 
material objects. We shall show first, that DeBcartee* 
system does not satisfy the rigorous prescriptions of his 
method. This means that either Descartes must relax his rule 
that no principle should be admitted which is not absolutely 
indubitable, or else he must sacrifice the system which he has 
constructed. We shall than try to show that one should 
reject both the Gartesian method apd the Cartesian system.
The philosophical method which Descartes prescribes
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is " to doubt of all those things in which we may discover
even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty"*^^ and "to consider
as false all that is d o u b t f u l . T h a t  is, the philosopher
should admit as true only what is absolutely certain and
indubitable. Descartes believes that if one succeeds in
discovering a principle which is entirely certain, one may hope
to deduce from it a complete system of certain knowledge*
In accordance with this method, Descartes proceeds to
doubt the existence of sensible things. He gives two reasons
"why me may doubt of sensible t h i n g s . H e  argues first
that "we know by experience that the senses sometimes err, and
it would be Imprudent to trust too much to what has even once
deceived us."^ 4» Hia sbcond argument is that in dreams we seem
to perceive many objects which have no real existence and there
are no marks by which we can "with certainty distinguish sleep
from the leaking s t a t e . I t  is important to be clear just
how much th^BC arguments actually prove#, for similar arguments
have had considerable influence in undermining the common sense
belief in the existence of an external world. Descartes'
argument^ proven, at most, that any paz'tioular sense-experience
mesmay be mistaken and is therefore doubtful. Me are sometlMm 
deceived, even when we feel quite sure of the existence of the 
object which we seem to perceive. Therefore, no matter how
^ The Principles of Philosophy. Part One, I. All quotations 
from Descartes follow Veitch'© translation. 
ibid., II. 
ibid., IV.
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sure we feel on any particular occasion that we are seeing 
what is really there, we must admit the possihllity that we 
are mistaken* Also, we sometimes discover that we have been 
dreaming, although at the time me felt sure that we were awake * 
Therefore, me can never be quite certain that we are not really 
dreaming, no matter how strong our belief that we are m/akê*
But even if we may doubt the veracity of any particular 
sense experience, it does not follow that we may doubt the 
existence of the external physical world* It may be that we 
can doubt any sense experience, taken by itself, without being 
able to doubt all sense experiences, taken together. One 
can admit that either of two sense experiences mgcy be mistaken, 
while maintaining that both cannot be mistaken. We may never 
be sure that we are not dreaming and yet know with certainty 
that we do not dream all the time. To argue from the premiss 
that all exrarienoes, taken one by one, may be doubted to the 
concluGion that all experiences, taken together, may be doubted 
is to commit the logical fallacy of composition. Therefore, 
Descartes has not disproved the contention that some sensé 
experiences are valid, even if me do not know which; and if it 
is certain that some sense experiences are valid, it is certain 
that the external world exists*
But in actual fact, Descartes does not reouire the above 
arguments in order to prove that the existence of material 
things may be doubted. Although the occurrence of dreams and 
perceptual mistakes is no good reason to doubt the reality
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of the material world, it 1b logically possible that our common 
sense belief is mistaken, in that on© does not contradict 
oneself if one denies or doubts the existence of the external 
world which we ordinarily accepte*^ In order to justify his 
otherwise unwarranted suspicions, Descartes may make use of 
the extremely powerful "Deceiver" whom he requires in any case 
to put in question the supposed truths of mathematies#
But Descartes maintains that there is one thing which 
it is absolutely impossible to doubt, and that is the existence 
of the doubting subject. For If I doubt, then I think; and 
if X think, then I necoBsai’ily exist. The existence of a 
doubting subject is a necessary presuppos11ion of any act of 
doubting, and it cannot itself be doubted without self- 
eontradiation# One can hardly question this step in Descartes' 
argument. That I exist while I am doubting is a principle 
which satisfies the most stringent requirements of the Cartesian 
method# But how much does this argument establish? It 
surely does not justify the conclus ion that the "I" vtrho doubts 
is anything beyond its present act of doubting.
But although Desoartés spotlights the case where the 
subject attempts to doubt his own existence and finds that 
he cannot without self-contradiction, his essential thesis is 
not, clubitos ergo sum, but cogito, ergo sum# Just as the 
existence of an act of doubting cannot be doubted by a subject 
who is conscious that he doubts, bo the existence of any act
^ Bee note at the end of this chapter#
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of thinking cannot *be doubted by the subject who is conscious 
that he thinkse I doubt@ therefore I am, is simply a specialW.ImI# i*.i1wW{g.y.a>gr<WSI»*wiai I imM# “ .JU Ç/ *1,
case of the more general principle, I think» therefore I am.
And "thought" (eogitatio)@ in Descartes' use of the term, has 
a very wide meaning and refers to any conscious experience 
Y/hatsoever. What Descartes is contending is that it is 
Impossible for a subject to doubt that he is really having 
the experience which he peen^s to be having. Descartes does 
hot himself see any need to defend this contention, but if he 
were pressed, he might answer, as does Professor H.E. Price 
in similar oiroumstances**, that there is no room for a distinctiot 
betY/een what j^ s given in consciousness and what seems to be 
given in consciousness.
In this way, Descartes establishes the existence of more 
than a bare act of doubt, but bo far he has not escaped from 
the "Oollpsism of the present moment". He cannot conclude 
that there is a thlnliing substance which endures through time 
and which has had in the past a variety of experiences. For 
our memory of the past is ’surely no more above suspicion than 
our perception of contemporary material objects.
But whatever the extent of the self or thinlcing eubstance 
which Descartes has established, he still has to prove the 
existence of beings other, than the self* In order to do 
this, he believes that he must prove that there is a God who 
is no Deceiver. Descartes gives in all, three proofs of the
of. Percept ion, p. 10.
I, I uriTi m* iT>r iift iinti-nil.
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existence of God, but none of these proofs is successful.
In the case of the two proofs given in Medfation III &
Descartes appears to be arguing in a circle. In the first
proof, Descartes argues that there must be a God who is respons­
ible for the existence of the Idea of God which he finds in 
his mind. In the second proof, he argues that the cause of 
his own existence must be God« It is not necessary to examine 
these proofs in detail, since both proofs clearly assume, 
among other things, the truth of the p'rinoiple that everything 
has a cause. Now, if me are strictly applying the Method of 
Doubt, we cannot accept the princi.ple that everything has a 
cause, because of "our ignorance on the point as to whether 
our nature... jis] such that we might be deceived, even in those 
things that appear to us the most evident. Descartes
wished to prove the existence of God in order to guarantee the 
truth of such principles. And it is therefore illegitimate 
to assume the truth of such principles in order to prove the 
existence of God.
But the argument given in Meditation V seems to escape 
this charge of circularity. For Deseartes attempts to derive 
the real existence of God from the existence of the Idea of God 
in the human mind, without assuming the truth of the Principle 
of CauBality or anything else* If this argument does prove 
that God exists, then the other two proofs of the existence 
of God might be sound arguments, although they would not be
* PgjnoiBMs^ Qi:. Phi-lQ-SQ^» Part One, XXX.
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independent proofm# And. if BescarteB put forward this 
argument first, as he does in The Principles of Philosophy 
his procedure would not he eircularq
The argument, in question is a version of the celebrated 
ontological argument, and is briefly as follows « The, Idea
of God is the Idea of a Supremely Perfect Beingo Existence
is a perfection and is therefore part of the easential nature 
of a Supremely perfedt Beings Therefore, wo cannot conceive 
God except as existing, and since h we can conceive God, God 
necessarily exists. It is clear, however, that this argument 
does make assumptions« It assumes that existence is the, sort 
of thing which may be part of an essence or concept, at least 
in the case of God„ But this is crirely a very dubious
assumption# How can an idea in the mind ever involve the 
real existence of the object to which it refers? In the
Griticme of Pure R e a s o n K a n t  shows in detail and very 
convincingly that existence can never be included in a concept, 
that to ascribe existence m to an object we must always go 
beyond its concept. Thus, it would seem that Descartes'
ontological proof of God involves an assumption which is not 
merely open to question, but which is almost certainly false*
Descartes, then, has failed to demonstrate the existence 
of God, and this involves the collapse of his whole system.
For Descartes assumes the existence of God in his proof of the 
existence of material things.
* A 592-A602; B 680-630.
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But it 1b perhaps unfair to maintain that BescarteB* 
argument is circular# One of the most difficult problems 
in the interpretation of Descartes* philosophy is to discover 
what are the limits to the power qf the Deceiver— in other words, 
to discover what exactly we may doubt and* what we may not.
It is not clear how Descartes would answer this question, for 
he writes in one place, "We might be derived even in those 
things that appear to us the most evident"*'®, whereas in another 
' place he wz\itee, "What the natural light shows to be true can 
be in no degree d o u b t f u l » H o w ,  if it is the second 
passage which expresses Descartes* considered opinion, and if, 
as Descartes maintains, the principles used in proving the 
existence of God are shown to be true by the natural light, 
then the Cartesian argument is not circular.
We must conclude that Descartes does not really mean that 
we may be deceived "even in those things that appear to us the 
most evident", even in the case of what the natural light 
reveals to be true. For if this was Descartes* real position, 
he would have to abandon all hope of certainty. Even the very 
existence of the doubting subject ?/ould not be certain*
For that "he who thinks must exist while he thinks"*^ f^ is a 
principle whose truth is discerned by the natural light, and 
if the natural light is not above suspicion, then this principle 
will not be indubitable. To doubt in general of what is
Principles of Philosophy, Part One, XXX. 
sc» Meditations III, Ever'jrman’s lltirary, pp« 98-99.
PrlSFIS I ^ o f  Philosophy. Part One, XI.ÏX.
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revealed by the lumen natural© Is to doubt the essential 
truthfulness of human reason» And if one doubts the 
truBtworthin.ess of human reason, there is no way in which this 
doubt can ever be removed# ' Reason can nevez’ be reinstated.
Any arguments which purported to prove the truthfulness of 
reason would have to assume the truthfulness of reason.
But what this amounts to is that what the natural light 
shows to be certainly true in certainly true. The existence 
of the thinkiasâ subject is safeguarded against all possible 
doubt# For the natural light shows that the thinking subject 
certainly exists, since its existence cannot be denied without 
self-contradiction* But the fact that the natural light of 
x'»eaeon must be above criticism does not save Descartes* proofs 
of the existence of God; for the important point at issue is 
what indubitable principles are revealed by the natural light. 
Does it show, for instance, that the principle, "Everything 
has a cause"pie certainly true? Unlike some of the other 
assufnptions which Descartes, makes in the course of his proof, 
this is not an unplausible principle. But it is not indubit­
able; it can be doubted without self-contradiction^ and many 
philosophers have maintained that it is false.
Thusp Descartes has not pr*ovided a certain demonstration 
of the existence of God. Granted that one cannot question 
the truthfulness of the natural light, Descartes has not
I do not wish to tackle here the difficult problem of
whether it is in fact possible to doubt in general the 
trustworthiness of human fëàëdhf I suspect that it is not.
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estab3,ished that the prinolplee renulred In his proof are 
shown by the natural light to be certainly true.
Therefore, there is a fundamental inconsistency in 
Descartes* philosophy in that his system does not measure up 
to the rigorous standards prescribed, by hie method# This 
means that either Descartes* method is wrong, or his system 
is wrong, or both» Let us first examine the Cartesian method*
If the Gartesian method is, defective, its defect cannot 
be that it will lead one into ez'ror. For if one accepts as 
true only what cannot be doubted, one surely cannot go wrong. 
But the method may be inadenuate and impracticable. If 
Descartes had succeeded in establishing his system, he would 
have done much to validate the method which he employed.
Nothing could come closer to fulf&lling the greatest hones of 
a spéculative philosopher than a metaphysical system in which 
every item was rigidly deduced from Indubitable principles.
Also, the universe which Descartes describes is not too unlike 
the universe in which we think we live: it contains thinking
beings£) a God, and a physical world. But as we have seen, 
the Cartesian system does not satisfy the Method of Doubt: 
if one refuses to accept anything which it is possible to 
doubt, one cannot get beyond the existence of the present self 
and the given ideas to an external world# Therefore, 
if a philosopher restricts himself to what can be known with 
certaintÿ, he will haye very little to say- But if there is 
more to be said, the Method of Doubt will not be an adequate
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philosophical method*
The Oartesian method is essentially the mathematical 
method g in abstract ion from the special object of mathematics-*-
quantityo Descartes was very impressed by the snooess of
mathematics, and he hoped that if the mathematical method was 
introduced into philosophy, philosophy would have a similar 
success0 But there is an important difference between 
mathematics and philosophy which makes it unlikely that the • 
method of the one would produce results in the other* In 
mathematics, the axioms of the system and the exact definitions 
of its elements are known in advance. Therefore, a 
deductive method is appropriate* From these axioms and 
definitions one may deduce the whole of mathematics* But 
in philosophy, axioms and exact definitions are not known in 
advance, and we have no guarantee that they will be quickly 
discovered* Indeed, it seems much more likely that these
axioms and definitions will be discovered, if at all, only at
the end of the philosophical investigation*
But the most serious criticism of the Method of Doubt 
is that Descartes* methodological rule does not itself satisfy 
the conditions which it lays down* That a philosopher should 
accept only indubitable propositions Is not itself an Indubltab&e 
proposition, and should thex*efore be rejected by a consistent 
Cartesian* ’ And if, in order to escape the contradiction, 
one asserts that the methodological rule makes an axceptlon 
in its own favour, one will have no justification for maintain-
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Ing that there can he no further exceptions.
Now, if the Cartesian method is given up, we may 
reconsider the Cartesian system. For even although Descartes 
does not practice what he preaches, he may nevertheless have 
constructed a system which provides a plausible explanation 
of the universe. He has not succeeded in demonstrating that 
his system is certainly true, but this is no longer a fatal 
objection against it. Wo must notice, however, that there 
is now no need for the complicated system which Descartes 
develops in order to prove the existence of material things.
For if a philosopher is not debarred from accepting propositions 
which it is logically possible to doubt, there is no necessity 
to reject the contention that we have a direct awareness of 
the external world. This removes Descartes* main justification 
for his initial rejection of such an awareness. Ae we have 
seen*î', the detailed arguments which he employs prove, at most, 
that any particular sense experience is open to question 
and not that there are good grounds for suspecting the unreality 
of the entire external world.
We now wish to show that Descartes* proof of the
material world, far from satisfying the stringent requirements
of a demonstration, in not even a plausible argument.
Descartes* proof is briefly this. I discover in my mind 
certain ideas of extension, motion, and so on of which I cannot
myself be the cause. I have **a very strong inclination
* above, pp. 59-53.
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to believe that those ideas arise from corporeal objects*'*^  
and God could not be ‘^ vindicated from the charge of deceit**^, 
if these ideas were not produced by material things* But 
God is no Deceiver. Therefore, material things exist, although 
for Descartes, the material world is not the rich and variegated 
world of common sense, but bare extended matter in motion.
Although God figures prominently in the Cartesian proof.
He is really Irrelevant to the argument. God is brough'^in 
to guarantee what Descartes believes is taught by nature#
But the real question is, “What does nature teach?“ Descartes
himself makes a distinction between what is taught by nature 
and what ne erne to be taught by nature. We naturally tend 
to believe that the things in the world really have the colours 
which we see. Descartes denies that this is so. Is God, 
then, a Deceiver? Descartes rejects the imputation. We 
merely seem to be taught by nature that external things are 
really coloured, and God has given us a power of reason by 
which we can criticise this unwarranted belief. What must 
be determined is “What does reason declare to be the case?“
God will automatically endorse v/hatever reason decrees; and 
He will show no special partiality towards Descartes.
Descartes must be prepared to defend his position on other 
grounds than that God is no Deceiver. Thus, in order to 
assess Descartes* proof of the existence of the material world, 
it 1b not necessary to assess the plausibility of his arguments
^ Méditations VI, Everyman* s Library, p.154.
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for the existence of God,
It was not long before other philosophers took advantage 
of this weakness in the Cartesian proof. Malebranche 
objected that no tw i the t and ing our strong inclination to believe 
that certain ideas are produced in the mind by external bodies, 
Descartes was mistaken. For the light of reason made evident 
that no interaction between material and mental substances 
was possible, Descartes deceived himself when he relied on his 
“strong inclination to believe“. He was not deceived by god, 
for God had endowed him with a reason which should have shown 
him his mistake. Malebranche did not himself deny the 
existence of matter, and he held that although there is no 
interaction between mind and matter, God directly xiroduces 
certain modifications in mental substances on the occasion 
of modifications in material substances. % He wished to 
contest only Descartes* view that material things are the 
direct causes of the appearance of ideas in the mind. But 
Berkeley could use a similar line of argument against the 
Cartesian view that there la such a thing as matter. . He 
could argue that reason shows that there is no such thing as 
the material substance accepted by Descartes, and that if 
Descartes was deceived into thinking that there was, it was 
certainly not by God. For Descartes wouldjhave avoided a 
deception, if he had accurately discerned what reason reveals.
Therefore, Descartes* proof of the existence of material 
things v/ill derive no support from a proof that there is a God
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who is no Deceiver. It must stand or fall on its own merits*
And when its merits are examined, one discovers that it is 
open to several serious objections.
The most radical criticism would be made by Phenomenalists, 
who would contend that it is illegitimate to argqie from the 
ideae presented in experience to an external reality which is 
responsible for their production* For what is the justificatior 
of the principle of causality which Descartes employs? In 
experience, we do indeed discover something which might be 
called causal connection. But this is nothing more than a 
phenomenal regularity of sequence which makes it possible to 
predict, often with considerable accuracy, what ideas will be 
presented in the future. The existence of this regularity 
of sequence certainly does not permit an inference to a reality 
beyond the presentations. Now, this objection has a good 
deal of force against the Cartesian position# For Descartes 
refuses to admit the direct awareness of external beings in 
which, as we hope to show in our final chapter, we experience 
a causal connection which is more than a mere regularity of 
sequence. The only answer which Descartes can give is to 
say that the truth of the principle of causality is known a 
priori, that it is an “innate idea“; and this answer will 
hardly convince those with Empiricist leanings.
But even if it is granted that our ideas of extension 
must be produced by some external substance, what reason is there 
to believe that this external substance is a matter which is
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characteriBed only by extension and motion? Should we not 
prefer Berkeley*b economical hypothesis that these ideas are 
directly produced by God? And even if the ideas are produced 
by other finite beInge, what guarantee have we for assuming 
that these beings are characterised by extension and motion?
And what justification is there for excluding from material 
things the other properties which we should naturally ascribe 
to them? As Berkeley pointed out, the arguments which might 
be used to impugn the reality of secondary qualities have an 
equal force against the supposed primary qualities*
And in any case, is the material world as described by
i
Descartes a workable hypothesis? For if the essence of matter 
is simply extenaionV what can there be which distinguishes one 
part of matter from the other parts? And if all parts of 
matter are the same, there could be no real shapes and figures, 
for boundaries are significant only if there is a difference 
between what lies on the two sides of the boundary* Motion, 
too, would be meaningless, for no interchange of parts could 
make the slightest difference to the nature of reality. And 
Descartes comuld not make use of the distinction between 
extended matter and empty space whichjis accepted by the 
Atomists, for he believed that the material world is a nlenum.
The conclusions which are to be drawn from this discuss ion 
of Descartes are first, that the assumption of a direct awareness 
of external beings is not necessarily illegitimate, since one 
cannot consistently maintain that a philosopher should make
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no assumption which it is possible to doubt; and second, that 
one can never infer from the ideas immediately present in 
consciousness to a real external world, even if one is not 
required to produce a strict demonstration and a plausible 
argufnent is deemed sufficient.
But although we have shown that a philosopher is not 
entitled to reject the assumption, that the subject has a 
direct awareness of external beings distinct from sense-data, 
on the ground that it is logically possible to doubt this, 
yet we have not established the existence of this immediate 
awareness of external things* And nothing has turned up in 
the course of our examination of the Gartesian theory which 
in any way v/eakens the case for Phenomenalism. For the 
Phenomenalist relies on the argument that there is no evidence 
that the subject has an immediate experience of external 
objects, and not on the argument that the existence of such an 
experience may logically be doubted. Indeed, the case for 
Phenomenalism has been greatly strengthened, since the argument 
that one cannot infer from senee-data to an external reality 
with a very different nature has removed an important competitor.
But before we discubs Phenomenalism proper, there is 
another theory which we must not overlook, namely Solipsism. 
Solipsism is very like Phenomenalism, in that both theories 
agree that there is no direct awareness of a physical reality 
distinct from the sense-contents immediately presented to 
consciousness and that it is impossible to make an inference
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to Buoh a reality from the immediate sense-data: indeed.
Solipsism might almost he considered to he one species of 
Phenomenalism* The essential difference is that Solipsism 
assumes that the sense-data of which a subject ie imrnediat&ly 
aware are elements in his constitution, that the contents 
presented in experience depend on the experiencing subject, 
whereas Phenomenalism makes no such assumption* The Solipsist 
maintains that he alone exists, since everything he experiences 
is part of his nature and he has no warrant for assuming the 
existence of anything beyond what he experiences, whereas a 
Phenomenalist would not hold that the experiencing subject is 
the only real being in the universe*
We nowj|wish to draw attention to the weaknesses of 
Bolipsism which make it a much less satisfactory theory than 
Phenomenalism* There are two main reasons why SolipsiBm is 
inferior to Phenomenalism# First, the Solipsist is compelled 
to contradict flatly the plain man*a belief in an external 
world, whereas the Phenomenalist claims that he can offer a 
reinterpretation of this belief* Secondly, the assumption 
made by the Solipsist and not shared by the Phenomenalist, that 
what is experienced la part of the experiencing subject, is an 
assumption for which there seems to be very little justification.
Although the Solipsist rejects the plain man’s bsiiM 
belief in an external world, he does not, and cannot, reject
the apparent facts of experience. And in his own way, he
can explain everything which ie given to consciousneeg.
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He must, indeed, reinterpret the facts of experience in a
manner alien to commn sense* But this re interpretation can
S
he carried out by a thoroughgoing Solipsâ^t, if the Solipsiét 
principle of interpretation he granted. That is, there is 
no detail in experience which can absolutely hold out against 
being construed in terms of the 861|jpslBt system. One might 
imagine that one could confute a Solipsist by argping thus: 
“You are trying to convince me of the truth of your doctrine. 
You could be serious in such an attempt, only if you believed 
that I was a real independent being, and no mere element in 
your constitution* And this belief is incompatible with 
your real belief in the truth of the doctrine of which you 
are trying to convince me.“ But the Solipsist could legitim­
ately retort: “In trying to convince you that Solipsism is
true, I am merely trying to alter one of my ideas in a way 
which I believe to be desirable* And it does not follow 
from the fact that my ideas are not what I should like them 
to be, that they are not sustained in existence by my being.“ 
Bolipeism cannot be refuted by a straightforward appeal to the 
facts of experience. But this does not prove that Bolipsiam 
fits the facts and is therefore true, for it may be that 
Solipsism systematically distorts all empirical facts to fit 
in with its own assumptions.
A Solipsist, then, can give his own account of the 
apparent facts; but his interpretation of the phenomena 
involves the rejection of the external world which the plain
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man imagines to be incontestably real* Now, it is, of course, 
possible that the plain man is wrong, and if there was no 
alternative to Bolipsism, the plain man* s belief would have to 
give way* But since there is an alternative theory which 
accepts our common sense beliefs more or less at their face 
value, an adequate epistemological theory has to do more than 
accept the contents immediately presented in experience, it must 
also accept the plain man* s belief in the existence of an 
external world. It would, of course, be legitimate to
interpret this belief in an unusual way, if such a reinterpret­
ation could be successfully carried through. But the 
Solipsist must simply reject as a complete illusion the common 
sense belief in an external physical world. For he cannot 
even agree with common sense that there is an external reality, 
since he denies that the contents immediately presented in 
experience are external to the subject to whom they are 
presented. Even if the Solipsist succeeds in explaining, on 
his own premisses, how the “illusion** of an external world is 
generated, this will not save his position, since it cannot be 
admitted that the external world an illusion, so long as an 
alternative is possible^ The Phenomenal1st, who admits that 
sense-data are external, is better placed: he can accept the
plain man’s belief in an external reality, although he has still 
to account for the plain man* s belief that this external reality 
extends beyond the contents presented to consciousness.
* of.above, pp.48-49.
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Therefore^! the fact that Bollpeiete assume that Bense-data 
are internal to the experiencing; subject makes it Impossible 
for them to come to terms with the ooîmon sense belief in an 
external world* But an even more serious weakness of Solipsism 
is that this assumption, that sense-data are internal to the 
mind, is itself very dubious* Phenomenalists are satisfied
with an assumption which can hardly be disputed— that certain 
sense-data are presented in experience— ahd they are in a much 
stronger position because they do not commit themselves to the 
view that sense-data are parte of the constitution of an 
experiencing subject* To say that sense-data are elements 
included In the nature of the conscious subject, that they are 
“in“ the mind, is indeed very plausible in the context of a 
system which admits the reality of exteimal beings dietfeinct 
from sense-data* For, as we noted in the previous chapter, 
what is immediately presented in experience would seem to be 
affected by the nature of the experiencing subject, and cannot 
be part of an independent external world* Therefore, these 
sense-data must be included in the mind, since one can hardly 
postulate a third realm, distinct from both the mind and the 
physical world, where they may be conveniently housed. But 
can one retain the position that the contents given to oonscious- 
ness are subjective, if one gives up the view that there are 
external beings beyond these *senee-contents? If one accepte
as real only the situation in which one is directly confronted
'
by certain aense-contents, it is difficult to find a justification
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for the belief that these BOBBe-contents are parts of one’s 
own being. Sense-eontents are simply given, and there is
no evidence that they are in any way affected by the subject*
And there is no undue incoherence in a system which maintains 
that they are objectively real, and exist apart from the mind*
One might argue, then^that the essential mistake of 
Solipsism is that it is insufficiently critical in its rejection 
of the straightforward Pluralism which accepts both minds and 
external bodies* The Solipsist rejects the real external 
beings accepted by the Pluralist, but retains unaltered the 
Pluralist*3 conception of the experiencing subject. The 
Phenomenalist is more consistent when he rejects both mlnde 
and external beings, as understood by the Pluralist*
Moreover, the Phenomenalist may argue that if the 
external beings accepted by the Pluralist are denied, sense- 
data must take over to some extent the role played by the 
external beings in the Pluralist system* Experience is 
basically an experience of an object distinct from the experienc­
ing itself. The Pluralist may make sense-data subjective, 
because he aaeûmes an external object of experience beyond 
sense-data. But if there is nothing beyond sense-data, then 
the sense-data must themselves have a certain objectivity*
The Solipsist can escape the force of this argument, only by 
dogmatically declaring that it is impossible for a being to 
experience anything outside himself. Such a declaration
is plausible, only because it is extremely difficult to explain
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how one being can experience another* But our. indapacity 
to explain in other terms an ultimate fact like our experience 
of external beings is no good argument against Its reality.
And the Solipsist* s dogmatism begs the question against the 
most natxirxal Interpretation of experience.
IV. The above considerations indicate that Phenomenalism
is a much more formidable position than Solipsism, and it is 
to Phenomenal ism that we must now turn our attention. The 
Phenomenalist does not make the unwarranted assumption that 
sense-data are parts of the experiencing subject, and so avoids 
one of the obstacles in the way of providing an adequate 
reinterpretation of the common sense belief in an external 
world, But we shall argue that although he makes an ingenious 
and valiant attempt to reconcile with his own assumptions the 
plain man’s belief in the physical world, the Phenomenalist 
does not succeed. What he produces as a substitute for the 
common sense “material object“ is not a Batisfacto??y equivalent.
The basic element in terms of which Phenoraenalists 
endeavour to explain experience is the sense-datum, the object ^ 
which is immediately present to consciousness# The first 
difficulty which Phenomenalists encounter is that they find it 
difficult to answer the question, “What is a sense-datum?“
It is certainly not easy to answer the question, “What is the 
ultimate ontological statue of sense-data?“ But Phenomenal- 
ists find it' difficult to answer even the question, “What
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elements in experience are to be identified as sense-data?“
The reason why the Phenomenalist finds this a hard 
question to answer is that in the Phenomenalist system, the 
Bonse-datum must perform two different functions which are not 
altogether compatible* On the one hand, the sense-datimi must 
be the entity which is immediately present to consciousneBS—
" this, it would seem, is infected through and through by
subjective Conditioning* On the other hand, sense-data are
the bricks out of which the Phenomenalist has to construct the
external world* If one makes a radical distinction between
external objects and the contents irmnediatly present to
consciousness, one has no misgivings about accepting all
features of sense-data which are due to subjective conditioning*
But the Phenomenalist, who must build up his external world out
of sense-data, is understandably reluctant to admit as character-
e
istiCB of sense-data all features of what is immediately before 
the mind. • If he admits, for example, that the sense-data 
exhibit the emphases and stresses which are due to the attention 
of the subject, he will find it increasingly difficult to 
build up an external world out of such entitles*
We may illustrate this difficulty if we take up again 
the case of the camouflaged frog which was discussed in 
Chapter 1 1 .*^ If a certain pattern in one’s visual experience 
is empHasised, one sees the frog: if another pattern is
emphasised, one sees only stones and leaves. The Phenomenal1st
* cf. above, pp.28-30*
Po?5*
must face up to the question, “Are these divergent emphases 
part of the sense-daturn on each occasion, or are they not?“
In a sense, this is not a difficult question for the Phenomenal­
ist, since it is very plain what answer he must give to it.
He must admit that the emphases are characteristics of the 
sense-data. Otherwise, he would have to ^ i t  a distinction 
between what a sense-daturn is in itself and how it appears to 
the subject* And he cannot possibly admit such a distinction, 
since a sense-daturn is by definition what appears to the 
conscious subject. Yet, in another sense, the question is 
a difficult one for the Phenomenalist, since the answer which 
he has to give considerably complicates hie theory, and makes 
the construction of the material world out of eense-data a more 
difficult task.
There is another difficult question for the Phenomenalist
besides “What is a sense-datum?“ This ie “What is ja sense-
datum?“ That is, how much of what is presented to the
subject at any moment is to count as a single sense-daturn?
Is the entire visual field one sense-datum? Or is the visual 
field
constituted by a very large number of infinitesimml 
sense-data? Or is what the plain man would consider a 
surface of a single material object such as a book or peil, 
one sense-datum? The Phenomenalist, because he wishes to 
construct material objects out of sense-data, is naturally 
inclined to accept the third suggestion, but it is not clear 
that he is entitled to do so.
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If a Phenomenalist is aware of the above considérâtions, 
he will find It more difficult in practice to explain how we 
construct our common sense material world out of the contents 
given in immediate experience. He will have to explain how 
we come to discount the stresses in the presented content ’^ hich 
are due to the focus of our attention. And he will have to 
explain how we manage to break up the sense-field into portions' 
which approximate to the surfaces of material objects. But 
these are merely practical difficulties which may perhaps be 
overcome. Vdiat we now wish to show is that even if these 
difficulties did not exist, or could be overcome without making 
implausible assumptions, a difficulty in principle would remain 
which would be an insuperable obstacle to the proposed reduction 
of material objects in terms of sense-data.
The obvious difficulty which must botackled by anyone 
who intends to reduce material objects to sense-data is that 
a material thing can exist, even if it is not perceived, whereas 
a sense-datum, it is supposed, cannot. Thus, when I assert 
the existence of a certain material thing, I am not merely 
asserting the existence of a certain sense-datum, or group 
of sense-data. For the material thing may exist even if there 
is no one to observe it", and where there are no observers, there 
are no sense-data. In order to gat round this difficulty, 
Phenomenalist^must introduce the conception of “possible sense- 
datum“, or something of the sort. A material thing, it may 
be urged, is not indeed a group of actual sense-data, but it is
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a group of possible senee-data, which may be actual if the 
appropriate observers happen to exist. But this suggestion 
is far from satisfactory* Fox* what exactly is meant by
“possible sense-d.atum“? There are two ways in which the term
may be understood. By “possible sense-datum“ may be
meant a particular existent very like an actual sense-datum, 
the only difference being that an actual sense-datum is in fact 
sensed by an observer, whereas a possible sense-datum is not.
Or else, by “possible sense-datum“, one may mean simply that if 
an observer fulfils certain specified conditions, it is possible 
for him to observe a sense-datum with a certain character*
That is, the statement, “There is a blue, rectangular, possible 
sense-datum on the other side of thisEs book“ will be equivalent 
to the statement, “If an observer goes round to the other side 
of this book and looks, he will have presented a blue, rectang­
ular sense-datum*“ But no matter which of these two inter­
pretations is accepted, there is a cogent objection which 
cannot be escaped*
If by “possible sense-datum“ is meant a particular 
existent very like an actual sense-datum, what evidence is there 
which would lead, one to accept the existence of such entities? 
Phenomenalist8 are attempting to reinterpret the common sense 
belief in materiâl things, because they believe that there is 
no justification for assuming the existence of beings distinct 
from the content presented in experience* But anyone who 
took possible sense-data to be particular existent© would surely
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"be making just this assumption, and in addition, the very 
implapisible assumption that the beings beyond the given content
a
are exactly like what is given to consciousness*
Phenomenalists, who are particularly anxious to avoid 
accepting the existence of anything which is not warranted by 
the facts, have usually rejected this interpretation of 
“possible sense-datum“* But if what is meant by a “possible 
sens e-da tum“ is no more thaiA a possibility of an observer having 
an actual sense-datum, if certain conditions are fulfilled, 
the objection ie that a group of possible sense-data cannot be 
exactly equivalent to what is usually meant by a material object* 
For a material object _is a particular existent, whereas a 
possibility of obtaining sense-data by following specified 
procedures is not*
This point is perhaps more manageable if it is discussed 
in terms of statements* The Phenomenalist contention Is that 
the categorical statement made by tho plain man when he asserts 
the existence of a material object is reducible to and exactly 
equivalent to a group of hypothetical statements which affirm 
what sR&se-data are obtainable by an observer who fulfils 
certain specified conditions* The question is, “Gan a group 
of hypothetical statements about sense-data replace without 
loss of meaning a categorical statement about a material object?“ 
The answer to this question dapendsx on how one interprets 
these hypothetical statements.
If one believes that the connection asserted in a
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hypothetical statement is a connection which must have some 
ground or reason in the nature of reality, then It is plausible 
to maintain that in the case of a hypothetical statement 
concerning what sense-data are obtainable in certain specified 
conditions, the justifying ground which is assumed is the 
existence of a material object of a certain kind. If this is 
BO, when the Phenomena!! 1st translates the statement, “There is 
an (unperceived) tomato to the left of the table“ as, “If I look 
to the left of this brown, rectangular patch, I shall see a 
red, bulgy patch“, he may be covertly assuming the existence 
of a material object as the ground which justifies his hypothet- - 
ical assertion. The plain man would certainly make this 
assumption, and if asked to justify a hypothetical assertion 
such as the above, he would be sure to answer “bedause there is 
a tomato t h e r e N o v / ,  if the existence of a material object 
is implicitly asserted by the hypothetical statements to which 
the Phenomenalist reduces a categorical material object statement, 
then assuredly, this group of hypothetical statements asserts 
no lees than the categorical statement which it translates.
But this does not mean that the Phenomenalist has succeeded in 
reducing the categorical assertion that the external thing 
exists to a group of hypothetical statements; Mor has he 
defined it in terms of hypothetical statements; for the 
equivalence between the definiendum and the supposed definition 
is due to the fact that v/hat is to be defined reappears 
covertly in the definition.
p. 80.
But a thoroughgoing Phenomenalist could not and
would not accept the thesis that what is apparently a hypothet­
ical statement about sense-data implicitly contains a cate­
gorical statement about material objects To accept this 
would be to abandon his whole position. Nevertheless, one 
may argue that the Phenomenalist view derives a good deal of 
whatever plausibility it has from the fact that one may be 
unconsciously influenced by the concealed presupposition oî^  
the hypothetical statements*
- A Phenomenalist must explicitly deny that the hypothetical 
statements about sense-data with which he equates common sense 
material object statements do assume covertly the existence of 
material objects. And if he is asked to give a reason
for his assertion, “If I look to the left of this brown, rect­
angular patch, I shall see a red, bulgy patoh“, he must not, 
like the plain man, reply that there is a tomato there. He 
must refer instead to cei'tain experiences he has had in the 
past which justify his prediction that if he looks, he will see 
a red, bulgy patch. And if it is objected that what has 
happened in the past is no infallible guarantee of what will 
happén in the future, the Phenomenalist would agree, but would 
maintain that this is the only justification which can be givën*
But if hypothetical statements about sense-data do not 
implicitly assume the existence of material objects, it can 
hax^dly be maintained that they are equivalent to categorical 
material object statements. For common sense statements
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about material objects assert the real existence of particular 
beings, whei^eas hypothetical statements about sense-data do not* 
They simply affirm what will be observed if certain conditions 
are met, or what would be observed if certain conditions were 
met® They do not assert the’actual existence of anything® 
Therefore, the common sense material object sentences and their 
Phenomenal 1 st:% translations are not exactly equivalent* It is, 
of course, possible that the Phenomenal1st translations 
reproduce the-truths contained in the common sense statements, 
and merely purge them of a mythical element. But we agreed 
above^ that if Phenomenalism is to be admitted to the short 
leet of epistemological theories which explain the facts, it 
must be prepared to come to terms with v/hat the plain man 
believeso
There is another argument against the Phenomenalist
reduction of categorical material object statements. This
argument is that no matter how large is the group of hypothetical
statements about sense-data with which the Phenomenalist equates
a specific material object statement, it is always possible that
4|
the material object statement is fï%se, even if all the
hypothetical statements about obtainable smnse-data are proved 
true by actual verifloation® Therefore, the common sense
statement and its Phenomenalist translation are not logically 
equivalent®
It is ironical that the very consideration which led 
pp® 40-49.
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Descartes to put in question the existence of* the material world
should provide a damagin^phjeotion against Phenomenalism®
This is the fact that the existence of a material object can
never be conclusively established beyond all possibility of
doubt. Thus, the fact that we continue to obtain the
appropriate sense-data v/hen we follow the specified procedures
does nôt prove that the material objeoti exists, for we may be
deceived by an extremely persistent illusion or hallucination*
Usually, illusions are dispelled very quickly by subsequent
investigationo The thirsty traveller in the desert sees an
■oasis a short distance away, but when he reaches the spot, the
oasis has disappeared, and he knows that he was deceived by a
mirage* But on another occasion, subsequent observations
might confirm the supposition that the oasis is there, and yet
that supposition might be false. One might seem to touch the
palm trees and taste the water, and yet this might be part of
the hallucination® Similarly, we can never be perfectly sure
of the real existence of the things which we seem to see around
us in normal life. It is perfectly possible that, as in the
schoolboy’s essay, we shall “wak€ up and discover that it was
all a dream“. Certainly, this is a possibility which for
practical purposes we can usually discount; but the fact that
we can conceive of a case where a material thing does not exist,
even when all the relevant observations, no matter how numerous, 
yield
yitesl the appz»opMiate sense-data, proves that we do not mean 
exactly the same thing when we assert the existence of a material
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object as we mean when we assert the truth of a finite number 
of p hypothetical propositions about sense-data.
Moreover, we can also conceive of a ease v/here a material 
object statement is true, even when one or more of the hypo­
thetical assertions to which it is supposed to be equivalent Is 
or are false® For sometimmues, we believe, a material object 
may exist oven if an observer fails to obtain the sense-datum 
which is usually appropriate In the circumstances. An extreme 
case is a blind man, v/ho doe© not have visual sense-data, even
I
although material objects are visible*
It might seem that one could get round this difficulty 
by introducing the notion of a “normal^ observer* Suppose 
one says that the categorical statement that a certain material 
object exists is equivalent to a group of hypothetical statements 
which assert that a normal observer will obtain certain sense- 
data, if he follows certain specified procedures* In this way, 
one might account for the fact that we are sometimes prepared to 
disallow the re%)ort of an observer who fails to obtain the 
appropriate sense-data after following the specified procedures* 
We disregard the reports of those who are not normal observers# 
But this suggestion will pass muster only if one does not 
Inquire too closely into what exactly is meant by a “no m a l “ 
observer* It would seem to mean one of two things® When 
one requires that the observation© be made by a “normal“ 
observer, one might simply be specifying more exactly the 
conditions under which'the observations must take place*
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Suppose the Phenomenalist translates the sentence, “There is 
an (unpercelved) tomato to the left of the table" by a groiipâ 
of hypothetical statements like, “If a normal observer looks 
to the left of t’ is brown, rectangu^llar patch, he will see a 
red, bulgy patch»“ If he is asked to cash this term, “normal", 
he may reframe the hypothetical sentence as follows: “If an 
observer passes all known test© of normality— for example, the 
test for colour blindness— and if he looks to the left of this 
brown, rectangu.la,r patch, he will see a red, bulgy patch® “
But it is impossible to specify the conditions which the 
observer must fulfil with sufficient exactness to make it 
inconceivable that the material object statement is true, 
when the prescribed sense-datum is not obtained* For there 
is always the possibility of a misperception which is due to
ly
an abnormality which has not been explieityl guarded against*
The second possibility is.that a “normal" observer means 
an observer who, when the material object exists, always 
obtains the prescribed sense-datum, if he follows the required 
procedures, so that it will be impossible, by definition, for 
a material object sentence to be true, if the appropriate 
sense-datum is not obtained by a “normal" observer# The snag 
is that this definition of normality involves a reference to 
the existence of a material object; and the conception of 
normal observer was introduced for the express purpose of making 
possible a successful reduction of categorical statements about 
the existence of material objects to hypothetical statements
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about sense-data.
It is worth noting that in The Problem of Knowledge
w , i ,*# i.iT ■■*■ >■ iiifT ii wl.iii .11 11.W i—» miwK i >■<,  irtl wfl
(pp. 118-129), Professor A.J« Ayer maintains that arguments 
along this second line of attack are conclusive against 
Phenomenalism, but that the first argument we gave-*^  ie without 
“any logical force"« He believes that Phenomena11sm should 
not be rejected simply because it replaces categorical 
statements about physical objects by hypothetical statements 
about sense-data: he relies on the argument that it is not
even theoretically possible to produce a group of hypothetical 
statements which will be logically equivalent to a given material 
object. It is never inconceivable that a material object 
sentence ie false, even when the ^ahypdthetical statements with 
which it is equated are all true; and it is never inconce1vable 
that a material object statement is true, even when one or more 
of these hypothetical statements is or are false. The reason 
,why Ayer takes up this position is that he interprets the thesis 
of the Phenomenalist as a “logical" thesis which must be 
subjected to a “logical" examination. According to Ayer, the 
Phenomenalist claim is that a group of hypothetical statements 
about sense-data may be substituted for a %)hysical object 
statement in such a way that this substitute is always true 
when the original statement is true, and is always false when 
the original statement ie false® In order to substantiate 
this claim, the Phenomenalist does not require to show that
above, pp. 78-81.
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oategorloal statements about material objects are not Implicitly 
assumed by the hypothetical statements which he uses in his 
translation* On the other hand, his claim is decisively 
refuted. If it Is Impossible, in principle, to produce a group 
of hypothetical statements such that it is inconceivable that 
the categorical statement and its translation should have 
different truth values.
But we take the Phenomenâllst to sustain, not a logical, 
but a metaphysical thesis. The Phenomenal1st makes the 
metaphysical assumption that only sense-data are immediately 
experienced. The metaphysical version of Phenomena11sm is 
both easier and more difficult to refute than the logical version# 
It is more difficult to refute, because Phenomenalism, Inter­
preted as a metaphysical theory, may be true, even if it cannot 
produce translations which are logically equivalent to cate­
gorical material object sentences. For it is not a conclusive 
refutation of Phenomenalism to prove that its fundamental 
metaphysical assumption cannot be reconciled with the common 
sense belief in material objectso . We maintained, however, 
that Phenomenalism cannot be considered a plausible hypothesis, 
unless it can come to terms with the common sense belief in 
physical objects. If this ie b o , the metaphysical version of 
Phenomenalism is easier to refute than the logical version.
For if the thesis of the Phenomenalist is metaphysical, he must 
do more than provide a translation which has necosearily the 
same truth value as the material object sentence translated:
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he must reduce material object statements to hypothetical 
statements which do not themselves implicitly presuppose 
assertions about material objects* We have shown that this 
cannot be done without leaving out an indispensable part of 
what is meant when the existence of a physical object is 
asserted. The Phenomenal1st muet leave out the belief that 
there ie a particular existent which extends beyond any actual 
sense-data experienced* And if this omission is not thought 
sufficiently serious to warrant the rejection of Phenomenalism, 
the other arguments which we have used will not have any more 
success* The arguments which are effective against the 
’’logical’® Phenomenalist will be effective against the ’’meta­
physical” Phenomenal 1st, only if the cogency of our first 
argument ie admitted» For if a ’’metaphysical” Phenomenal 1st 
is entitled to deny that a material object statement affirms the 
existence of a particular being, he can reply to the arguments 
which Ayer is prepared to endorse*
If it is legitimate for a Phenomenal1st to maintain that 
the plain man is mistaken when he believes that to assert the 
existence of a material object is to affirm the reality of a 
particular existent, then the phenomenalist may also maintain 
that the plain man is mistaken when he imagines that it is 
possible to assert definitely the existence or non-existence of 
a material thing* If the concept of ’’material thing” refers 
to a definite, particular being, then either this thing exists, 
or it does not exist; and it is clearly meaningful to assert
p.
without qualification that a material thing exists, even if one 
could never have evidence which would justify so dogmatic an 
assertion. But if the concept of ’’material thing” does not 
refer to a definite particular being. If when one asserts the 
existence of a material thing, one is not affirming the reality 
of an individual existent, then it is no longer self-evident 
that it is even significant to make the unqualified assertion 
that a certain material thing exists, or does not exist. It 
is therefore possible for a Phenomenal1st to argue that it is ' 
strictly significant to say only that a material thing very 
probably exists, or very probably does not exist* We 
naturally suppose, indeed, that the statement, ”It is probable 
that this tomato exists”, could not be significant unless the, 
statement, ’’This tomato exists” were also significant* We 
imagine that the notion of the definite existence of a being is 
involved In the notion of its probable existence. But a 
throroughgoing Phenomenalist may challenge this® He may make 
use of a Kantian distinction, and maintain that the notion of 
the definite existence of a physical thing is simply a remilatl' 
Ideaip^  which leads us to seek out evidence which will permit uo 
to assert that it is more and more probable that the physical 
thing exists* The notion is not a constitutive idea# which 
declares that a physical thing must either exist or else not 
exist, even although we can never know with certainty which 
alternative is true* Therefore, the series of statements 
asserting the probable existence of a material thing need not
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pfesuppôse the signifleemee of a statement assorting the 
definite existence of the material thing* This statement is 
simply the ideal limit of the series, and is strictly no more 
significant than the assertion that there will be a future event 
at an infinite distance from the present, which is the ideal , 
limit of the series of meaningful assertions which maintain that 
there will be future events at an ever increasing distance from 
the present* The Phenomena 11st argues that ’’material- object” 
language is no more than a shorthand v;ay of dealing with thé 
8 onee-data which are actually presented, and beliefs about what 
sense-data would be presented, if certain conditions were 
satisfied* He would agree that one can assign no definite 
limit to the class of hypothetical statements about obtainable 
sense-data, which might be relevant to a certain material object. 
And he would agree that a statement which, without qualification, 
asserted the existence of a material object, would have to be 
equivalent to a completed class of hypothetical statements, 
which cannot, in principle, be produced. But he ?/ould not 
conclude that his theory is inadequate: he would argue that
the simple statement that a material thing exists is strictly 
meaningless* .
A phenomenalist who adapts this line of defence can 
account for the facts which critics have considered conclusive 
evidence against Phenomenalismo He may reinterpret these facts 
in m  a way which is compatible with his own view. The critic 
argijiee that any finite group of hypothetical statements
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about obtainable sense-'^data might be all true, and yet the 
material object statement to v/hicsh they are relevant might be 
false* The Phénoménal!st would admit this fact, but would 
interpret it as follows: Ho matter how many hypothetical
statements about obtainable sense«^data are actually verified, 
this will do no more than make very probable the existence of 
the mate3?ial thing in question* It is ■ always possible that 
some further hypothetical statement will be confuted by exper­
ience in such a way that it becomes probable that the material t 
thing does not exist* The critic also argues that a material 
object statement might be supposed true, even although one of 
the hypothetical statements with which it is equated is shown 
to be false* But this fact will not disturb the hardened 
Phenomenalist. he does not believe that it is any more
significant to assert definitely that a material object state­
ment is false than to assert définitely that a material objects 
statement is tame* He is perfectly pa?epaiî0 d to admit that
the falsification of a relevant hypothetical statements does 
not prove definitely the non-existence of the material object 
in question: at most, it makes the existence of the material
thing highly improbable* And he can admit that it is always 
possible that some further observation may lead us to discount 
the falsification of a hypothetical statement, because some 
abnormality in the observer is suspected* . ’
The Phenomenalist is taking up a very extreme ijosition 
when he maintains that material object statements are not
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definitely true or false, but only probable or improbable *
But he can do something to conciliate the plain man* He 
can admit that the plain man’s affirmation that such and euoh 
a material thing exists, or does not exist, is perfectly 
legitimate for practical and everyday purposes, just as one can 
admit that for practical purposes we are often entitled to say 
that we are certain that such and such a material thing exists. 
But he would argue that just as we must confess that the exist­
ence of a specific material thing never absolutely certain, 
so we must admit that an unqualified assortion that a material 
thing exists ie not strictly meaningful.
Thus, the only effective argument against the metaphysical 
version of Phenomenalism is the simple argument that the 
Phenomenalist is forced to contradict the plain man’s belief 
that when he makes a material object statement, he is asserting 
the existence of a particular being. And the greatest 
ingenuity of the Phenomenallot cannot make plauelble such a 
disdain of common sense, if, as we maintain, there is another 
possible epistemological theory which has a greater respect 
for the plain man’s beliefs.
If the common sense belief in material objects cannot bo 
reduced to beliefs about sense-data, actual and possible, there 
must be in experience another element in addition to the 
presented sense-data. Professor H«H. Price, who is in general 
sympathetic to the Phenomenal!st approach, recognises its 
limitations in this respect and introduces, in order to make
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good its deficiencieBp the notion of "material thinghood”, 
which "is an a jwiori notion, which cannot he reached by 
inspection of eense-data anfi abstraction of their common 
chax^acteristieso How certainly, some such notion, \?hieh is
a priori, in the sense that it is not derived from the sense-
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data presented in experience, is required, unless one Is 
prepared to make a complete break with the common sense view®
But it is necessary to determine what is the origin of this 
notion, and what is its justification^ Price suggests that 
the notion of material thinghood is an "innate idea” in terms of 
which human beings are constrained to interpret their experience. 
But it seems much moi^ e plausible to say that the notion of 
material thinghood is derived from experience, although from an 
experience distinct from and in addition to the experience of 
the sens0--data immediately presented to consciousness. The 
suggestion that the conception of material thinghood is an 
innate idea can be seriously considered, only if no direct 
experience of external physical beings is thought possible®
We have argued that an immediate experience of external beings 
is perfectly possible, and we shall defend our view in more 
detail in a later chapter. Price’s assumption that the notion 
of material thinghood is an innate idea would seem to be an ad 
hoc hypothesis, advanced for the express purpose of reconciling 
his assumption^that sense-data alone are inmediat^ly experienced^ 
with the plain man’s belief in material things* This
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hypothesis does nothing to explain the o3?lgin of the notion of 
material thinghood, and it certainly does nothing to justify 
its objective validity.
V* There is another powerful argument against Phenomenalism
which we have been keeping in reserve® This argument has an 
equal force against Phenomenalism, BolipsiBm, Oartesianism, and 
any theory which maintains that experience is basically the 
inspection of the sense-contents present in consc1ousness.
So far, we have argued that the Phenomenalist assumption that a 
subject can experience only sense-data is not necessarily true, 
that on experience of a reality distinct from sense-data is not 
impossible* And since this is so±, the Phenomenallst is not 
in a position to contradict the common sense belief in material 
objects: he must come to terms with common senses and this,
we have seen, he cannot do. We now wish to make a direct 
attack on the fundamental tenet of Phenomenalism, that experience 
is essentially an immediate awareness of sense-data* We wish 
to show that this assumption, far from being necessarily true, 
is not even plausible®
Although we cannot claim that the existence of an m. 
experience of external objects distinct from sense-data may 
be discovered by simple introspection, there is good evidence 
which suggests that the structure of experience is very different 
from what the Phenomenal1st believes* Experience is not the 
mere contemplation, entertainment, enjoyment, or inspection
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of certain eense-data or senoe-dontents; experience is ® 
essentially judgment* Experiencing is not simply a matter of 
having sense-data; when we experience, we are making a claim, 
affirmation, or assertion about an external reality distinct 
from the content presented to consciousness. It is true, 
indeed, that an experiencing subject is not always making 
explicit judgments about an external reality* It is only in 
special circumstances that he takes the trouble to put into 
words what he believes about the external world* But 
nevertheless, one can maintain that experience is implicit 
judgment* An overt judgment simply makes t explicit what is 
usually implicit in experience; it is not a mental activity 
radically different in nature from the normal processes of 
experiencing* Even when we do not formulate a judgment, we
are not content to accept passively what is presented to 
consciousness. We ascribe what is before us to a real
external world, and we claim that this ascription is true.
When we "see” a material object, e*g* a book, we are implicitly 
claiming that what we see is real* And we are willing to
grant, in the case of an illusion, that we have made a mistake, 
even if we have not committed ourselves to an explicit assertion, 
Now, if experience is essentially judgment, if in 
experience the subject ascribes the given contents to an 
external reality, there must be a primitive awareness of this 
external reality in addition to the awareness of the sense- 
contents. One could not refer sense-data to an external
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reality unless one believed in its existence, and the only 
basis for such a belief would seem to be an actual experience 
of the external reality in question. The reason why this 
primitive awareness presupposed by common sense judgments about 
the world cannot be detected by simple introspection is that, 
at the level of consciousness, it never occurs in isolation from 
the rest of experience. Oonsoiovxs experience normally consists 
of judgments, which presuppose an awareness of their subjects, 
the things in the external world, and an awareness of their 
predicates, the given sense-contents* The awareness of
sense-oontents may be isolated on introspection, but the 
awareness of external beings cannot— at least not in the same 
way® The evidence for its existence is that it is an 
essential presupposition of empirical judgments.
Because the awareness of sense-data can be isolated in 
experience, it might be supposed that this awareness is the 
fundamental and essential element in conscious experience, and 
that the activity of judgment is accidental and secondary* 
Experience, it might be said, is essentially the inspection of 
sense-contents, although the experiencing subject is compelled 
by the exigencies of practical life to make judgments and 
assertions which go beyond the immediate data which are 
presented. Experience is a two stage process: first, the
subject passibely entertains the sense-datitm and then refers it 
to an external reality.
But this suggestion is not supported by the evidence.
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The fact that one can Isolate the awareness of sense-clata doeo
not prove that this awareness is the first stage in the process
of experiencing— a stage at which one’s experience might
conveniently stop, were it not for the practical necessity of
discovering what is likely to happen in the future. It is
quite false that the mere entertainment of sense-data is the
most primitive experiences to entertain sense-data without
ascribing them to reality is to accomplish a feat of which only
le
a highly developed subject is capaba. For this feat requires 
the deliberate suspension of judgment; and perhaps, only a 
philosopher is enough of a sceptic completely to suspend 
judgment about the external world. And the experience of a 
philosopher who makes such an experiment is never a mere 
entertainment of sense-data; for, in the background, there is 
alvmys an awareness that judgment has been suspended. Thus, 
our ordinary concrete experience is always judgment, and the 
sense-contents come to be, only as elements in judgment. The 
mere awareness of sense-data is isolated by an abstraction from 
the concrete experience which is revealed by introspection.
But although the Phenomenalist must admit that in 
ordinary experience, we make judgments about the external 
reality, and do not confine ourselves to the mere entertainment 
of sense-data, this is not a conclusive refutation of his 
position. For he can always argue that experience really is 
a two stage process, even if the two stages are usually run 
together in such a way that they cannot be distinguished by
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Introppeotion. , But the theory that the experiencing subject 
is first presented with sense-data and then makes judgments 
which go "beyond the presentations is a mere hypothesis• It 
is certainly not necessitated by the t evidence of introspection: 
indeed, that evidence, for what it is worth, supports the 
opposite view.
To sum up this discussion of Solipsism and Phenomenalism, 
we shall state briefly what we believe to have been established. 
The basic assumption of these theories, that what is fundamental 
in experience is the awareness of sense-data, may be true, but 
its truth has not bean demonstrated and the evidence of intro­
spection suggests that it is false. And even if judgments 
about an external reality were secondary and inessential, they 
could be incorporated in the Phenomenalist system, only if a 
vital part of the common sense belief was left out. Again, 
it 1 b possible that the plain man is mistaken when he accepts 
the existence of external and independent objects beyond the 
given sense-data. Nevertheless, Solipsism and Phenomenalism 
are improbable and farfetched hypotheses, since they deny that 
experience really ie as it seems to be, and since th.5^  deny a 
common sense belief which one is extremely reluctant to abandon* 
The main reason why Bolipsism and Phenomenal 1 sm have been taken 
seriously is that it has been thought that no alternative is 
possible. But we have seen that there is no reason to reject 
the supposition that the subject has a direct awareness of 
external beings. We hope to strengthen our position in the
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final chapter, where we explain in terms of oixr general 
metaphysical theory how it is possible for one being to 
experience another.
In conoluslon, I wish to deal with a consideration which 
gives à specious plausibility to Solipsism and Phenomenalism. 
Although the chief defect of these theories is that they deny 
one of the assumptions of Naive Realism, that the subject 
experiences commn sense material objects, they derive a certain 
plausibility from the fact that they accept another Naive 
Realist assumption, that experience ie essentially the inspection 
of an object. They get round the obvious objections to that 
theory by claiming that the object inspected is a sense-datxam, 
and not, ae the Naive Realist believes, a concrete, physical 
being in an external world. But v^ e have been arguing that 
the Naive Realist is right when he maintains that experience is 
concerned with external physical thihgs, and wrong when he 
maintains that experience is the straightforward inspection of 
an object. We do not simply inspect the things in the world; 
we make judgments about them, and refer characteristics to them. 
Thus, Phenomenalism is really further from the truth than Naive 
Realism, since it endorsee the errors and rejects the truths 
contained in that view.
The Phenomenalist doctrine that experience is the 
inspection of an object has generated a confusion which, if it 
is not detected, may make Phenomenalism seem more plausible 
than it really is* This is the confusion between appearing
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to see an object and seeing an appearance, i.e. a eenee-datiim.
If this identification is permitted, then the epietemologist 
must admit that the experience which he has to describe is an 
experience of appearances or sense-data. For when one 
reflectively examines one’s experience, one can hardly report 
that one is seeing particular material objects such as tables 
end chairs. To say that one is seeing a table is to endorse 
the claim which is made in practical life, that there is a table 
before one. But since there is a possibility of error and 
illusion, a philosopher cannot commit himself to the assertion 
that the k table exists. What he must report is that he 
appears to see a table. Now, if "appearing to see a table” 
is equivalent to "being aware of a table-like appearance”, 
then the Phenomenalist description of experience will have been 
conceded. Experience will be an immediate awareness of certain 
a%)pearanoes or sense-data. But "appearing to see an external 
object" is surely not at all the same thing as "seeing an 
(internal) appearance or sense-datum". For, a subject who 
"appears to see an external object" making a clâim about an 
external reality, even if the validity of this claim is not 
granted by the subject qua philosopher. But if experience is 
siftiply an awareness of appearances or sense-data, that is all 
there is to it, and one has no justification for believing in 
the existence of external things. In short, by identifying 
"appearing to see a thing" and "seeing an appearance", the 
Phenomenalist has reduced a judgment about an external reality
A
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(although this judgment may be false; that Is the force of 
the "appear") to a mere immediate awareness of sense-data#
But if the* objections to Phenomenalism given above are valid, 
such an identification is clearly illegitimate*
Note* We must reconsider the question, "Is it even logically
possible to doubt the existence of an external reality beyond
the experiencing subject?" If our thesis, that experience ie
essentially judgment,, is correct, if in all experience the
subject ie referring to an external reality the content 
e
imedlat^y before him, if the existence of an. external reality 
is a presupposition of all experience, how can it be doubted 
that such an external reality exists? We argued above that
\
Descartes could show only that any sense experience might be 
mistaken, and not that all Bense#experienceB might be mistaken. 
But even if all sense experiences were mistaken, it would not 
follow that the existence of the external world could be doubted, 
for the existence of an external reality is a |)resupposition of 
all experience, even if we are always mistaken in the characters 
which we ascribe to it* These considerations certainly make 
it very difficult to doubt that there is an external reality, 
but do they make it logically Impossible? For is it not 
logically possible that this presupposition of all experience 
is false? We may assume In all experience the existence of 
an external reality, and yet this assumption may be mistaken. 
Therefore, if one is to argue that the existence of an external
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reality cannot logically bo doubted, it is not enough to point 
out that an external reality is assumed by all experience.. One 
would have to maintain that all judgments necessarlly involve
" I
not only a judging subject, but also an external reality about 
which the judgment is made. If this were so, the existence 
of this external reality could not be doubted, for a judgment 
which denied its existence would be self-contradictory, since 
it would deny the very thing which, qua judgment, it must 
assume. But although judgments are about reality and claim 
to b© true of reality, they are not necessarily about an 
external reality beyond the judging subject. It is surely 
legitimate to make a judgment which exoludeB from reality 
everything except the subject and his act of judgment. We 
must therefore admit that it logically possible to doubt 
that there is an external reality#
OHAPTBH FOUR.
BRADLEY*
I, The main object of the previous chapter» was to show
that reality extends beyond the contents given to the conscious­
ness of the experiencing subject. The arguments presented 
were directed against the Solipsist, who is uncompromlsing in 
his rejection of the plain man’s belief in an external reality, 
and against the Phenomenalist, who does try to come to terms 
with common sense, but vibose analysis of the plain man’s belief 
must leave out what is most essential. These arguments were 
not, indeed, completely conclusive, but theywere powerful 
enough to secure the central assumption of this thesis against 
attacks from the side of Solipsism or Phenomenalism®
But to exhibit the implausibility of denying the existence 
of a reality beyondl the contents of one’a conseiouBneBS is not 
sufficient to establish against all possible attacks the 
assumption that the conscious subject is a real substantial 
being who experiences other real substantial beings* For 
although we have defended the existence of external things which 
do not depend on the consciousness of a subject who may experience 
them, we have not shown that these things are independent 
substances, and we have not even shown that the conscious 
subject is an independent substance. It may be that reality 
is a single whole of which the finite self is a mere fragment.
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insubstantial by itself and relative to the complete reality 
in which it is included* What has been established is the 
existence of a multiplicity of elements— 'conscious subjects and 
"physical things" beyond the contents of consciousness® But 
what has been said so far has done nothing to decide the problem 
of the One and the Many raised in the first chapter. It is 
possible that it is these many,elements which are the substantial 
beings and the final realities and that the whole which they 
comporte depends on its constituents: but on the other,hand,
it is also possible that it is the whole which is the substantial 
reality and that the many elements are no more than dependent 
parts or aspects of this whole. This second alternative is 
accepted by F.ÏL Bradley, and his view must be examined 
carefully and in detail*
e
Bradljy does not make the mistake, of the Solipsists he 
does not believe that the mind is a mere container into which 
all the varied content of experience must be packeds for he 
argues that thought is essentially an activity of judgment 
whereby the ideal content is necessarily referred to a reality 
beyond the judging mind* Nevertheless, Bradley’s contention 
that in the last analysis, the finite self is unreal and 
insubstantial would seem to conflict with common sense no less 
seriously than the Bollpsist doctrine that there is nothing, 
apart from one’s own consciousness, and the common sense 
philosopher may be tempted to dismiss Bradley’s system as 
ingenious sophistry which no one can accept, however difficult
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it may be to refute it by logical argument. Now, we certainly 
could not agree that Bradley may be decisively refuted merely 
by an appeal to the verdict of common sense; for this would be, 
in effect, to condonm Bradley unheard by a snap judgment based 
on a superficial survey of the situation. But on the other 
hand, one can hardly maintain that one’s instinctive opposition 
to a theory which denies the substantial reality of the self 1© 
entirely without significance. In order to determine the 
mean between these extremes, it will be necessary to consider 
briefly the nature of common sense and the extent of its 
authority in the present context.
Oommon sensory is, as it were, the first precipitate of
experience; it is the original crystallisation of experience
in thought and language* Since the task of philosophy is
the eludidation of experience, the spontaneous description of
experience i^rovlded by common sense can hardly be disregarded.
But the common sense description of experience is by no means
above criticism— reflection may lead us to modify or revise
this unrefleetive account. The deliverances of common sense
have more weight in some cases than in others. The Solipsist
1b in a weak position because his doctrine flatly contradicts
the very fundamental common sense belief in an external world*
But the beliefs of the plain man do not have the same force
against Bradley’b view. The plain man may affirm that he
exists and that he is a real bèing, in the sense that he is no 
mere figment of imagination. But Bradley does not wish to
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challenge this; what hé denies is that the finite self is an 
ultimate reality and an independent substance» And the plain 
man cannot question this, for he does not grasp what is at 
stake— he has not attained a level of philosophical development 
which would make it possible for him to hold a theory which 
contradicted that of Bradley. The pipin man is in no position 
to say definitely whether the self is an independent substantial 
reality, or an appearance of the one a11-oompreheneive reality. 
But although the philosopher’s description of experience must 
go beyond common sense, some philosophical interpretations may 
involve a much more extensive modification of common sense than 
others. And if one interpretation demande a radical change 
in our common sense beliefs, whereas its comx^etitor seems to be 
a simple development of common sense, then it is plausible to 
argue that the second interpretation is to be preferred® Now, 
at the level of oommon sense, the self is a final reality,
BO that a philosophical view which permits the self to retain 
this status will ha%e the advantage over a view which introduces 
the conception of, a reality which transcends the common sense 
ultimate* This means that Bradley must bear the main onus 
of proof# He must show that no system of metaphysical 
pluralism in which finite selves are regarded as substantial 
beings is possible* And if one can construct a system which 
is not demolished by the arguments which Bradley directs against 
metaphysical pluralism, this will almost amount to a disproof 
of Bradley’s position# And this is, indeed, the argui'aent
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on which we shall have to rely®
The disouBBion of Bradley’b philosophy has more than a 
merely negative importance in the scheme of this work® It 
is Intended to do more than to remove the opposition of a 
formidable rival# It will introduce two of the. most important 
problems confronting the metaphysical pluralist— the problem 
of reconciling the relatedness of finite substances with their 
substantial independence, and the problem of the relation 
between thought and reality* It will have the effect of 
leading the discussion,to a new and deeper level*
II® It will be necessary to consider Bradley’s view at
some length in order to become clear about what is involved In 
his difficult and subtle theory. Bradley maintains that his 
fundamental assumption is that "truth has to satisfy the 
intellect, and that what does not do this is neither true nor 
real. This is an assumption with which it is difficult 
to find fault: indeed, one might claim that "intellectually
satisfactory" is a proper definition of "true". But if 
Bradley’s assumption merely states a definition, it would not 
seem that one could derive from this assumption consequences 
of any importance * Thus, one may suggest that the real 
assumption which Bradley makes is his conception of what will 
satisfy the intellect and what will not. For Bradley
 ^ F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 4th impression 
(London^l906) pp. 569-570.
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interprets what is neeeseary for the satisfaction of the
Intellect in so stringent a way that no thought or system of
thought can measure up to what the intellect requires and 
e
d^andso According to Bradley, the intellect has a criterion 
which compels it to reject as uneatisfactory v/hatever is not 
perfectly self-consietent®
Vî/e may distinguish two parts in this requirement of 
self-consistency* To satisfy the intellect, a thought or 
judgment must not he self-contradictory and it must he self- 
contained, absolute and unconditioned. A judgment will not 
be true unless it satisfies both these criteria# A judgment 
will not be intellectually eatisfactox»y, if it contradicts 
itself, or if it is subject to and relative to an external and 
unknown condition. It is crucial to our argument to take 
the principle that satisfactory judgments must be unconditioned 
as a distinct assumption in Bradley’s system. If Bradley’s 
only assumption were the Law of Contradiction, his position 
would be impregnable.
In this section, we shall first show how Bradley proves 
that judgments which claim an unconditioned truth inevitably 
contradict themselves. Bradley’s argument does not prove
that all judgments necessarily involve a contradiction, but 
only that no judgment can be both unconditionod and non­
contradictory; a judgment may escape self-contradiction, 
if it is conceded that the transition in the judgment depends 
on an external ground. Then, we shall discuss the consider-
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at ions \?hlch support Bradley’s view that a judgment which le 
subject to an external condition is not intellectually satis­
factory®
The most concise and the most effective presentation 
of Bradley’s argument, that a judgment which is taken as 
uncondi11oned must contradict Itself, is to be found in 
Appearance and Reality , (2nd edition) Note A# Bradley 
begins this note by giving his explanation of the nature of 
contradiction# He holds that the essence of contradiction 
is the unification of differences in thought without a ground 
of union and distinction# Without a ground of connection and 
distinction, thought is forced to unite in a bare point.the 
differences with which it attempts to deal; and this is tanta­
mount to the identification of what is different, which is 
obvious contradiction#
Thus, there are no elements which are guaranteed by , 
their very nature against conflict with other elements# All 
diversities whatsoever become contraries if thought combines
t K
them wiWout a ground of union and distinction# We do not 
usually treat as potential contraries red and square, for example; 
for when we attribute these characters to the same object, we 
assume in the object a ground capable of reconciling their 
differences* But certainly, red and square become mutually 
contradictory ;if they are simply identified#
On the other hand, there are no diversities which are
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"Intrinsical oppOBites”# W e  may think that "round square”
is a contradiction in terms# But this is because we are
implicitly excluding from reality any possible ground of union
and distinction. When we call "round square" a contradiction,
we are assuming that it is the same surface of the same object
which is being taken to be at once square and round. But
square and round are not essential contraries# They do not
conflict if there IB a ground of union and distinction in the
reality to which they are attributed. The peaceful co^
existence in the same universe of square things and round
things is perfectly possible®
Now, it is of the essence of thought to unite differences;
for thought without differences is bare tautology, and as
Bradley says, "A bare tautology is not even as much as a
poor truth or a thin truth. It is not a truth in any way,
in any sense, or at all. Thought must unite dlffe.reneeB—
the question is, "How can thought obtain the ground of union
and distinction which is necessary if its unification of
differences is not to be a self-contradictory identification
of opposites?" Bradley answers that there is no way in which
thought can obtain the ground of connection and distinction
cwhich it requires. Therefore, thought is üompelled,- against 
reason, to identify the differences which it finds, and this is 
self-contradiction. Let us examine the argument in more
*  AE$ea£anoe_ajia_Reain2» p .8 66 .
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If thought is to have an unconditioned truth, it must 
somehow contain within itself a ground of u%%lty and diversity 
which will permit a consistent movement from one element to 
another. There are two possibilitiess thought may be able 
to produce this ground from its own internal resources; or else, 
thought may be able to receive into itself a ready-made ground 
given from outside* Bradley dismisses both these suggestions*
The first suggestion Y/ould be defended by a He^^elien 
who maintains that the diversities given in thought are 
"complementary aspects of a process of connection and distinction, 
the process not being external to the elements, or again a 
foreign compulsion of the intellect but itself the IntKkteestfci
intellect’s own pr opr lus raotus*"'>, Bradley admits that such 
a "self-evident analysis and synthesis of the Intellect itself 
by itself"*’*' would satisfy in full the demands of the Law of 
Oontradietion* The Hegelian dialectic in wiiich each element 
is of itself a transition to another element is a system of 
thought in which the intellect would obtain complete satis­
faction* For thought has here a mode of union which is not 
the sheer identification of differences* But there is
a strain of l^mpiricism in Bradley’s thought which makes it 
impossible for him to accept the solution offered by this
thoroughgoing Idealism and Rationalism * He states tkKzha
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that he is **unahle to verify a solution of this kincP**'^  ^ The
thought ?/hioh we actually enjoy is always *Hhe putting together
of diffei*oncoB external to one another and to that which couples
themo*’*^ The thought of which we have any experience is always
a mere synthesis of differences without an internal ground of
union and distinction^ and we have no warrant for assuming the
existence of a kind of thought so very different from the
thought which we actually possess«
But the second suggestion seems much more promising*
Thought certainly cannot conjure up from inside itself the
ground which justifies its transitions; but this ground of
connection and distinction is to be found in the external
reality with which thought is concerned* To take a simple
example# suppose that I judge that a certain circular patch
is coloured red. When I assert that the circular patch is
red, I am surely not identifying these two distinct elements*
This would indeed be a contradiction* Rather, I am predicating
redness of the circular pfetch* The **is*^  which is used in the
judgment is the **is** of predication and not the **ie’* of identity*
In predication, one connects two distinct elements, and the
grouAd which justifies the connection while maintaining the
distinction is the external reality to which the judgment is
applied* It is the nature of the external reality which 
justifies the transition in the judgment from the conception
of the circular patch to the conception of red*
* Appearance and Reality , p.569*
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But what is at stake (Bradley would urge) ie whether or 
not thought can accept this justifying ground which is offered 
from outside* Does one provide a sufficient justification 
for thought’s transition from A to B when one asserts the de 
facto conjunction of A and B in an external reality? If 
the de facto jaf conjunction of A and B is to supply the ground 
and reason which mediates the transition from A to B» it must 
he brought within't thought. But when the conjunction is 
brought within thought# it fails to provide the necessary 
ground of union and distinction# for it has become a discrete 
third element with which thought must somehow deal. Thought 
has no reason which justifies the transition from A to AB and 
from AB to B« And Thought can no more pass without a reason 
from A or from B to its conjunction, than before it could pass 
groundlessly from A to B.
Thus# a judgment cannot provide from within Itself a 
ground of union and distinction# nor can it accept such a 
grouhd# if it ie offered from the outside. This means that 
judgments must inevitably contradict themselves. And no one 
can deny that a judgment which contradlcts itself ie false and 
intellectually unsatisfactory. The Law of Oontradiction is 
a principle whose truth is implicitly assumed in any attempt 
to doubt or deny it#
But the conclusion just reached is subject to a quali­
fication# Judgments contradict themselves only if they
** Appearance and Realitjg, p*563*
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claim absolute and unconditioned truth. A vital step in 
the b above argument is the premiee that an external ground 
which is supposed to justify the transitions of thought must 
be brought within thought. But this step is necessary, only 
if thought is demanding an unconditional guarantee of the 
validity of its transitions. We may legitimately assume a 
justifying ground ift an external reality for a judgment v;hich 
is content to be taken as conditioned and conditional.. Thus, 
judgments may avoid contradiction if they do not make unwarranted 
pretensionso Without contradiction, one may in thought unite 
differences, provided that one accepts this synthesis in thought 
as conditioned, as subject to an unknown ground of union and 
distinction. So long as one makes no claim to an absolute 
and unconditioned truth, one imj accept the transitions in 
one’s thought as connections **the bond of which is at present 
unknown*
Thus# our ordinary judgments cannot be rejected as 
intellectually unsatisfactory on the basis of the Law of 
Contradiction alone. There are passages which suggest that 
Bradley himself recognises that the Law of Oontradiction, by 
itself# Is not enough* He writes, for instance, '*Yet while 
it [^ the assertion of any complei^ offers itself as but contingent 
truth and as more or less incomplete appearance, the Law of 
Contradiction has nothing against it. This would seem
Appearance and Reality, pcB34o
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to imply that so long as a judgment does not claim to be absolute 
and mieonditloned# it cannot be thought unsatisfactory because 
it contradicts itself— some other reason must be given*
We do not, however, rest our case on a ©ingle passage 
in Bradley’s writings# taken out of its context* Our 
fundamental argument 4s that Bradley can prove that a judgment 
which depends on an external ground contradicts itself, only 
if he assumes that this external, ground must somehow be incorpor­
ated in the judgment* He has not proved that such a judgment 
contradicts itself, iff the external ground is left outside# 
as it should be. Bradley, of course, does not have to admit 
that it is possible or legitimate to assume the existence of 
an external ground of union and distinction which justifies the 
transition in a judgment. But any valid objections which he 
may make against this assumption cannot be derived from the Law 
of Contradiction alone* For the argument which Bradley uses 
to prove that any complex assertion contradicts itself depends 
on the presupposition that the assertion cannot be justified 
by an appeal to an external ground*
The main difficulty which faces those who assume an 
external ground to justify the transitions in judgment, is the 
problem of explaining how it is possible to assert significantly 
the existence of such a ground. This is essentially the 
problem of explaining how one can think about a reality beyond 
thought. But before examining this difficulty in detail, 
we shall consider whether Bradley can reach his main conclusion
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by establishing what we distinguished as his second fundamental 
assumption* Bradley has proved that discursive judgments
are self-contradictory# if they are taken as unconditioned#
If he can also prove that no judgment will be intellectually 
satisfactory, unless it is uneondl11oned, it will follow that 
no human judgment can satisfy the demands of the intellect#
Even if a judgment which does not claim to be absolute 
and unconditioned is not self-contradictory, such a judgment# 
Bradley holds, is by no means intellectually satisfactory*
For thought has as its goal an absolute and unconditioned truth# 
and it ^ill be fully satisfied by nothing less than this* 
Moreover# judgments which depend on an external condition are 
not even satisfactory as far as they go. It is natural to 
suggest that even if thought can never attain to the complete 
truth about reality# it may sometimes be satisfactory enough, 
in BO far as it reaches a partial truth which at least contains 
no admixture of error. The deliverances of thought can never 
be the whole truth^*, but they may some times be ’^ nothing but 
the truth^'« But even this# Bradley would not concédé.
Buch partial **truths*^ are by no means free from error, because 
the elements combined in the judgment v/otjld not remain unaltered 
if they were included in a completed system of truth which made 
explicit the condition which the judgment Implicitly assumes. 
These elements are not simply E fragments of reality; they are 
mutilated fragments, falsely abstracted from the context in
which they have their being.
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There is another argument which Bradley may use to prove' 
that judgments which are subject to an external condition are 
not Intellectually satisfactory# If the transitions of 
thought depend on a condition external to thought# the condition 
is unknown, and the transitions are, for thought# unintelligible# 
If thought is to understand its traneitions— ahd it is not . 
satisfied by transitions which it does not understand— thought 
must possess the reason for its transitions; and thought cannot 
accept as a reason an external condition of which it has no 
knowledge0 ,
Thus# if satisfactory judgments may be neither conditioned 
nor contradictory# the intellect is never satisfied by the 
judgments which it makes* No judgment can fulfil both 
requirements of the Intellectually satisfactory* A judgment 
which sets itself up as unconditioned can be shown to contradict 
itself# and a judgment can escape contradiction only by admitting 
that the transition in the judgment is subject to and governed 
by an external and unlmown condition®
But an unfriendly critic might object that the standard 
set by Bradley is Impossibly and unreasonably high* One 
cannot dispute that a judgment which contradicts itself is the 
reverse of satisfaotory# but is it so clear that Bradley’s 
gecgnd requirement is justified? Gez’talnly, thought will 
always be unsatisfactory# if one will accept as satisfactory 
only an absolute and unconditioned system of thought in which 
all the transitions are fully intelligible* But is it
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sensible to give the intellect a task which it cannot possibly 
accomplish, and then to reproach it because of its failure?
The idea of a completely intelligible system may be an ideal 
to which thought ought to approximate as closely as possible, 
filling in where it can intermediate principles which in part 
explain Its transitions. But to demand that thought bridge 
completely the gaps between the discrete elements with which it 
deals is to ask for something which thought, by its very nature, 
cannot suoply. To some extent, thought may furnish elements 
which mediate its transitions; but ultimately, an appeal must 
always be mafte to a reality beyond thought. This does show 
that thought is in some sense limited and defective; but is it 
not a misleading exaggeration to say that thought is never 
intellectually satisfactory? It is not in the nature of 
thought to be an unconditioned reality. Thought is eBsentially 
thought about a reality beyond thought. Thought is necessarily 
subject to an external condition in that the transitions in 
thought are to be justified by a reference to the external 
reality with which thought is concerned. In order to satisfy 
the standards laid down by Bradley!, thought would have to be 
identical with the complete reality. Now, it is unreasonable 
to condemn thought because it is not reality. Moreover, this 
supposed defect of thought which Bradley takes so much trouble 
to establish is the direct consequence of a fact vAiich nearly 
everyone would admit— that reality is something more than 
thought. Bradley’s central conclusion, boiled down, would
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seem to 'be simply that thought is not everything; b o that 
Bradley’s philosophy, far from being too paradoxical to be 
taken ser1ously, 1b nothing but sound common sense.
Indeed# the critic might even say that Bradley’s arguments 
are important# only because they constitute a refutation of the 
thoroughgoing Idealism which identifies reality and 
thought— a re:rutatlon which is framed in Idealist terminology 
and which Idealists cannot ignoré, Bradley is usually
considered an Idealist, but in fact, Idealists are the only 
philosophers who are embarrassed by Bradley’s arguments.
Bradley talks paradoxically about the inevitable contradictions 
in thought, but what his position amounts to is that reality 
cannot be exhaustively analysed in terms of abstract thought# 
that t?ie concrete reality is a surd, irreducible in rational 
teamms, Thus Bradley, in spite of the appearances, is really 
an ally of the jExistentialif^ts in their protest against 
Absolute Idealism, against the view that reality is neither more 
nor less than a complete system of thought. The Existential­
iste Bay that the existent reality is irrational or absurd, 
whereas Bradley says that reality is suprarational; but both 
parties agree that reality is, in some sense, non-rationa]., 
and the difference in language may simply reflect a difference 
in emotional attitude*
Buch a reaction to Bradley’s theory is very tempting*
There are two very different ways of deflating a philosophical 
system* On the one hand, one may argue that the doctrines
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of a philosopher are false and nonsensical: on the other hand,
one may argue that the philosopher is expressing in an unnecess- 
arily obscure way obvious truths which everyone has known all 
along* The above argument uses this second method; and this 
would certainly seem to be the most promising line of attack 
in the casé of Bradley, on account of the extK?eme difficulty 
of producing a direct refutation of Bradley’s careful arguments* 
But Bradley’s elaborate dialectic is not so pointless as this 
critic is su'ëS^Btingo And the point becomes clear when we 
meditate on the problem of asserting the existence of a reality 
beyond thought* Bradley does not work through a long and 
difficult argument, merely in order to prove that there is a 
reality beyond thought— a proposition which few would challenge. 
His purpose is to show how it is possible to assert a reality 
beyond thought, and this# he would argue# is something which is 
not shown by those who simply accept a reality external to 
thought on the basis of common sense* At first sight, there 
would seem to be no objection to asserting a distinction 
between thought and reality, but on reflection, this may com© 
to seem a problem of almost insuperable difficulty® How can 
one assert a difference between thought and reality '’without 
somehow transcending thought or bringing the difference into 
thought?'**^ In order to think of a reality beyond thought, 
it would be necessary for thought to go beyond itself, to have 
a certain self-transcendence * But how is this possible?
Appearance and Reality, p.554*
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Bradley has an answer, and one will be in no position to 
criticise Bradley unless one can suggest an alternative answer* 
Bradley* b answer is that thought transcends itself, because it 
has claims and criteria which are never satisfied by thought. 
Thought ’’demands to be, and so far already is# something which 
completely it cannot be.”'*^ Reality is more than thought, and 
it is known to be more than thought, because reality is what 
satisfies the intellect, and the intellect has standards which 
thought as Buch can never satisfy. Thus, Bradley*s contention
that thought is never intellectually satisfactory is ndt merely 
the carping criticism of one who sets impossibly high standards. 
It must be possible for the intellect to make such a criticism 
of its own performance, if we are to be able to maintain that 
there is a reality beyond thought. Thought can# in a sense,
attain to a reality beyond thought, because thought has criteria 
which it knows it cannot satisfy, and in recognising its own 
defects and limitations, thought has in some way transcended 
these limitations.
This problem of explaining how one can% assert the 
existence of an external reality beyond thought is, as we have 
already remarked, the chief difficulty facing those who wish 
to save ordinary judgments from contradiction by basing them 
on an external ground of union and distinction* Now, if it 
is possible to assert that there is a reality beyond thought, 
only because thought has a criterion which thought can never
Appearance and Realito, p. 555.
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eatlBfy, it will not be possible to aseuBie an external reality 
beyond thought, if one is attempting to prove that human 
judgments may satisfy all legitimate requirements® Therefore,
the above criticism of Bradley’s system will be valid, only if 
an alternative solution to the problem of thought and reality 
can be suggested. We shall consider whether or not there is 
a reasonable alternative in the final section^of the present 
chapter. In the next section, we shall discuss the positive 
knowledge of the general nature of reality which Bradley 
extracts from thought’s criterion.
III. According to Bradley, thought possesses a criterion 
of reality, and it has therefore a positive knowledge of what 
v/ould satisfy this criterion. This means that we have a 
positive knowledge of what reality must be like. This 
knowledge is, indeed, abstract and general; on account of its 
limitations, thought cannot present reality bodily and in full. 
Therefore, our knowledge of the general nature of reality must 
fall short of complete truth. Nevertheless, the knowledge 
of reality which is derived from thought’s criterion may be 
said to be absolute knowledge when contrasted with ordinary 
empirical knowledge. For this metaphysical knowledge of 
reality is intellectually incorrigible, whereas our empirical 
knowledge is always liable to a possible intellectual correction! 
Our metaphysical knowledge is defective, because it gives us 
the bare outline of reality which must be filled in, if the
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Intellect is to achieve complete satisfaction® But this is 
a defect which the intellect as such can never remedy. To 
supplement its metaphysical knowledge of the general character 
of reality# thought would have to pass beyond itself and become 
identical with the concrete reality.
We must now examine the detailed content of this
metax>hyBical knowledge of the general character of reality, 
which is the utmost to which thought can attain without becoming 
something other than itself* We know, first of all# that 
reality is one; for a plurality of unrelated reals is impossible® 
We cannot form a conoe%)tion of a Many# unless we take the many 
beings to compose some sort of unity. We cannot think of a 
plurality without thinking of it as ^ plu"rality<™-one single 
plurality* It is impossible to thinlc away the unity of the 
plurality and leave only the multiplicity. And we cannot 
suggest that reality might be something which we cannot 
consistently conceive.
Now# if the many beings must compose a unity# they must
have some sort of togetherness and some sort of relatedness*
But the above argument does nothing to determine the nature 
of this unity or the nature of the connections between the 
elements in the plurality* The unity of the plurality— the 
One— might be the ultimate substantial reality of which the 
many beings are mere parts of aspects» But on the other hand, 
the elements in the plurality— the Many— might be the substantial 
realities, and the unity of the plurality might depend on its
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substantial components# and on the relations between them.***
Brqdley maintains that it is the One which is substance*
A substance and a final reality must have a certain independence
and self-sufficiency# and the relations which must exist
between the members of a plurality cannot be reconciled with
their substantial Independence* Bradley argues that the
relatedness of beings io compatible with their independence,
only if the relations between the beings are external# that is,
make no difference to the terms they connect® But’ merely
external relations are impossible* An element which is
external to two terms cannot be used to connect them* It is
a distinct item in the universe which must itself be connected
with the original terms. And if we assume second order
relations to connect the external x^elation with its terms, the
same problem muF3t be faced anew* We are committed to an
infinite regress in which we multiply intermediaries without
ever being able to bridge the gap* Thus# the relations
between beings cannot be external relations which make no
difference to the characters of the beings related* A thing
must be affected by the relations in which it stands* The
relations between the many beings in the universe must be
internal; and if two beings are internally related, they are
interdependent and are therefore not self-existent realities*
The only way to deal with the diversity in the universe is
to take the ultimate reality as a ©ingle whole of which diverse
Of* above. Chapter I
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beings are merely interdependent and interrelated aspects.
Thus# reality is one, in the strictest sense; its unity is 
prior to its diversity* A plurality of beings can be under­
stood only as a diversity which falls within a single whole*
The above argument proves that reality must be one and 
that diverse elements must be included in a single substance 
as subordinate parts® But it does not establish the existence 
of any such diversity® How do we know# then, that reality
is not absolutely simple and without parts? The answer is
that the diversity is actually given; in our experience, 
a diversity and manifold appears# and "What appears is, and 
whatever is cannot fall outside the real* The absolute
reality must somehow include the whole detail of its appearances. 
Bradley denies that the experienced manifold is, as such, real, 
but he does not wish to reduce it to sheer nonentity®
Whatever is, in any sense, must find its place within reality.
We know, then# that reality is one substance and that 
it includes a diversity* And thirdly, we know something; 
about the way in which the absolute reality includes the 
diversity of appearance which falls within it. The Absolute 
must synthesise the diversity which it contains into a 
harmonious system* All Inconsistency and incoherence must 
somehow be eliminated* Appearances, which at the level of
appearance are in open conflict, must be reconciled and 
harmonised. How in detail the Abso3aite achieves thdbe self-
* AppeapancQ .and.. Eeali.tg» p.140.
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consistent synthesis of the manifold# Bradley does hot pretend 
to show * But we know that reality must unmake the contra­
dictions of what appears in thought, since reality must satisfy 
thought® B criterion of self-eonsi^ency. We also know that 
the Absolute may remove these contradictions, since there are 
no differences which are, as such, contradictory. There is 
contradiction when one attempts to unite differences without 
a ground, of union and distinction, but the contradiction will 
be resolved when the necessary ground Is supplied. And what 
may be, if it also must be, certainly is.
Fourthly, we know the matter which fills out this abstract 
skeleton of a system which embraces a diversity of elements 
in a consistent unity® This matter Is experience; the 
Absolute is an experience. It follows from what has already 
been said that the Absolute must include experience; for 
experience exists, and whatever exists must be included in 
reality. But Bradley requires a further argument in order 
to show that the Absolute Reality is nothing but experience.
The essence of this argument is that we cannot significantly 
distinguish between being and experience. We find that 
anything which we can assert to have being consists in sentient 
experience. Thus, when we assert that the Absolute has being, 
we are asserting that the Absolute is experience, "for anything 
other than experience is meaninglees. To sum up these
four characteristics of the Absolute, the ultimate reality
Appearance and Reality, p. 555®
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1b a single, all-inclusive, self-consistent whole of experience.
IV. If the only faculty of the mind were the power of
abstract thought, then the only way to reach a reality beyond 
thought would b© to follow the path indicated by Bradley.
But In experience we find an element very different from mere 
abstract thought. There is an immediate ex^berienoe of 
concrete reality which may be called "feeling" or "sensation", 
and one may suppose that we can reach a reality beyond thought 
because this reality is directly given in immediate experience.
The limitations of discursive thought do not really require 
one to postulate an Absolute# such as Bradley describes*
It is reasonable to suggest that the existence of 
immediate experience makes possible the alternative solution 
to the problem of thought and reality which is required# as we 
have seen, if one wishes to maintain that our ordinary judgments 
may be intellectually satisfactory. We can think about the 
reality beyond thought which justifies thought’s transitions, 
because this reality is directly given in experience* The 
problem of thought and reality is serious, only if one has 
falsely abstracted discursive thought from the concrete experience 
in v/hich it is ©mbedded® Thought can deal with what is not 
thcughtp because it is not an isolated and self-contained 
reality; it is merely an element in a comprehensive experience 
which includes other elements.
This is essentially the criticism which philosophers
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like Bergson and William James make of what they call 
"intellectualism". They point out that a subject’s experience
contains another element besides abstract diseursive thought—  
an element of feeling or sensation# Y/hich provides an immediate 
experience of reality® How, Bradley# as v;e shall see, is by 
no means unaware of the importance of feeling or immediate 
nexperiencG. Why# then, does he refuse to accept James’s 
contention that in immediate experience we are given the concrete 
reality to v/hich we refer in abstract thought. This is the 
problem which we must now^xamine.
William James is perfectly prepared to agree with what 
Bradley says about the defects and limitations of thought.
Thought is abstract and provides no access to the inner nature 
of concrete reality. And if thought sets itself up as absolute 
and unoonditionedp it becomes involved in contradiction; for, 
as we have seen, it can supply no ground of union and distinction 
to justify its transitions from one element to another, so that 
the system of terms and relations which it employs ie necessarily 
self-contradictory. According to James, thought has a merely 
subsidiary function in experience. We require to form 
abstract concepts in order to deal effectively with practical 
situations and in order to handle the masses of material given 
in immediate experience® Abstract thought cannot present 
bodily the concrete reality® It fuimishes, as it were, a map 
of reality# v/hich is useful for some purposes, W t  which cannot 
purport to be reality.
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But the above defects of abstract thought# James argi'ieo, 
do not justify the aBsumption of the Absolute accepted by 
Bradley» We are not given reality in thought# but we are 
given reality in feeling or immediate experience. In Immediate 
experience# we have a contact with reality, which is beyond the 
powers of abstract thought® And there is no need tp appeal 
to an Absolute in order to pi^ovide the ground of union and 
distinction which is required to justify thought’e transitions. 
For the necessary ground is directly given in feeling. In 
immediate experience# we find the concrete unity amid difference 
which thought cannot supply* Unlike some Empiricists# such 
as Hume, who believe that what is given in experience is a set 
of disconnected .atomic presentations, James maintains that in 
immediate experience we are given the conjunctions as well as 
the disjunctions of the elements. We have a direct experience 
of terms in relation; this is an ultimate fact which must be 
recognised by the Radical Empiricists a system of terms and 
relations is self-contradictory only when isolated in abstract 
thought, apart from the immediate experience in which it is 
given* Thus, there 1b no need to invoke a mysterious 
Absolute to resolve the contradictions inherent in isolated 
relational thought.
But just as James ie prepared to accept in general v/hat 
Bradley has to say about thought, b o Bradley would be prepared 
to accept in general what James has to say about feeling.
Of» Essays in Radical Empiricism^
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There is a very remarkable similarity between the accounts of 
immediate experience offered by James and Bradley respectively, 
as is admitted on both sides.":' In the first place, Bradley 
willingly concedes the main point on which James is insisting, 
that in immediate experience we are given concretely identity 
in difference, unity amid plurality. In feeling wo are given 
neither a bare plurality nor a simple unity; we have presented 
a complex whole. "We cannot deny", Bradley writes, "that 
complex wholes are felt as single exp0 x*ienees.
And when we consider Bradley’s tes?35± description of 
the othey? charaetejyiotics of feeling or immediate experience, 
we discover further evidence of the close parallel between the 
views of thinkers with so very different a temper as Bradley 
and William James. Bradley agrees with James that in feeling 
we are given a reality which is not given in thought. "It is
only in feeling that 1 directly encounter reality. Feollng
has a certain reality which may be contrasted with the ideality 
of thought. In feeling# we have a direct access to reality; 
this is what is meant by the Immediacy of feeling. In 
feeling# we are given what Is individual— a "this"— whereas 
In thought we must be content with universais® Feeling isA
cf. Bradley, Essays on Truth and Reality. (Oxford, 3.914)
Chapter V, Appendix III, and James,'"Bradley or'Bergson?",
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VII, Ho.2. Each philosopher 
expresses his surprise that the other should reach b o  different 
a conclusion on the basis of an almost identical account of 
experience® James attributes this to Bradley’s anti­
empiricism# Bradley to James’s anti««rationalisin.
App^-»ance and Reality, p.521.
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concrete; thought is abstract. Feeling has what William 
James would call "thielmess", whereas thought is thin and dry. 
Bradley surely echoes James’s sentiments when he writes, "When 
we turn from mere ideas to sensation# we experience in the 
"this" a revelation of freshness and life.
Moreover# Bradley would agree that feeling is the 
:(hindamental factor in experience# and that conceptual processes 
are derivative and in comparison insubstantial* Feeling may 
be said to be fundamental in the sense of being a necessary 
first stage in the development of the psychical life®
Bradley maintains that such a stage# "not only# with all of us# 
comes first in fact# but at times it recurs even in the life 
of the developed individual. But even if the possibility
of such a stage of pure feeling is denied# this will make 
little difference to Bradley’s position; for there is a more 
important sense in which feeling is fundamental in experience. 
Feeling is the "immediate unity of a finite psychical centre" 
and must therefore be the basis which grounds the experience 
of a finite subject, even when this experience transcends the 
mere immediacy of feeling* There is more to experience than 
feelings there are ideal systems of terms and relations.
But such systems necessarily depend on a background of feeling# 
which is therefore fundamental in experience. "At every
Appearance and Reality# pcl^â.884-®
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moment# my state, Y/hatever else it Is, Is a whole of which I 
am Immediately av/are. It is an experienced noh-relational
unity of many in one. .And object and subject and every
possible relation and term, to be experienced at all, must fall 
within and depend vitally on such a felt unity* That is#
feeling does not disappear when the relational modes of exper­
ience supervene; it remains and "remaining it contains within 
itself every development which in a sense transcends it."-:*':*
Now, if Bradley is prepared to grant that in immediate 
experience we encounter the concrete reality and are given 
directly a unity in difference# why does he not agree with 
James that it is immediate expérience which supplies the ground 
of union and distinction which abstract discursive thought 
cannot furnish from its own resources? Why does Bradley 
believe that feeling will not provide what is required and 
that we must invoke an Absolute beyond immediate experience? 
Certainly# the appeal to feeling will not renair the eseontial 
defect of diseursive thought# in that the ground of union and 
distinction provided by immediate experience cannot be brought 
within thought to make thought’s transitions both non-oontra- 
dictoï*y and unconditioned. Also, thought cannot reproduce 
the mode of union of the diversity given in feeling® If
thought attempts to combine a manifold unconditionally according 
to the way of feeling, it will inevitably contradict Itself.
Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 175-176®
IDld., p.161.
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But this does not prove that complex wholes, as given in feeling, 
are eelf-contradictoryo And in pointing to the eomplex who3,o 
given in feeling (it may be urged) one does indicate the 
condition which governs the transitions of thought, and this Is 
all that is necessary. A satisfactory philosophy is not 
required to transform abstract analytic thought into the 
concrete reality which it articulates. Thought cannot escape 
its dependent and derivative function; thought must be contônt 
with its station in the universe and must admit beyond Itself 
as its condition an iiïimedlate experience which it may articulate, 
but which it can never encompass. Moreover, the Absolute 
assumed by Bradley is, in this respect, in exactly the same 
position as Immediate experience. The Absolute can do no 
more than feeli|5g to remove the essential limitations of thought. 
Like immediate experience, the Absolute must function as an 
unlmown condition which governs and justifies thought’s 
transitions® And if we refuse to accept the unity amid 
difference which Is actually given in feeling, because it 
cannot be consistently represented in abstract thought, then 
for the very same reason, we must 3?efuse to accept the unity 
amid differece which is assumed in the Absolute® The Abso3.ute 
must retain on a larger scale all the supposed contradictions 
of immediate experience® But as lîilliam James puts it, 
"Intellectualism sees what it calls the guilt# when comminuted 
in the finite object; but it is too nearsighted to see it
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in the more enormous object®
But Bradley denies the u3.timate reality of feeling, not 
because its mode of synthesis cannot be repî?oduced in thought 
without contradiction# nor because he believes that unity in 
difference is impossible in principle® For if Bradley did . 
subscribe to such a principle, he could not grant a special 
dispensation in favour of the Absolute® The reason why 
Bradley will not admit that feeling, as such, is real is that 
feeling is finite— he maintains that nothing finite can be 
ultimately real. For the limited content or character of 
a finite being cannot be reconciled with the immediacy of its 
existence0 This inconsistency is not to be attributed simply 
to the limitations of abstract thought: finite beings are not
to be condemned# merely because in thought we cannot exhibit in 
detail the coherence of content and existence; for this is 
something which cannot be done even in the case of the Absolute# 
whose reality Bradley admits. We have positive knowledge 
that the content of a finite experience cannot be brought into 
harmony with its existence* A finite content is necessarily 
related to what lies beyond itself# and therefore# it must 
somehow pass beyond, its own existence; in this self-transcendence 
it will pass beyond the limits of its own immediacy# thereby 
becoming inconsistent with the immediacy which a concrete 
reality must possess® This important part of Bradley’b 
argument must be examined in detail®
A Plural! stic Universe# p.297.
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The content of immediate experience is finite and 
relative to what lies loeyond itself* Bradley points out that 
the z^elativity and finitude of the content of immediate experience 
is shown, for instance# by the fact that the presented content 
is always in process of changing. "Mutability is a fact in 
the actual feeling 'Which we experience* A changing content
of experience is by its very nature relative to what is not 
itself: it is of necessity relative to that from which it has 
changed and to that into which it is changing. And anything
which is transient is surely finite.
But even if it is conceded that the content given in 
Immediate experience Is finite and relative to what lies beyond 
itself# how doe8’ this prove that the content does not cohere with 
its ovm. existence? ■ Why does Bradley hold that there is an 
incoherence mf between content and existence, between the "what" 
and the "that" in the case of a finite being and not in the case 
of the Absolute? The answer is that Bradley conceives the 
Absolute as an entity which is completely self-contained# whose 
content does not stray beyond the limits of Its existence^
But finite beings# since they are related to beings beyond 
themselves# are not self<r^oontained: a finite content must pass 
beyond the boundaries of its own exioteneco This would not 
be necessaryg if it were possible for relations to be merely 
external; for in tills case, the content of a finite being would 
keep within, the limits of its ov/n existence# and the relations
Appearanoe and Reality# p*.106o
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of the being to other be Inge would be Buper»ficial and irrelevant
to its character and internal nature. But Bradley, as we have
seen, argues that merely external relatione are Impossible.
The relatione be tv/e en finite beings must bo internal; they muet
make a difference to the inteinial characters of the beings
related® How, if a relation to othea? beings is involved in
the Internal character of a finite being, this character or
content must pass beyond its own existence, for it necessarily
involved elements which lie beyond its own existence* This
self-transcendence of the content of a finite being, Bradley
calls the Ideality of the Finite*
This doctrine of the Ideality of the Finit© explains and.
Is confirmed by the existence of discm?slve thought* Diecursive
thought, for Bradley# is essentially judgment, and judgment#
as Bradley defines it in the Prinolnles of Logic« "is the act
which refers an ideal content* *. to a reality beyond the act,
How an ideal content may be referred beyond its own immediacy
to an alien existence, because every idea has two sidess on the
one side, it is a psychical existent, a psychological idea; on
the other side, it is a meaning, a logical idea* It is as
meanings or logical ideas that the contents of Immediate m
experience are used in judgment* Nov/, the existence of
judgment and the relational consciousness is no accident and no
yimystery* In xxrtue of its finitude, immediate experience lo 
compelled to pass off into relational consciousness# The
^ Book I# Ohaptorli, Section 10.
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development of the dinoureive intellect is due to the intninaic 
ideality of the finite» In judgmentg the content of feeling 
is divided from the Immediacy of its existence and hecomes Ideal 
and universal0 But this division is poBsihle only hecause of 
the Inherent Instahlilty of the union of content and existence 
given in feelings This instahility is due to the fact that 
the content of immediate experience necessarily transcends Its 
own existencep hecauee a. finite psychical centre is internally 
related to what lies heyond itself*
And just as Bradley’s account of iimiediate experience 
explains the emergence of discursive thought g so the existence 
of ±h discursive thought confirms Bradley’s account of immediate 
experience. The fact that in judgment the content of feeling 
is sundered from its psychical existence and referred elsewhere 
is in itself good, evidence that the immediate union of content 
and existence in feeling is not satisfactory. A.1b o, the 
existence in the mind of an activity of judgment is an additional 
proof of the finitucie of the self. We find that in judgment 
we refer ideal contents heyond the thiS’*»*nov;«'*here of immediate 
feeling to,an external reality. This means that the Solipsist 
is mistaken»— * that there is a reality heyond the psychical 
existence of the contents of our ex;perience; and this external 
reality delimits the "boundaries of the judging self, and
entahlishes its finitude.
Although feeling» as such» is not real» it is nevertheless 
very important to take account of it; for feeling provides
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a elue to the concrete nature of* realityo In feeling or 
immediate experience we are given as a fact a complex ivhole » 
a diversity in unity» and this experience gives u b » as it were » 
a sample of the concrete reality. In feeling» we encounter**
reality and he come av^ are of a concrete Immediacy to which 
ah8tract thought can never aspire. But we eann.ot rest 
satisfied with the immediate union of the one and the many
which is given M  feeling. The feeling of a finite psychical
centre is not self-cons is ten t«*™. the content of the feeling is 
inconsistent with its existence^-^-'hheeause the finite content 
has a certain ideality and transcends its own existence.
This **ideality of the given finite** is responsihle for the
development of a discursive thought which goes heyond the
immediate unity of feeling; hut this discursive thought can 
never recapture the immediacy of feeling and the coherent 
unity of content and existence. This means that discursive
thought does not satisfy its own crite3?ion of reality» and 
it must he developed until it reaches its proper completion» 
even although this will mean the destruction of thought as such# 
We must develop thought until the consistent union of content 
and existence is restored» and we reach a higher form of 
immediacy which is an all*^incl\isive whole heyond thought.
start from the diversity in unity which is given in feeling» 
and we develop this internally hy the principle of self-Gomplet« 
ion heyond self» until we reach the idea of an all«»inclusive 
and supra-3?elational experience.**"^ '
Appearance and Reality» p. 566*
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V, If Bradley is right» must admit that thought :1b
never rlntelleettially aatiefaetory» and we must abandon our 
attempt to conetruet a system of metaphysical pluralism^ for 
Bradley denies the central assumption of the p l u r a l i s t» that 
in the world there are many r e a l  substantial beings. How»■ 
no direct and conclusive re:fat.atlon of Bradley’s view seems 
possible: we have not detected any major Inconsistency in 
Bradley’s system. Certainly» Bradley’s theory» like all other 
philOBDph:loal theories » la not self-«evidently true. The path
to the Absolute» which he maps out» is in alacoB very obscure2 
‘for. exemple» his principle of self««completIon beyond s e l f  la 
rather mysterious. But one cannot say definitely that this 
principle is false or that the path does not exist. We must
therefore attempt to emewer Bradley by providing an alternative 
account of experience and reality which admits the BUbetantlality 
of the finite self» the plurality of real beings» and the general 
validity of thought. If such an alternative is possible» then 
Bradley» as we remarked at the beginning of the chapter» will be 
in a weak position. A theory which accepts the common sense 
belief in the reality of the self and the other things in the 
ivorld must be preferred to one which do eu not» other things 
being equal.
The previous discussion has isolated the two basic reasons 
why Bradley will not admit the possibility of an alternative to 
his system* We have examined two objections to B rad leys ’ s 
position«»««th0 fl3?stf that Bradley is merely stating in a very
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o M  ancljmlsleading way the obvious truth that reality is more than 
thoughts the second, that in immediate experience we are directly 
given a oonorete reality which supplies the ground of union and 
dietinetion rreqtiired to justify thoixght’s transit lone. Th© 
answers which Bradley would give to these ohjeetions pinpoint 
the crucial issues in the controversy. Against the first 
objection» Bradley would maintain that his doctrine that 
thought does not satisfy Its own criterion. expXaiiiB how it is 
possible to assert in thought a reality beyond thought and is nùt 
merely affirming that thought is not everything. Against the 
eeoond objection» Bradley would argue that what is given in 
immediate experience cannot be reality as such® because the 
finite content of the experience Is essentially involved in 
Internal relations to what lies beyond its own existence.
Bradley believes that a system of metaphysical |)luralisBi is 
impossible» because it cannot explain how one can think of a 
reality beyond thought® and because It cannot reconcile the 
interrelatione of the many elements in the universe ?/ith their 
substantial reality. It is important to answer Bradley’s 
arguments. For the fact that Bradley’s system involves a 
radical modification of our common sense beliefs will not count 
against it» unless one can show that an alternative system which 
conforme to common sense 1b actually possible*
Bradley would claim that he maintains that thought ie 
inte1lee tually uns a 11sfac tory» not because he is making the 
unreasonable demand that thought should oonforia to a standard
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which is not proper? to its own nature™»-^the Bignificanoe of his 
contention that thought has criteria which thought can never 
complet el, y satisfy is that this is what makes it possible to 
talks meaningfully about a reality beyond thought. This means 
that an alternative theo3?y which accepts the existence of a 
reality beyond thought mist be able to show in its own way 
how a knowledge of such a reality ie possible.
But if one is pz^epared to accept the stra 1 gl$orward and 
obvious solution to the problem of thought and reality» this Is 
not a serious difficulty* We may say quite simply that we can 
thlnlc of a 'reality beyond thought» because® in fact» we are 
thinîçlng of such as reality all the time® o r nearly all the time* 
Mo special intellectual contortions are required in orde:r to 
think of what is not thought. Thought is essentially thought 
a^ut a reality beyond thought* We can distlnguieh betw^een 
thought and reality because this is a distinction implicit in 
the very nature of thoughto When we reflect on an act of 
thought® we can isolate the thinking of the subject and dls«# 
tinguioh it from the object thought about. It is certainly 
impossible to think[about something; which is not® in some h«r 
sense® an object of thought» but it la not impossible to thin% 
about soBnethiBg which is beyond the activity of thinliing as such* 
If one makes a clear distinction between thought and its object® 
the main difficulty disappears*
This solution is not» of coure©» a complete explanation 
of how we can thinlc about what lies beyond thought. It ie
offered as a mere description of the actual nature and structure 
of thought and it does not purport to explain vAiy the thinking 
of a conBClouB etxbjeot is as It is. But surely this 1b not 
a fatal weakness® One cannot explain how it is possible to 
thlnlc of an external reality® only because thought is a 
fundamental factor in experience»and its functions cannot be 
explained in other terme. Our inability to do more than 
describe the structure of thought does not make it necessary to 
accept the solution which Bradley offerte to the problem of 
thought and reality* This question vrill be reconsidered In 
the next chapter® when w© are discussing the related problem of 
how it is possible to indicate the individuality of the beings 
in the world » when one is compelled to use a language which Is 
made up of universal terms.
But Bradley’e most effective argument is the argument
which depends on his doctrine that relations are internal to
the terms they cozmect* Even if Bradley cannot prove that
those vdio do not accept his system are not entitled to assert
a reality beyond thovzght® he may be able to prove that the
finite content given in immediate experience is not an ultimate
I <%
realityo If all resirtions are internal to their terms® then 
the taîîediate experience of a finite %)8ychical centre cannot be 
an independent and final reality. Indeed® any plurality of 
Independent substances will be Impossible. Members of a 
plurality must be related to one another® and the substantial 
Independence of a being Is not compatible with internal
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relations to other elements*^
The 6loet3?ine that all .real relations must be internal 
1b probably the m m  t crucial principle In Bradley’s philosophy*
On this prineipXe de pends Bs?a,clley’b arguments against the reality 
of what is given in feeling and against the very ±m|3 possibility 
of a system of Metaphysical Pluralism* It is therefore
essential to refute this doctrine® if an tetemsEi alternative 
to Monism is to be possible. B)?adley’© proof that all relate* 
ions are internal is briefly this* Eolations must be either 
internal to their terms ® or external to their terms * Mow# 
terms cannot be really related by a relation which 1© merely 
external*':* Therefo)?e» all telations must bo internal*
Bowp the vmalmoss in this argument is that there is a possibility 
which Bradley has neglected* ' Bradley has considered only 
Bymmetrical relations* The choice he offers Is thiss either 
A is internally related to B and B is internally related to A$
02? else A is externally related to B and B is externally 
related to A* But there is a third possibility# It may be 
that the concrete relations between substantial beings are 
asymetrieal* It may be that A is internally >?elatecl to B 
although B is externally related to A. The relatiomi between
A and B may be internal to B and external to A* If we assume 
that real relations between substances must be Bymmetrloal® 
then certainly the substances will fall apart if the relations 
are external® end their independent substantiality will be
of* above» pp.
destroyed if the relations are internal* But the suggestion 
that tlier, conez?ete relation between BubstaneeB :la mi asymmetrical 
internal‘-*0xte2?nal relation offers a way of eeeape»
And this is no mere logloal poBsibilltyo For there 1b 
aeycnmetry in the universes there is the passage of time*
Is it not plausible® then® to suggest that the basic relatiozi 
between substances » the fundamental structural relation in the 
univez?B0g Is an asymmetrical tr ans temporal relation of past 
being to present being? The past makes a difference to the 
presents this is proved by the fact of causal conditioning*
But the present does not make a difference to the past® for the 
past is fixed and unalterable. Therefore » the relation 
between past and present is internal to the present but external 
to the past® It is possible to accord to every finite being 
its moment of substantial independence before its Immediacy 
is destroyed by the lapse of time® when it survives only in 
8 0 far as it is internally related to and included in the
constitution of a being which now becomes present* In
subsequent chapters » this suggestion will have to be explored 
in greater detail. For the time being® we shall maintain
only that there ie at least a possibility of constructing a
system of Metaphysical PluralisBi which is not open to Bradley’s 
general objection and which may reconcile the interrelations 
and the independence of the many beings in the world*
There is one final point v/hioh should be mentioned 
before we conclude this disaussion of Bradley* We cannot
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accept Bradley’s account of feeling or immediate experience. 
Thought is® in some sense» an expression of Immediate experienee® 
and just as thought is thoug;ht about an object which is beyond 
the activity of thinking» so experience is essentially the 
experience of an object beyond the activity of experiencing* 
Bx^adloy believes that immediate experience is a non-relational 
unity of many in one which is, below the level of the distinction 
between subject and object* But we would argue that oven 
immediate ezpqz»ience has a subject-object stmeture* In
iimiediate experience® what we are given is the self experiencing 
the not-self* Certainly® the conscious recognition of the 
distinction between self and not-seXf may not occur until the 
psychical life has attained a high level of development^ but this 
ie because the conseiouB recognition of this distinction Is 
only possible in  the case of a developed subject® and not 
because a more primitive experience is simple and wiMiou® a 
fundamental distinction between subject and object* Our
basic epistamological doctrine is that the subject directly 
experiences external objects® and if this is true in the ease 
of a developed experience® it seems probable that it is also 
true® even in the case of a very elementary experience®
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I. In the previous chapter©» we have been concerned to
answer eez*tain objections to our fundamental asBumptiozi that 
there are many substantial beings in the world. In Chapter II 
and Chapter III » we dealt with epistemologieal a2?giim0nts against 
the possibility of an immediate awareness o f real beings beyond 
the e xp erien c in g  subject and the contente presented  to his 
eonsciouBness* In Chapter IV® we made an examination of 
Bradley’s position* Bradley admits that there is a reality 
beyond the experiencing subject® but denies that theî?e are 
many substantial beings® maintaining that reality is a single 
substantial whole® and that the self and all other finite beings 
are no more than ineubstant1al parts or aspects of the Absolute 
Reality. Wo were unable to  provide a conclusive refutation 
of Bradley’B theory® but we noted that Bradley» since he denies 
the coimnon sense belief in the substa*^tiality o f  the self» is 
in a weak position® unless he can show that no adequate 
pianation of the universe can be given by a Metaphysical 
Pluraliste How Bradley does argue very persuasively against 
the possibility of a plurality of substances® but we indicated 
Y/ays in which his arguments might be overcome® A final 
answer to Bradley® however® cannot be given unless one can 
cozietruct a system of Metaphysical Pluralism which provides
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a pXaueible anci coherent explanation of thé universe and which 
Buooeeds In getting round the difficult lee; to which Bradley has 
called attention* W© shall now take fo:r granted our funda« 
mental tenet that there are many substantial being© » and work 
out the consequenoOB of this hypothesis. ' The hypothesis will 
tend to be eonfirmad if on this basis we can supply a satis­
factory explanation of the universe» and it will be refuted if, 
we comeup against insuperable difficulties.
The metaphysical^ doctrine that there is a plurality of 
substantial beings has two Biain iraplieationfs® both of which 
give :risé to difficult problems. The first implication is 
that the memberB of the 'plurality have some sort of togethe5?nesB-* 
they form some sort of unity: this point will be ciiBcmssed in
the next chapter* The second implication is that each member 
of the plurality is distinct from all the other members®
In the [present chapter® we shall investigate this second ^ 
implication® and we shall try to discover what constituées 
the distinctive peculiarity of each member of the plurality. 
Binee a Bzibstantial being is different from every other 
substantial being» It is unique azid unrepeatable® The , 
problem is: ’’What is responsible for the xznlqueness of a
substantial being?’’ This problem is essentially the same as 
the medieval problem of the principium inclivxduationis.
There are tv/o ways in which we are accustomed to dis­
tinguish between different beings in the world® Beings may 
be diBtingii.ished because they differ In quality or because they
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occupy different areas to the spatio-temporal extensive conttouum, 
Two beings cannot be the same if they have different Ciua3.ities® 
nor can they be the same if they exist ii% different places 
or at dlfferezit times®
If g as many believe® substantial beings may endure 
through a lapse of time without the destruction of their 
identity® the above statement® of coixrse® will have to be 
modified. If substances persist in this way® one and the 
same substance may exist at different times® may have different 
qualities at different times® and may exist in different place© 
at different times. Therefore® we would not be entitled to 
eay more than that two cqntemporai% eubstaneee cannot be the 
same if they have different qualities or occupy different places* 
We shall argue in a later chapter that the substances in the 
world are epheme^bal and do not persist through time® and that the 
element of permanence in the universe must be explained in 
another way. But for the purposes of the present discussion® 
it is immterial i^hether or not this argument be accepted#
We hope to show that the uniqueness of an ephemeral substance 
can be determined neither by its special quality nor by its 
position in space and time* And if this is so® a fortiori 
one y/ill not be able to determine the uniqueness of an enduring 
substance by its quality or spatio-temporal position* .For 
in order to determine in this way the uniquenose of an enduring 
substance® one would have to define as unique by a reference 
to quality or position each of its passing states (and this
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would still leave unexplained the identity whleh unite© the 
various states of the substance.)
II* Although beings must be different if they differ in
quality or position® it does not follov; from this that two beings 
which have the same quality or the same position in apace and 
time are really one anci the saine being* It seems perfectly 
possible that two beings which possess exactly the same qualities 
are nevertheless numerically distinct. It may be difficult to 
find two peas exactly alike— the same sise® the same shape, the 
same shade of green— but is it impossible? And if two different 
beings may be identical in quality, it cannot be their peculiar 
qualMy which determines their uniguonesa*
But it ie more plausible to maintain that the miiqueneBo 
of every distinct individual is defined by its particular 
position in the spatio-temporal extei-nsive continuum, ©very 
part of space and time is uni que and is distinct from all other 
parts of space and time. And if wé accept the principle that 
no two substances can occupy the same part of space at the same 
timep then every unique Individual will be pinned down by 
referring to its unique position in space and times the unique­
ness of the individual will be determined by the uniqueues0 of 
its spatio-temporal position. Mow» it is® of course, pOBsible. 
that the principle which excludes all other substances from 
the portion of space and time occupied by a given substance is
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false#::' And if it is false® the miiquezieoB o f a being’s 
position will not be sufficient to aecount for tlB uniqueness of 
the being, and it will not necessarily d1 stingxtish that being
from all others* This objection» however, is far from 
convincing: it is very odd to claim that two different things
may be in the same place at the same time* But it 1b not
necessary to examtoe this point in detail, since there is 
another more cogent objection to the identification of the 
spatio-temporal continuum as the principle of individuation.
Even if one concedes that there is a one-to*«ozie oorz’espondence 
between every uni qua substance and every unique position in 
space and time, one does not have to grant that the unli|uene©s 
of the beings in the world, is to be explained in terms of their 
unique spatio-temporal positions. For it may be the ease that 
the uniqueness of distinct spatio-temporal positions ie to be 
explained in terms of the uninueness of the substantial beings
which occupy these positions.
A t this point we must introduce the notion of metaphysical 
o r ontological priority. One element in the universe can be 
explained in terms of another element, only if the second 
element is metaphysically prior to the first. The prior
Whitehead, fo3? instance, would argue that the p r in c ip le  
depends on a misconception of the relations between substantial 
beings and space and time: it depends on hhat he calls the
fallacy of simple location# the mistaken view that every real 
being is  confined to one definite portion of the spatio-temporal 
oontinniâm» Whitehead maintains, cm the c o n tra ry , that ”In a 
certain sense, everything is everywhere at all times*”
Boienea and the Modern World ( Cambridge, 19^©) p« 114©
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cannot be explained in terms of the posterior: the posterior 
must be explained in terms of the prioî?* Thus® one will be 
able to use the spatio-temporal continuum ae a prinoixjle of 
individuation with respect to the beings in the world, only If 
space and time as such are me'physically xpix prior to spatial 
and temporal beings. Therefore® the point to be Investigated 
is this: ’’Are space and time metaphysieallly prior to spatial
and temporal beings® or is it the£5 other way abound?”
But first® we must make a digression in order to elarigy 
as far as possible this obscure and rfundamental notion, ’’meta­
physical priority”# ’’Metaphysical” priox^lty is to b© 
distinguished from ’’temporal” priority. We say that one 
thing is prior to another if it precedes it in time. But 
this is clearly not the kind of priority which is in question 
here* One thing Biay be Bietaphysically prior to another® 
even If the two things do not stand ixi a temporal relationship 
of before and after.
It may be suggested that the %)roper definition of 
metaphysical priority is that fC is metaphyeically prior to B» 
if and only if B could not exist unless A exists® while A 
might exist without requiring the existence of B. How this 
may perhaps state a sufficient condition of metaphyBlcal 
priority: it may be that one element is metaphysically prior
to another, if its existence is presupposed by and does not 
presuppose the existence of the other element. But we could 
not accept the above as a definition, since we could not agree
that the conditioh which it lays dovm is a neeessary condition 
which must be satisfied by all instances of metaphysical 
priority* We wish to say that one element may be metaphysically 
prior to another, even if neither could exist without the other.
W’e have already referred, to the connection between 
metaphysical priority and metaphysical explanation® namely that 
one element cannot be used to explain another element vdiieh is 
rfletaphyeioally prior to it* The task of the metaphysician . 
is to explain the elements in the universe which a?:*e posterior 
in terms of the elements which are. prior. For an element 
which is metaphyBioally x^rior to another element in some sense 
supplies the reason for its existence*
But although to exhibit the connection between meta­
physical priority and metax^hysieal explanation does something to 
elucidate both notions, nevertheless the concept of metaphysical 
priority is still far from clear. The difficulty of explaiziing 
the notion of metaphysical priority is dxieK to the fact that 
this is a fundamental conception which cannot be defined in 
other terms* But it is possible to gain a clearer under­
standing of the notion if we relate it to the notion of 
substance. In Chapter I® we agreed with Aristotle’s view 
that substance is primary being— being in the primary sense.
How® when we say that substance is primary being, what we mean 
is that substantial being is metaphyBioally prioz? to any other 
type of being* Thus® we can indicate the nature of meta®*- 
physical priority by saying that it is the kind of prio"rity
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mfhlcîi a substance has to derivative and secondary modes of 
being* This is not to claim that the priority of substance to 
other modes of being is the only ease of metaphysical priority^
It may be that metaphysical priority is a generic notion which 
include8 ’’substantial” priority as one of its speoieso There 
may be other species of metaphysical priority: for instance® 
if in addition to the finite substances in the vmrld there 
exists an infinite substance, it may be possible to say that 
this infinite substance is metaphysically prior to the finite 
beings in the world, without having to reduce these finite 
beings to mere attributes of the infirdte substance* But
we do a good, deal to elucidate the nature of metaphysical 
priority by pointing to one clear instance, even if there may 
be other instances which are significantly different* We can
now see that the problem of the One and the Many discussed in 
the first chapter, ”Xe reality one or many substances?”® is 
for practical purposes':^ the same as the problem, ”Is the unity 
of the universe metaphysically prior to its multiplicity» or 
is it the multiplicity which is prior to the unity?”
It la now clear why what seemed a plausible enough ^ 
definition of metaphysical priority should not be accepteds 
the reason is that the metaphysical priority of substantial 
being will not conform to this definition* A substance is
The two pz^obleme will not be precisely the same, if substantiaJ 
p%y.ority is .not the only kind of metaphysical priority# But 1:? 
we can shov;» for instance, that the Many is metaphysically prior 
to the One, and if we make the additional assumption that either 
the Many or the One but not both must be eubstantial, then it 
will follow that the Many are substances and that the One is not,
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prior to the Internal diversity which it contains® and substenees 
are prior to the aggregate which they compose* Yet a substance 
will not exist unless all its parts and aspects also exist® and 
the existence of a plurality of substances is topoBslble without 
the existence of thé unity which they must form. One eamiot 
say that the me t aphys ie ally prior must not presuppAse what Is
posterior to it. A whole and its parte necessarily presuppose
one another; yet we may legitimately eay either that the whole 
Is prior to Its parts of that the parts are prior to the whole.
The notion of substance and the notion of metaphysical 
priority help to elucidate each other. We understand what Is 
meant by fstibstance when, we say that it Is the primary kind of 
being® the mode of being which is metaphye1cally prior to all 
other modes of being# And we understand w.hat is meant by 
metaphysical -priority when we say that it is the kind of priority
possessed by eubetance with respect to other types of being-.
Of course® this kind of elucidation would be circular® if it 
was intended as an explanation of concepts which are in them- 
selves completely incompx^ehensibl©. But to establish a 
eoimeetion between substance and metaphyBlcal x>riority is of 
value because we have a lre ad y  a vague sense of the meanisxg of 
these concept ions ». and their meaning is to some extent clarified 
when we exhibit their intereonnection.
We must now return to the question whether or not space 
and time are metaphyeieally plf?lor to spatial and temporal beings. 
This is a very dlffloult question to azis?;er. The first
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complication is  that our natural comon aenao beliefs ?/hich are 
relevant to the problem are by no means conelatent© On the
one hand® we naturally suppose that spatio-temporal beings are 
prior in reality, since they seem solid and substantial whereas 
space and time as such are in comparison insubatantial and 
intangible entities# On the other hand® we often talk as I f  
space and time were prior to the beings in space and time® as 
if the Bpatio-temporal continuum were a pre-existent 3?eality 
in which various positions are already mapped out® positions 
which are g;radually occupied by the s'patio-temporal beings as 
they come into existence*
Our view of the matter ie that It is  the first of the 
two eontradûetory strains present in common sense thought 'which 
3?epreB0Bte the essential truth. Throughout this woz'k® we 
rely heavl&y on the common sense belief that there are in the 
world many substmitial beings» and we must therefore attempt 
to explain away any elements in common sense thought which are 
Inconsistent with this belief*
When we attempt to describe the relationship between 
©pace and time and s p a tio -tem p o ra l beings® it is natural to say 
that these beings are to space and time* This lead© one to 
suppose that the spatio-temporal continuum ie a kind of 
container which 1© prior to the beings v/hlch it contains#
Again® we tend to  thinlc o f  space as i f  i t  were a framework 
in to  which a l l  s p a t ia l  beings must be f i t t e d  and which 
determines the unique position of ©very being. AXbo® we
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suppose that somehow future time already exista before it 1b 
occupied by tem poral beings as they become présent© When we 
th in k  of the coming to te and the passing away of the things 
1b the world, we imagine that,the universe is moving steadily 
through a time which exists before it la traversed® just as 
in ordinary life a path must already exist before we can move 
along ito But although such a story has some superficial 
plausibility, vié have no guarantee that it is an adequate 
description of the true state of affaire© We say that things 
are in space and move through time » but we are using métaphore 
which® although satisfactory enough! for normal purposes® are 
mleleadlng if we take t h ^  to furnish a clue to the real nature 
of the relationship ‘between spatio-temporal beings and space 
and time#
Another important reason why one tends to suppose that 
space and time are prior to 1;he things in the world is the 
recognition that a single spatio«»teraporeal b eing  is not prior 
to Bpace and time ae a whole# But it is unfair to take this 
fact to establish the priority of space and time# For the 
view which one ought to refute ie that the entire multiplicity
' ' UPJVk taw* atft^-esOrsGS^itttAiSXlt
of the beings in the world is prior to the spatio-temporal 
extensive continuum which is constituted by their inter— 
re la t ionsh ips #
Thus, it ie fairly safe to discount the suggestions in 
oonmion sense thought that space and time are meta-phyaieally 
prior to spatio-temporal beings- We must now consider
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whether or not it is safe  to roly on the contrary suggestion
which may also bo detected in common sense' thought— that Bpatio«»
temporal beings are prior to space and t im e # We naturally 
tend to believe that the beings in space and time are substanoes® 
whereas space and time as such are not. How® this natural 
belief is not® of com?se® beyond all rmeBtion® but it is difficitll^  
to disregard our very ilmdamezital conviction that we ourselves 
and the beings which exist with us in the world are substantial
beings» and it is ziot very  plausible to maintain that entities
BO very different from the beings in the world as are space and 
time are also aubetaneee. How® if this natural belief is true® 
it would seem to follow that space and time eamiot be metaphyBio­
ally ï>rior to the beings in space and time© In the' Emc above 
examination of the concept of metaphysical priority® we noted 
that substantial being is prior to all other modes of being*
Thus ® it would seem that the uniqueness of the substances in the 
world oarmot be explained in terms of their unique positions in a 
spatio-temporal continuum which is not a substantial being©
Hfnfortimately, the matter is not q u ite  b o simple as that* 
One may acknowledge that space and time are not sub stances— one 
may respect the feeling of uneasiness which we experience when 
we entertain the suggestion that space and time are independent 
Bubetazitial beings— and yet maintain that space and time are 
metaphysically prior to the substances in space and timeo 
For it is always possible that space and time are secondary 
modes of being which depend» not on the substances in space and
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tifrte® “but on some other Bubataneo# Bow® we have admitted 
that one substanoe may [perhaps be metaz^hysieally prior to other 
substances® and if this substance on which space and time depénd 
is prior to the substaneee in spaoe and time® then the spatio- 
temporal continuum may derive from the substance which supports  
it, a certain priority to the elements which it contains©
If ojie Bays® for instance, that space and time are p ro p e rtie s  
of an infinite Deity who ie metaphysically prior to the 
substances in the world which he has created® then one can say 
that the space-time eontinmim is prior to spatio-temporal sub- 
stances without having to suppose that it is a substantial and 
aelf-existent reality»
There are two possible objections to this approach#
%n the first place, one may argue that this theory makes certain
assumptions which we have no means of verifying# It is m a 
more economical hypothesis to suppose that it is the finite 
substances in the world which support the existence of the 
spatio-temporal extensive continuum rather than, to Introduce 
in addition an infinite substance in order to perform this 
function® Becondly, it is by no means clear how precisely 
the priority of space and time to the beInge in space and time 
is to be reconciled with the substant1allty of these beingeu
These object ions, however, are cer ta Inly not
conclusive, and all things coneideredr, we cannot honestly claim 
that our view that spatio-temporal beings are metaphysically 
prior to space and time ae such is any more than the most
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plausible hypothesiBo But before we can maintain even this 
muehp there are certain very dangerous argqrments which must be ■ 
answered.#’
Ill© In addition to the suggestions already examined
which are contained in our common sense thinking about the 
subject® there are formidable pîillosophleal arguments to the 
effect that space and time are prior to spatial and temporal 
beingso It will be convenient to discuss these arguments as
presented by Kant in the H Traznscandental Aeethetio**:^ Kant,-
indeed, wishes to establish more than the priority of space and
times, his primary aim is to show that the objecte of experience 
are no more than appearances end that space and time are forms 
of sensibility which depend on the nature of the experienoing 
subject# But in the course of hie exposition of the concepts 
of space and time, he i*ndieates the main considerations which 
might lead one to believe that space and time are is prior to 
the things In space and time.
Kant divides his exposition of the concepts of space end
time into two main parts# I.n the transcendenta 1 exposition 
of these concepts» he maintains that they are principles which 
alone can explain the possibility of other a priori synthetic 
knowledge » In the meta^y^^al expoeitiozi® he attempts to 
show by a direct examination of their nature that those 
eoBcepts are given a_ïi£lQni.
Or it loue o f Pure Re a son» A B
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în the transeendental exposition of the concept o f space, 
Kant begins from the premisn that in the science of geometry, 
we actually possess synthetic knowledge* And he
argues that such synthetic a.prlprl knowledge of the propeî^ties 
of space is possible, if and only i f  the original reprc^sentation 
o f space is an Intuition# This knowledge, since it
is synthetic, must be grounded in an intuition and not in a mere 
concept; and it cannot be derived from an empirical intuition, 
since it is a priori knowledge® Eant provides a similar? 
argument in the case of the concept of time® Here® we have
no science of geometry, but we do have some a priori synthetic 
knowledge of the nature of time, e.g® we know that, time ha© 
only one dimension® And the existence of this synthetic 
a .priori knowledge proves that the original representation 
of time is also an a priori intuition*
Two additional assumption©, however» are neceBsary, if 
one is to derive fro.m Kant’s transcendental exposition the 
cozieluslon that space and time are prior to the things in space 
and time# First» one must assume that the beings in space and
time are not known a priori# Becondly, one must assume that 
an element mbieh can be kzio?;n by an ^J^rlortl intuition must be 
prior in reality to an element which oarmot® If these
assumptions are granted, the conclusion, will followo If 
space and time are knoirn a priori, and if the things in space 
and time are known only a posteriori, and if,what is known 
a priori ie prior in reality to w^ hat ie known a posteriori,
JilartKraAestwaÉiyKSS « r u - J ï B ««-iV^ fw*>“ »*• tWkz&J#-hnit*»’ *
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then it follows that ©pace and time are prior to epatie-temporal 
beings©
How, the above argument could ziot be endorsed without 
mlsgrivings by anyone who wished to maintain that space and time 
are objective realities prior to the real beings which they 
contain© For the conclusion reached by Kant himself in the 
transoendental exposition Is that both space and time and spatial 
and temporal objects are what he calls ”transoendentally ideal”, 
and that space and time are merely a jirlorl forms of sensible 
intuition© However® Eant’s derivation of the transcendental 
ideality of space and time from the premiss that the original 
representations are a.^priQ5?i intuitions' m is not .completely 
conclusIve# What Kant says in this section does not prove 
the impoBBibility of an q ^ priori rational intuition of the nature 
of a fully real space and time, althoi|gh to assume such an 
intuition is certainly far from plausible, and in other places, 
Kant puts forward powerful objections against the reality of 
space and time, which we shall examine in due course©
But it makes no difference to our theory which of these 
two opposing positions Is accepted© If either is correct, 
the view that therce are real» substantial spatio-temporal beings 
which are prior to space and time as such will be refuted#
We must therefore attack the underlying argument on which both 
positions depend©
The two additional assumptions» which® as we have seen, 
are strictly recji ired in order to derive the priority of space
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and time from Eant*B tratiBcendental exposition are not self=* 
evidently trueo It is not» indâed» easy to deny that what
we know a priori must he prior in reality to what we can know 
only a posteriorio But the other assumption^, that spatlo-* 
temporal ohjects ere not known JiJirlori is certainly questionable* 
Kant himself maintains in the Transoendental Analytic that we 
do have an a priori knowledge of the general nature of spatio^
3**a«STS»0'»f»scW»ï5** •?'
tSSporal objectS'^ '^ w^e know » for example» that they are governed 
by causal lawso Therefore » Kant has to rely on the metaphysical
exposition to determine the relative priority of space and time 
and 0|)atio-»temporal beings® But if one maintains that the 
subject experience8 real external substances which are things 
in themselves» one cannot very well adO"pt this line of attack®
For it is extremely difficult» although perhaps not impossible» 
to justify an a priori knowledge of spatio««temporal beings 
which are things in themselves and not merely phenomenal objeotsB® 
Therefore» the assumption which we must challenge is the premiss 
which is Kant* s point of departure» that in mathematics we 
actually possess genuine synthetic a-priori knowledge®
At first sight» Kant’s position is plausible enough® 
Mathematical propositions do seem to be a .priori: they seem
to have a certain necessity which ie not shared by propositions
IT
derived from ordlnÿ experience® And mathematical propositions
do seem to be synthetic and informative^ they do not simply 
furnish an analysis of abstract concepts» but %)rovlde genuine 
information about the world in which we live® Hevertheless»
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there is a way in which it is possible» while taking account 
of these considerations» to maintain that Kant is mistaken 
and that the nature of mathemstieal knowledge ha© 'been mis«=> 
represented by those who base it on ^ 32Pig^ synthetic intuitions 
One may argue that mathematical propositions seem to be both 
synthetic and a-priori» only because of a certain fundamental 
ambiguity. Taken in one way» mathematical propositions are
^^pri^gril taken in another way» they are synthetic; but they 
are never unequivocally ^ p r i g ^  synthetic. The distinction 
which must be recognised may be described as the distinction 
between and applied^’ mathematics» or as the distinction
between an abstract mathematical system and its empirical 
interpréta t ion”,
0?he propositions in an abstract mathematical system are 
neoëseary and a ^ priorl® But the necessity has been introduced 
by the definitions of the mathematician? the meanings and 
relationships of the elements employed in the abstract system 
are l a M  down by definition. This means that the propositions 
in the system are not synthetic-^they are necessary» only 
because they are analytic, Hot all mathematical p-ropositionsp 
indeed» are analytic in the strict Kantian sens©«.<=»the prediaate 
is not always simply an unfolding of what is implicitly 
contained in the subject term. But ’'analytic*^ should be 
given a wider sense than Kant would allow; for one can hardly 
deny that a proposition in which two concepts of equal weight 
are interlocked in a specific way by definition is an analytic
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a priori proposition.
Therefore » :lt is possible to construet» for example» 
an a priori geometrical system in which all propositions are**F3itir33k*^u3tiiejkoiic^x).-sk6iS2rT37> ^
rigidly deduced from certain necessary axioms# But these  
geomletrieal axioms will not he eyxithetic. Geometrical axioms 
are synthetic» only if they are taken, not as mere definitions 
within an ahetract system, hijfas asserting a connection 
'between elements in the real, world. And we have no necessary 
guarantee that any particular geometrical system and, the axiome 
which It contains can he truly applied to a space which is other 
than an abstract system atic  construct-^^^to the space which is 
given in experience. If we take a geometrical axiom to he
synthetic » it is neither necessary nor a priori# It must he 
tested hy a reference to the data of experience, and such a 
test will never establish that the axiom is true, necessarily 
and always# For example, experience may confirm the axiom 
that apace has three and only three dimensions, but it will not 
prove that it is necessary that space have three dimcneionB 
or that space will always have three dimensions#
Recent developments in mathematics have tended to confirm 
the above account of mathematical knowledge® . The distinction 
between an abstract mathematical system and. its concrete 
^interpretation*' was not bo  clear in the case of traditional 
mathematics, because the abstract systems devised had an 
pbvious application to the world encountered in experience®
But the distinction between an abstract system and its pxppâirarà
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apx^li Gestion is clearer, when eye terns are constructed which have
no obvious application to the real world# It 1b possible
to construct geometrical systems which describe spaees with
four, five or any number of dimensions® Buch systems do not
differ in structure from the system which deserihee a space with
only three dimensions® The only difference is that the three-®
dimensional system has an apxxLicatlon to the actual world,
whereas the other systems have not® But the applicability
of Euclidean geometry is a contingent and empirical fact and
not a necessary and a_priqri truth.
At this p&lnt» must briefly consider an objection*
It may be argued that there are certain basics mathematical
principles to which the above account doe© not apx)ly, even if
there are some less fundamental principles which can be
adequately explained in this way* One may admit that the
axiom that space is three»«dimenBional is not a synthetic
truth and yet maintain that there are certain other
axioms which ere known to be true by an a ^ priori intuit ion®
For 0xa?n:ple» it is none too easy to prove that simple aritbmet^
leal propositions» such as 74^5*19» are not synthetic a priori
truths* In order to defend the priority of spatio-»temporal
rl
beings, it is strictly necessary to prove only that .sggmetttcal 
proposition© are not synthetic a. ^prioris nevertheless, we 
shall discuss this example briefly, because even in this 
extreme case, it is possible to dispute the Kantian view®
And if arithmetical propositions are not synthetic a_priqr1 ^
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it is unlikëly that any mathematical propositions are.
It is not at first sight plausible to make a distinction 
between ''pure*' arittaetic and ''applied*' arithmetic© There 
does not seem to be much difference,if any, between the abstract 
and its concrete coraelative "one thing plus another 
thing equals two things", because one supposes that arithmetical 
principles necessarily apply to the real world® It is 
reasonable to suggest that the applicability of a three«=> 
dimensional geometry to the actual world is a contingent fact, 
whereas it may not be thought reasonable to distinguish an 
abstract arltimetleal system which might not apply to the 
concrete reality# But there is no fundamental difference 
between the two caseso Arithmetical prlncipleB will apply 
to the external reality, if and only if this reality contains 
definite units which may be enumerated, so that arithmetical 
principles as such are not synthetic a'_.priori truths®
B 'Propositions in an abstract arithmetical system, which
is not applied to any real entitles, are, ihdeed, B^prigri, but 
they are analytic, not synthetloH® Kant is certainly right 
when he points out that in the ease of the proposition, 
the concept of twelve cannot be derived by an isolated analysis 
of the subject term. But it does not follow that the 
proposition tocnmgxrm is not analytic in the wider sense o§ 
being true by definition. One may suggest that arithmetical 
Xiropositions are true in virtue of the definitions of the 
symbols employed and the axioms prescribed by the mathematician
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to govern the arithmetical series which he has constructed.
The above discussion is m c h  too brief to do full 
justice to the important topic of the nature of mathematical 
knowledge # But we may be permitted to claim that we have 
shown, at least, that it is not nedessary to.admit that matlieraat»* 
leal knowledge is synthetic a...,priori and that an alternative
account is not unreasonable. To eummarisG the alternative
o
theory, if one employs mathematical propositions to create a 
consistent abstract system, then these pnopositiona are either 
axiofiîG true by definition or else follov/ necessarily fro# 
axioms true by definition® The mathematical propositions
are indeed necessary and a ^ priori» but they are also analytic.
If» on the other hand, one supposes that a mathematical 
proposition is making an assertion about the real world, then 
the proposition is synthetic, but it is not necesBarily true, 
nor can it be known to be true a priori.
To suggest a plausible alt^ernative to the Kantian view 
is not, of course, in itself enough to refute conclusively the 
theory that mathematical propositions are synthetic % d%ipr:%.
But this does show that an argument against the priority of 
spatlo<^temporal beings which depends on Kant* s transcendental 
exposition of the concepts of space and time is not an Insttper*^  
able objection. For it depends on,a premise which is certainly 
open to question“»«»a, j>remisB which, indeed, is diapiited by the 
majority of contemporary philosophers of mathamatiea.
We must now examine the raetaphyeical exposition of the
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concept© of ©pace and time, which Eant divides, into four parts* 
ICant* 8 first point is that space and time are not empirical 
concept© derived from our experience of spatial and temporal 
objects# For an experience of spatial and temporal objects 
1b possible only if representations of space and time are 
presupposed. But there is nothing in this ar^qament which 
would compel one to admit that ©pace and time are prior to 
spatiO"#temporal beings® One may agree that a repï?esentation
of time is essentially involved in all experience and that a 
representation of space ie Involved in the experience of 
external things, but the priority of space and time doe© not 
follow, unless one can show that spatio-temporal objecte are 
nont ©BBentially involved in the representations of apace and 
time.
The second argument which Kant develops ie more important 
and more dangerous, and it closes the gap which we noticed 
in the first argimient. Kant’s contention is that % e  can 
never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though wo 
can quite v/ell think it as empty of objects"':' and that % e  
cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time 
itself, though we can quite well thinîc time as void of 
appearancee® Wa can think of an empty space and an
empty time, but we cannot thinlt of objecte of a possible 
experience which are not in space and time. To be quite
ibid® » A 24& B 5Bo 
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accurate, Kant makes a distinction between space and time in 
this respect. He admits that there are objects of experience 
which are not in space, but he lays down that all appearances » 
all objects of a possible experience, must be in time. We 
shall restrict the discussion to the ease of time® A similar 
argument is possible in the case of spaco, but it is more 
eomplieated on account of Kant* b qualification that only the 
objects of outer experience must exist in apace.
How, if it is true that we can Imagine time without 
having to assume temporal beings within it, whereas cannot 
imagine possible objects of ezperilii'cse which do not exist in 
time g then it would seem that time as such must be prior to 
the temporal- objects of experience® We shall grant Kant’s 
assertion that we cannot thlnïc of possible objects of experience 
which are not subject to a temporal condition. But one can 
show that Kant’b argument does not prove the priority of time 
to temporal beings, if one makes a careful distinction within 
the premiss that the conception of time does not require the 
assumption of temporal beings to occupy time.
When one aays that one can think of an empty time, one 
may mean that one can suppose that time might have in some sense 
a real existence wiîthnut having to suppose the real existence 
of a manifold of finite temporal beings; or else, one may mean 
simply that one can form an abstract conception of a scheme of 
temporal relationships which does not imply the existence of
Gonci’ete temporal tielnge. Mow, If one chooses the former
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Interpreta11on of this premiss, the priority of time to temporal 
beings will indeed follow, if the premiss he true. But If 
this interpretation is accepted, one may seriously question 
its truth. For can one think of time as really existing 
unless one assumes the existence of individual temporal beings ‘ 
to distinguish the various parte of time? Time is real, only 
if there is a real distinction between before and after, and 
there is a real distinction between before and after,only if 
there is one real being which comes before, and another which 
comes after.
On the other hand » if one is simply asserting that one
c anCTH form an abstract conception of time which does not imply
the real existence of temporal beings, the premise is probably
true, although one may still have to postulate abstract elements
of some so:ct to serve as tame for the temporal relationships.
But it does not follow that this empty time, abstractly
conceived, is prior in reality to the concrete temporal indivld**
uals. We must admit that A is prior in reality to B, if A
can exist without B -whareas B cannot exist without A« But
we cannot say that A is metaphysically prior to B, if the mere
.HShee^t^ign of A does not pz*esuppose the conception of B,
whereas the conception of B does presuppose the conception of A*
b
To H illustrate the point, the concept of a eu^e does
involve the concept of a square, whereas the concept of a 
square does not involve the concept of a cube or any other 
solid object. But this does not prove that square surfaces
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are prior :ln reality to solid objects which incorporate square 
surfaces. For although a cube cannot exist unless its square 
surfaces also exist, neither can a square exist in the real 
world in and by itself, but only as a surface of some solid 
object® And indeed, in the light of what was said previously 
about the nature of metaphysical priority, it is much more 
plausible to suggest that it is the solid or cube which is 
prior in reality» since it would seem that the solid is the 
complete substantial being, rather than the square surface, 
which is merely an element which may be abstracted from the 
solid in wdxieh it is included®
To apply the above principles to the case of time, time 
as such is not necessarily prior to temporal beings, even if it 
is possible to form the conception of an abstract system of time 
which does not involve the conception of temporal beings, 
whereas any conception of temporal beings does involve the 
conception of time. For although the existence of temporal 
beings presupposes the existence of time, the real existence 
of time also presupposes the existence of temporal bainge.
And just as a cube may be metaphysically prior to its square 
Eiurfaces, so temporal beings may be metaphysically prior to time 
as such®
But it is the third and fourth sections of the metaphyaical 
exposition which contain the most forceful ax^ gsument in favour of 
the priority of space and time to spatial and temporal beings* 
Kant’s main purpose in these sections is to prove that the
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original rexxreeentatiens of space and time are not concepts but 
pure Intuitionso But in the course of his discussion, he 
maintains that the various determinate parts of apace cannot be 
prior to the one all-^embraeing space in which they are included* 
Space as a whole cannot be constituted by its parts; for the 
parts presuppose the whole, since every determinate part of 
apace is possible only through the delimitation of space as such, 
Moreovez^» space as a whole must be infinites "Space is 
represented, as an infinite given m a g n i t u d e ® T h i n k  of any 
finite extension, no matter how large» and one finds that one 
is assuming a space beyond^within which the boundaries of the 
finite volume are determined® We cannot conceive of a finite 
space which is the totality of space» because we must at the 
same time assume a space beyond these finite limits* Mow» 
if space is infinite» it can be neither derived from nor 
posterior to any finite being or any finite group of finite
t lk
beings» since the spatial extension of any finite being 
^ space beyond its own boundaries®
There is a corresponding argvmient in the case of time* 
"Every determinate magnitude of time ie possible only through 
limitations of one single time that underlies Any
finite duration of time présupposés a farther time within which 
its boundaries are determined® And we cannot think of a limit
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to time as a whole without assuming the existence of a time on 
the other side of this limit® We cannot thiâiïc of a beginning 
to time? We cannot suppose that the temporal series originated 
at a definite point in the past: for, in thinlcing of a
beginning to time, we are covertly assuming, prior to the 
official beginning of time, a time within which the moment of 
origination is determined* Therefore» time as such is infinite 
and must be prior to any finite temporal being or any finite 
groupj^ of temporal baingSo
This is, an argument which cannot be legitimately used 
by those who wish to maintain that space and time are objective 
realities which are metaphysically prior to the real spatio-­
temporal beings in the world® The reason wixy can be explained 
most convincingly in connection wdth the series of past time#
Kant holds that every finite time prcssupposes a time beyond^ 
within which its limits are determined® Now, if e^ery finite 
duration presupposes a time which precedes it, the series of 
past time which is formed by moving from a finite duration to 
its predecessor cannot be finite: it must be an infinite series#
But this means that there is no real totality of past time.
% e  series of past time can never be completed® We use the 
term "infinite" to refer to just that type of serial order v/here 
we can never reach a final totality» where the series can never 
be completed by successive operations® There are, indeed, 
mathematical techniques for dealing with the sum to infinity of
certain series» but the existence of these techniques does not
prove the reality of a eompleted Infinite series » any more than 
the existonce of techniques for dealing with the square root of 
minus one proves that this entity is a real number®
But if time is real, the series of past time must he a 
completed infinite series. Uniess the series of past time up
to the present moment has actually 'been completed» time» so to 
speak» could never have got as far as the present moment# - The 
existence of the present moment preBirppèaes the existence » in 
some sense » of the totality of all prior momenta in the temporal 
contimmm# But it was shown above that the series of past time 
is an infinite series which can never be completed® The
conclusion is that time and the temporal series cannot be real
boinge# Those who believe that space and time are perfecting 
real are confronted with a dilemm® Space and time must be 
either f-Pnite or inf In it e. Mow» they cannot be real finite
beings» since every finite space or timeî pz^esupposes a further 
space or time® Mor can they be real infinite beings, for 
this ui^ ould require the actual completion of an infinite series » 
which 1b impoBBible® It would seam that one is driven to 
accept Kant’b aolution» that Bpaco and time are merely forms of 
sensible intuition, contributed to the object of experience 
by the experiencing subject®^ :'
e The above argument is very similar to the argument employed
by Kant in the First Antinomy, A 4B6«-435 B 454-*401®)
But the difference 1b that the above'^argiment is developing the 
eonsequenees of the supposition that space and time are real 
totalities» finite or infinite» whereas in the First Antinomy» 
Kant ie drawing out the absurd implications of the hypothesis 
that the world is a real totality, finite or infinite as regards
an infinite' space and time.
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it is, however, small eonsolatIon that this argument will 
demolish the position wiiieh we originally set ± out to challenge, 
since if it is valid» it will be equally fatal to the view which 
we ourselves wish to defend® Indeed, Kant’s thesis that space 
and time and the being© in space and time are not objectively 
real things in themselves will damage our central position mich 
more vitally than the view that space and time are objective 
realities metaphysically prior to the real spatlo-»temporal 
beings in the world# Therefore, if we wish to maintain that 
the Bpatio<^temporal extensive continuum is an objective order 
which depends on the finite substances which we encounter in 
experience, then we must endeavour to answer Kant’s very poweribil 
arguments® But It is very difficult to fihd a flaw in Kant’s 
argumient or to suggest an alternative solution to the dilemma 
concerning the nature of space and time as a whole * This 
task we shall 'postpone until the next chapter when we shall be 
investigating the nature of space and time in more detail®
We shall argue that the spatio-temporal order ie finite with 
respect to the past and infinite with respect to the future. 
Althoug;h it is not easy to make this suggestion as convincing 
as one would desire, heroic measures may be justified in order 
to avoid denying the common sense belief in the reality of the 
' spatio*-terrtpora 1 world®
To sum up this discussIon, the attempt to use the ©patio- 
temporal contlmmm to individuate and determine the uninuenosG 
of the being© in the world must break down, unless one can
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produce a good z*eason for doubting the intuition that the 
being© in the world are substances which are metaphyaically 
prior to space and time as such# For one cannot explain what 
is prior in terms of an element which is posterior and dependent. 
We have suocesefully answered certain arguments v/hich seemed 
to prove that space and time must be prdbor to the beings in 
space and time® And the argimient which has as yet been loft 
unanswered cannot be used to pro%^ e that s%)aôe and time may 
determine the uniqueness of every real spatio-temporal being#
For although this argument maintains the priority of space and 
time » it also Implies that zieither epaoe and time as such nor 
the beings in space and time are fully real# Space and time, 
Kant holds, are transcendentally ideal» being forms of intuition 
impoBOd by the experiencing subject, îio?/ever» this argument 
constitutes a very formidable and fimdermental objection to our 
entire position, and it must be examined carefully in the 
following chapter«
IV# We must therefore reconsider the other suggestion
which was mad© at the begizming of the present chapter, that 
the uniqueness of the beings in the world is determined by their 
specific character or quality® We find within a being an 
element which is indicated by any of the terms "definiteneee", 
"whatnees", "oBeence", "charaetez^"/'quality" » "mature" and so on< 
How, if the definiteness of a being is, ae some believe » an 
individual essence» it will obviously be logically adequate
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to distinguish the being In question from all other heInge#
But if the défini tone 8 8 of a being :1b a specif io universal 
character which, in principle, may have many instantlatlone,
It 'would eeem that the different be Inge in the world will not 
necessarily be dlBtlnguished by their specific de fini ten© s se s % 
However, the view that the imiqueness of each being is determined 
by its specific universal character is moz»e plausible than it 
appears at first sight» and a detailed examination is required®
At first sight, it seems that, although different beings 
very often differ in univereal character, it is not possible 
to use the specific universal character of a being to distinguish, 
it from all other beings or as a metaphysical principle of 
indivicMatiora® Every concrete boizig in the woz’M  is unique 
and unrepeatable, whereas a universal is by definition repeatable 
and its own specific nature will only distinguish it from all 
olther universaIs® A imlversai is an entity which is capable
Of an indefinite number of instantiations® How, then, can
miiversM© be used to indicate the distinct uniqueness of 
concrete beings, since a universal» by its very definition, 
cannot be used to discriminate among the many instantiations 
of which It is capable?
But although one cannot deny that a univereal character, 
no matter how complex» la In principle capable of an indefinite 
number of inetantlations, nevertheless, one may argue that thep 
system of the universe is such that it prohibits in fact the 
duplication of the total specific universal character of any
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being® If this is g o , the eosÿplex imivereal which constituteo 
the total definiteneBB oi? "whatnesa" of a being will he suffio#» 
lent to clistingulah *it from all other beings and to determine it 
as absolutely unique# Any partial element in the character 
of a being may be repeated elsewhere and at other times, but 
the total character of the being will never be and. can never 
be repeated®
We were prepared to concede that the spatlo-temporal 
extensive continuum Is logically adequate to distinguish a 
being from all the other beings in the world : objection was
thatthis continuum could not be used to determine the uniqueueas 
of these beings,, since it was posterior and not prior to them* 
But we shall endeavour to prove that, notwithstandtog certain 
ingenious arguments to the contrary, the specific universal 
character of an individual is not even logically adequate to 
disting^ixlsh it fro# all other possible individtaal bei3igs#
If one wishes to use the specific universal characters 
of beings, as the principle of individuation, one must prove that 
the nature of the universe is such as to prevent the repetition, 
by another being, of precisely the same universal quality as 
characterises a being already in existence# But how is this 
possible? It is clearly Illegitimate to invoke some Principle 
of the Identity of IndiBcerniblos which would state dogroatieally 
that two beings which are indistinguishable with, respect to 
their total universal chaz"actor must be one and the same being® 
To use such a principle would be to beg the point at issue#
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For it has been assumed that identity in total universal 
charaoter is equivalent to identity in all reepeots^and it 
has not been shown that two beings which share the same 
universal character may not differ in some other way, e®g'« 
numerically#
Now, if one restricts the total universal character of 
a being to what one may call its qualitative characterIstics, 
it ie very implausible to suppose that the specific character 
of one being could never be repeated by another being* But 
if one also includes in the total character of a being its 
specific relations, direct and indirect, to other beings, the 
plausibility of this view is very significantly increased.
If the total character of a being involves specific universal 
relations to ± other beings, each of which has its own total 
character involving specific universal relations to other beings, 
each of vdiieh has its own total character etc., then the.charact^ 
©r of a single being involves, directly and indirectly, an 
almost infinite complexity, and the repetition of the character 
of one being would seem to require the duplication of the entire 
universe with which that being; is eomieeted.
If one also maintaine that space and time are constituted 
by the spatial and temporal relations of one being to another, 
one may claim that one is according due recognition to the 
common sense belief in the individuating power of the spatio- 
temporal extensive continuum, wlthout having to suppose that 
the orders of space and time are objective and independent
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0 x1Btents# For these spatial and temporal relations to other 
beings will form an Important part of the total universal 
eheractar which determines the uniqueness of a being; and in 
certain instances, one will have to appeal to the specific 
spatial and temporal relations of a being in order to distinguish 
it from another being with which it is identical in other 
respects.
But even if w© do include in the total universal 
character of a being its spatial and temporal relations to 
other beings, is this enough to define that being as absolutely 
unique? The reproduction of the character of any given being 
would indeed require the reproduction of the entire spatio- 
temporal world in which the given being is implicated, but is 
this impossible? It Is  certainly not very likely that the 
whole universe to which the being is related has somewhere or 
other an exact duplicate, but if we can even conceive the 
possibility of such a state of affairs, this will prove that 
the total character of a being is not logically adequate to 
individuate it« A feature which we take to be responsible 
,for the unique individuality o f any being must be such that it 
1b completely impossible for the same feature to be shared by 
another being® A genuine principle of individuation must be 
a dietingznlehing mark which will always allow us to diffe]?ent- 
late between different beings® On© must show that there is 
not even the possibility of a case arising where the supposed 
principle of individuation will be unable to allow a distinction
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"between beings which are really distinct»
But one can argue very cogently that the duplication of 
the miiverse with whichja given being 1 b connected 1 b  absolutely 
impoBsible» that the total specific universal character of a 
being does not simply include relations to other belngs-»it 
must inelizclé specific relationB, direct or indirect, to all 
other beings without exception® For we cannot even conceive 
the poBsibility of two universes or two beings which are com­
pletely unconnected» As we have already Been*» a plurality 
of unrelated reals is impossible# If there are many real 
beings, these many beings must form a single plm’ality, and the 
members of this plurality must be interconnected In some way# 
Therefore, the universe in mizich a given being is implicated 
must be absolutely unique. If we poetzilate the existence of 
a group of beings which we suppose to duplicate the given 
universe g this group of beings must somehow be related to the 
original universe and must therefore be included in Its unity# 
If there is to be any duplication of the total character of a 
being, this must take place within the one actual universe♦
But the attempt to use t3i$ total uziiversai character of 
a being to determine its uniqueness breaks down because we can 
In fact conceive of a case where two beings are identical- in 
total character g although they are related to one another and 
are both included in one and the same universe# Let us 
imagine a world in wiiich there are i?m groups of beings,
o cf* above,
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B’ and. B", which are related by the relation 3?» and which have 
the same internal character B. How B’ and B" have the siwae 
internal character B and. the same relational character rB, so 
that, although distinct» they are identical in total character 
and every member of the first gz»oup has an exact counterpart 
in the second group.
Wo have been assuming that the relation between B’ and B" 
is a symmetrical relation, that is, that the relation of B’ to 
is the same .as the relation of B" to B’ # But if the relation 
between the two groups were asymmetrical , if the relation, 
when directed from B" to B’ were different from what it is when 
directed from B’ to B", the situation would be quite different# 
If the relation was pq, B’ would have the relational character'^* 
istic pqB, whereas B" would have the relational characteristic 
çîpB* B’ and B" v/ould be distinct in total character#
Therefore, if one could prove that the specific relations of 
a given being to all other beings must be aspnmetrieal, then 
the situation described above would, not be a x'*eal possibility#
There is certainly evidence that asymmetrical relationei 
are very Important in the univez'^ ee® The temporal relations 
between beings are vary fundamental» and temporal relations are 
obviously asymmetrical® If A is in the past of B and B is in 
future of A, the zîte relatlorry of A to B is clearly not the same 
as the relation of B to A# Temporal relations have a 
direction and the relation of past to future ie the opposite 
of the relation of future to past® But can one claim that
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all relations between real beings are necessaz*ily asymmetz"Ical?
In a later chapter, we shall argue that all direct relations 
between beings in the world are and must be asyimnetrlcal trane^* 
temporal relations® But even if this is granted, it will not 
be sufficient, since not all beings are directly related®
And it does not follow from the fact that all direct relations 
are asyimiietrical that all indirect relations are likewise 
aByfnmetrical® The indirect relation between A and B will be 
oyyiimetrloal if these two beings are linked by a third being: G 
to which both A and B have the same asymmetrical relation pq«
The relation of A to B will be the same as the reXatlo:n of B 
to A, namely, pqQqp.
But in any ease» even If one could establish the truth of 
the principle that the total character of a being must include 
specific asymmetrical relations to all other beings, this still 
would not prove that the beings in the v;orld can be individuated 
by means of their total characters. Professor Ayer* doBcribes 
a world in which there wouD.d be an IM'lnlte number of beings 
with the same total character » even although the above prtooipl© 
was strictly obeyed. Ayer’s suggestion is that history may 
be eyeliealp the whole process being without any definite and 
uniquely characterised beginning or end® If this were so, 
then every cyi^lo, although asyrfimetrieally related to the infinite 
number of other cycles stretching before and after, would be 
identical in total character with every other cycle, and each
* efo The Problem of Knowledge (London, 1956) pp# 1B5«-186.
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being within a cycle would have an infinite number of exact 
Gomiterpaz’ts» This ie Indeed, a© Ayer admits, a fanciful 
BUggéetion» hut the very fact that this suggestion can he 
Bignificantly made proves that it is not impossihle for heings 
to differ » although identical in total character. There is 
an irreducible difference hetween the uniqueness of a hèlng 
and the B'peoifio nature of its total character.
Moreover, a genuine principle of individuation, as we 
have Been» must not only he logically adequate to distingaish 
every 'being from every other helng;, it must also he meta­
physically prior to the "beings which it individuates# We 
have seen that the specific universal characteristics of beings 
cannot even meet the first of these two requircements* Let us 
now■ consider 'briefly whether or not they can meet the second*
Are universal© metaphysically prior to the heinge which they 
characterise? It Is very difficult to maintain that they are* 
In the first place, universal characters or properties would 
seem to "foe merely derivative aspects of the substantial beings 
which they qualify* Our sense of the priority of a substance 
to its universal eharactere is evidenced by the very metaphors 
which we naturally employ to describe the situation* We talk, 
for instance, about a substance "possessing" certain qualities* 
And in the second place, if we suppose that unlversals are 
metaphysically prior to the substances in the world, we shall 
have to postulate, with Plato, the Independent existence of 
a realm of universal©, and it is not easy to justify such
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a postulate or to reconcile this realm with the realm of 
individual ezibstancee.
Thus, the iznlquenese of an individual being can be 
determined neither by its position in a spatio-temporal 
extensive continuum, nor by the group of univex^sal characters 
which it Instantiates® But this Is a negative result, and we 
have not yet shown what the principle of individuation is*
We have seen that an indispensable prerequisite of a principle 
of Individuation is that it should be metaphysically prior to 
the beings whose unique individuality it purpoz*ts to explain* 
Bowp the beings in the world are substances, and substantial 
being is metaphysIcally prior to all other modes of being*
This means that any principle of individuation with respect to 
the beings in the world must itself be a substance* It is not 
impossible that there exists a transcendent substance which is 
metaphysically prior to the finite substances in the world and 
which is their principle of individuation* For example, if 
there is a God» who has created the universe of finite beings, 
it is reasonable to suggest that the principle of Individuation 
is to be found in the natuz’e of God® But a discussion of this 
suggestion is beyond the scope of the present enquiry into the 
structure of the world*
If one is unwilling to postulate the existence of a 
transcendent God, then on© must admit that, strictly speaking, 
there is no such thing as a principle of individuation* The 
unique individuality of the beings in the world is an ultimate
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which cannot be explained in terms of an external principle®
But even if one maintains that It is the individual ‘being Itself 
which is responsible for its uniqueness, there are still 
questions which may he asked— questions which may or may not 
turn out to he meanlngilil* Are there such things as indiv­
idual essences— defining characters which, unlike the universal 
characters discussed above, are in principle and by their very 
nature confined to the substances which they define? And is 
the distinctness of each and every substance to be attz^ibuted 
'0 to its individual essence or to its unique existence? But 
these are questions which we cannot attempt to answer in the 
present work.
V* Before leaving the topic of the uniqueness of beings,
there is one farther important problem which must be discussed. 
We wish to maintain the lullque individuality of all the sub­
stantial beings in the world® But how is it possible to 
formulate a significant proposition which will succeed in 
expressing what we want to say? If we assert that every 
substance is unique, are we not, ±n effect, ascribing to all 
substances a universal characteristic » namely "uniqueness"?
But how can one use a universal characteristic to express the 
fact that every substance is unique? To say that a being 1b 
Unique is to mean that it Is distinct from all other beings| 
but we have just seen that universals cannot be used to 
aiG'fcingulsh. one "being from all others. Indeed, slnee the
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uniTel'usai characteriBtic ’xHiiqueness*’ ie to l)e attributed to 
ever^ substance^ it cannot *be used to distlniçuish one substance 
from other substance. Striving to express the unique 
peculiarity of each substance s> we have actually gone to the 
opposite exti’*eme and have predicated a character common to 
all substances®
But this problem seems insoluble only b o  long as we 
neglect the fact that the universal character ^\mlqueness'® is 
not the only element invoitved in the assertion ’^ Every substance 
is unique^®» There are perhaps some propositions v/hich are 
confined to explaining the relations between universaisj e.g. 
**Blu0 is a colour**. But there are other propositions#
propositions concerning mattei’s of fact and existeaice#which 
involve more than mere universale® Such propositions essent^
ially involve a reference to concreteg individual beings.
Take# for example# the proposition# **This cup is blue**. It 
would seem that we are here predicating a universal oharacterist^ 
io; **bluenesB** of a concrete individual subject. This kind 
of proposition essentially implicates the individual being or 
group of individual beings to which the universal x?redicate is 
attributed. And in every proposition about the world# there 
is an implicit recognition of the particular existence of the 
subject.o Therefore# it is possible to understand the 
distinct uniqueness of every being# since in any matter of fact 
propos it ioh one refers# and in some sense knows that one is
Bee note at the end of the chapter.
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referring# to a unique individual subjacto How# in the ease 
of ordinary practical and scientific propositions concerning the 
nature of the world# it is the spécifie universal characters# 
ascribed to the individual subjects# which engage our attention® 
What is important for us is not the uniqueness of the being on 
the other side of the street# but the fact that it is a cat and 
not a tiger. What interests ub is not that there is an 
individual being lying in our path# but that the being in 
question is air# which we can easily displace# rather than a 
lamp post# which we cannot. The individual uniqueness of the 
subject of any proposition about the nature of the real world 
is a constant and invariant factor# and as such does not normally' 
occupy the focus of one*s attention. But there Is nothing to 
prevent a philosophez? from making explicit the uniqueness of the 
subjects of matter of fact propositions# if he so desires.
This can be done by ixsing a proposition like **Every substance 
is unique**. Here# the predicate explicitly directs one’s 
attention to the uni queuess of the subject*
But this is not a complete solution to the problem.
.For how can one use a universal predicate **uniciueness** to 
direct one’s attention to the unique being of a substance?
And it is not easy to deny that ** uni queue b a** is a universal# 
eommon to all beings# which.v/e ascribe to individual beings when 
we assert that they are uhlque. In order to solve this 
problem# it will be helpful to consider a parallel cas€^ «»»>the 
case of existence. **Exlstenoe*% too, would seem to be a
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universal characteristic which we ascribe to beings when we 
assert that they exist* Philosophers have often been pUKHlcd 
by the problem in conraaetion with existence# although they have 
tended to neglect the corresponding problem in connection with 
uniqueness •
The problem is: **How can one express the real existence
of a being by ascribing to it the universal eharacteristic 
’existence’?** It is tempting to answer this problem by simpl]^ 
denying that ’^existence** is a universal-»-**Bxistence is not a 
predicate**. Those who believe that there is a universal 
oharaeteristie **exiètence** # it may be alleged# have misunderstood 
the logical function of the verb *Ho exist**® When one says# 
for example# that ghosts exist# or do not exist, one is not 
saying that ghosts possess# or do not possess# the universal 
character **existence*** SSîow# it must be admitted that the verb 
**to exist** is not always uieecl to assert the poesession of a 
certain universal characteristic* What settles the matter is 
the paradox in which one becomes involved if one attempts to 
interpret in this way the proposition that something or other 
does not exist* One must assume the existence of anything 
to which one attributes or refuses a certain character# and if 
one denies that a thing possesses the character **existence** # 
one is at once asserting and denying the existence of that 
thing* But this does not prove that the verb **to exist**
Bradley# however, is well aware of the difficulty when he 
distinguishes between the **thia** and Of*
Appearance and Eeality#
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can never be used to ascribe to a being the universal character*» 
is tic ’^existence**® There is nox reason why **to exist** should 
not have two distinct iVnctions. Although it is absurd to 
refuse the character ’’existence** to a given being, it is not 
necessarily absurd to ascribe the character ’’existence** to a 
being® The absurdity in the first case is due# not to the 
illegitimate use of**existence" as a charaotéristlc, but to the 
contradiction which has been introcluaed® Thus, a metaphysician 
may say, "Substances exist" and mean more tha1% "There are 
substances"® The sentence "Bubstances exist" may be used 
to assert that different eubetances all have this in common, 
that they exist, and how can we understand this identity in 
difference except as a universal characteristic? There must
be a universal "existence" sine© existence is an element shared 
by all real things.
There is another possible objection to the vie?/ that 
there is a universal character, "existence"* One may leglt-^ » 
imately combine a universal v/ith any other universal, so long 
as the Law of Contradiction is not transgressed® For example,
one may combine together the group of universal characters which 
define a unicorn® Kow, If "existence" is a universal, 
"existence" may be legitimately added to this group, since the 
existence of unicorns does not involve a contradiction. It 
?/ould seem to follow that unicorns exist, and this is false® 
Therefore 5 "existence" cannot be a universal®
But this objection can be answered® The real existence
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of unicorns does not fo3,low from the fact that the universal 
chai^acteps which define a unicorn may be combined with the 
universal "existence"® To combine into a complex universal 
the characters "uniaorn-ness" and "existence" is by no means 
the same thing as to assert the real existence of a unicorn.
To assert the real existence of anything is to make a judgment, 
and in making a judgment about the world# we do not simply
I
combine universal characteristicso This, indeed# is generally 
recognised, b|s»t it is not usually so clearly recognised that the 
principle will hold good, even if one universal characteristic 
is the universal "existenee'%
B\it a further difficulty iïTimedlately presents itself.
We have seen that if "existence" is a universal concept# it 
may be combined with other universal concepts# the concept of 
a unicorn, for example® But what is added to the concept of 
$ unicorn# when one adds the concept of existence? The concept 
of an existenit unicorn does not seem to be signlf icantly diff#* 
erent from the bare conee%)t of a unicorn. The concept of 
an existent hundred thalers^ -^  woüld seem to contain no added 
determination over and above the bar© concept of a hundred 
thalerso And since we are maintaining that the mere concbpt 
of an existent hundred thalers is radically different from the 
assertion that the hundred thalers really exist# it would, seem 
that this added concept of existence is meaningless and without 
any function. The solution to this difficulty is perhaps
ef« Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 598<=«*600p B 686-698.
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to say that the reason why the concept of an existent unicorn 
does not differ from the concept of a unieorn Is that the 
concept of a unicorn already implies the concept of existence 
in the same way as the concept of blue implies the concept of 
colour® Whenever we form a valid concept# i.e. a concept
which obeys the Law of Gontradiction, we suppose that the ' . 
object conceived is possible® That is® we eoi^ive it as a 
possible existent and necessarily include&l in our concept the 
concept of existence® The qualification expressed by the 
term "possible" refers to the fact that we have not determined 
whether or not to assert the real existence of the object 
conceived®
Finally, it is worth noting that the assumption of a 
universal concept "existence" does not preclude one from 
subscribing In general to the Kantian answer to the ontological 
argument* Even if the concept of the ens realissimimi Is
taken to include necessarily the concept of existence# this 
will not entitle one to posit the real existence of such a being 
as an object which is something more than a mere concept® 
Moreover# if the argument of the previous paragraph is correct, 
it will 'provide another conclusive objection to the ontological 
argument® If every self-consistent concept necessarily implies
existence, the concept of the ens realiBsimuii} 
will not be in a special position®
To' return to the original problem® it seems that we can 
refer to that element in the constitution of a being which is
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its existence# only by making use of a universai eharaoteristio* 
There is a characteristle "existence" which may be legitimately 
attributed to every being which existso But it is clear that
the real existence of a being is no mere universal character**» 
istic. The solution to the problem is perhaps to maintain 
that there is a universal characteristic or meaning "existence" 
which may be used to refer one to its instantiations# the 
existence of particular facte® But an instantiation of the
universal "existence" is a very different thing from the 
universal "existence" as such. One might say that a universal 
like "redness" is essentially uncha%)ged when it is instantiated, 
when it acquiree a real existence as opposed to its conceptual 
existence as an object of thought. This may not be the 
correct account of the situation ,even in the case of uhlversal© 
like "rednGBs"* And it is certainly not the correct account 
in the case of the universal "existence"© To exist is indéed 
to possess a eertato abstract universal oharaeteristie "exist­
ence". But concrete existence is very much more than the 
poBsessionif of such a universal character. That is, the 
relation between an existing fact and the universal "existence" 
which it instantiates is not adequately described by saying that 
the fact "possesses"the universal, i.e© incorporates it un­
changed in its constitution. The metaphor is m%± misleading. 
And it is not a fatal objection that one cannot provide an 
alternative positive description of this relation of instant- 
iation. For one may argue that the relation of instantiation
p.190.
is a quite ftmdamental relationship which cannot he deecrihed 
in other terms © Thus# one may use the universal concept 
"existence" m to refer to the real existence of beings, since 
a universal may be used to f refer one to its instantiations, 
and the instantiations of the universal "existence" are very 
different from the universal itself.
A similar solution can be given to the similar problem 
in connection with uniqueness. When we say that every 
substance is unique# we are using a completely generic universal 
"uniqueness" to refer to the unique being of each substance«
How# this is possible# because a universal may be used to refer 
to its instantiations# and the instantiations of the universal 
"uniqueness" are not themselves universale# but unique facts*
The element in a being ?/hich we must call its uniqueness is not 
simply a universal character which the being "possesses".
Just as to exist is more than to possess the character 
"existence", so to be unique is more than to possess the 
charaGter "uniqueness".
The above discussion is very relevant to a problem 'which 
was considered in the previous chapter-*»the problem of thought 
and reality* The problem raised by Bradley is in esBence,
"Ho?/ can one thi%dc of a reality which is other than thought?
Hovr can thought transcend itself in order to provide one ?;ith 
some knowledge and under standing of what Is not thought?"
In a sense# we can add little to the solution ?;hieh we suggested 
before— one can think of a reality beyond thought# because
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thought by its very nature involves a reference to a reality 
beyond the process of thinking in its subjective aspect*
And if one makes further inquiries as to the nature of
this reference# if one asks for an explanation of the meaning 
of the preposition "about" which we use when we say that thought 
is essentially about a reality distinct from thought# there is 
little to say in reply. One might, perhaps® discover more 
appropriate terms to describe the structure of thought as we 
knoi? it, but it is not likely that one will ever be able to 
explain why thought has the nature and structure which it seems 
to have. We must accept as an ultimate and fundamental fact 
that thought is an activity which has its own nature and its 
own laws® and we must not suspect a paradox because thought 
cannot be assimilated to other activities v/hieh do not have the 
eanie se If-transcendence or because the nature of thought cannot 
be explained in other terme.
But the t?/o problems discussed above do thro?/ light on
the problem of thought and reality, since they are# in effect,
specifications of this very problem. The reality beyond 
thought® we supx^ose, has a real existence and is unique. In
03?der to think about these aspects of reality# ?;e must use the
universal concepts "existence" and "uniqueness"* Thus# we
Bee that in fact we are dealing with specific aspects of the 
problem of thought and reality when ask, "How is it possible 
to use the irniversal concepts "existence" and "uniqueness" to 
refer to a real existence and a unique b e i n g ? T h e  solutions
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suggested to these two problems follov; much the same pattern 
as the solution to the original problem of thought and reality—  
?;e simply asserted that it is inherent in the very nature of a 
universal that it can be used to refer to its instantiations® 
v/hich are not themselves uhlversais. In the last analysis, 
we can no more explain how a universal can refer to or can be 
instantiated by entities which are not unlversals® than we 
could explain how it is possible to think about a reality 
beyond thought * But to exhibit the interconneotion of these 
three problems end to show^  that a similar solution can be given 
in each ease does seem to increase the plausibility of the 
whole account*
NOTEo We do not wish to maintain that all matter of fact
propositions have exactly the same logical structure as "This 
cup is blue." When we make an assertion about the world, 
we are not always attributing a universal predicate to an 
individual subject® Some times® both subject and predicate 
Involve a reference to unique individual beings, e®g® the 
proposition#"This animal is a lifcon." This proposition may, 
of course, be reframed so that it conforms to the logical 
structure of "This cup is blue"# becoming "This animal is 
leonine." Now# for certain purposes, this odd translation 
is equivalent to the proposition which it translates, but the 
two propositions are# nevertheless, not exactly the same*
Both subject and predicate of the proposition, "This animal
P*196*
is a lion" refer to an individual ‘being® whereas in the ease 
of the supposed translation® the predicate is a universal and 
only the subject refers to a concrete individual* It is 
perhaps easier to being out the uniqueness of individuals, if 
one uses a proposition v/ith the structure of "This animal is. 
a lion", where both subject and predicate refer directly to 
unique beings and not to universais® e.g. "All substantial 
beings are unique individuals." (We could not, of course@
accept the interpretation of this proposition which would be 
offered by many eytiabolic logicians® who would take it as merely 
aaaerting a connection be'Ween unlvereals and making no 
existential commitment* Bee the discussion of the dietinetlon 
between the two meanings of "all"— "all" referring to an actual 
totality oT axistents and "all" referring to a universal 
raeanlng-ln Paul Weisss Modes of Being;, 8.87.)
OHAPTEH BIX.
THE TOaSTHEimSBB OF BEINGS*
The .fimdmnental as sumption of this thesis® that there 
are in the world many substantial beings® has two main implic»* 
ationso In the previous chapter# we dlecussed the implication 
that every substantial being is unique and distinct from all 
other beings. In the present chapter# we shall deal with the 
other implications that the many substantial beings in the vmrld 
are interrelated and form some sort of uni ty--^  the y arê^  together 
in the same universe* The elements in a many must be related; 
for a plurality of completely unrelated reals is impossible.
One cannot think of a plurality without at the same time 
thinlcing of the unity of the plurality*
Thus# the various substantial beings in the world are 
all interrelated in some way# and this gives rise to a very 
serious problem^ Ho?/ is the Interrelatedness of beings to be 
reconciled with their substantial independence? In the first 
chapter® pointed out that substances are independent and 
self-existent beings® which provide the reason for their own 
existence in a way in which the±3S properties of substances do 
not— properties are to be explained by a reference to the 
substantial being in which they are included and which is 
metaphyBically prior to them* Of course# this self-existence 
and independence of substances must not be Interpreted in too
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stringent a way. When we say that a substance provides the 
reason for its own existence® we do not wish to deny the reality 
of causal eonditioning. We do not deny that there is a mod© 
of explanation according to which the coming to be of a substance 
of a certain, specific type is to be exiflained by a refe3?enca to 
the characters of other substances in its environment* Also® 
the measiu*e of independence possessed by a substance does not 
necessarily rule out the poseibility that the substance has been 
created by and in some sense depends upon an infinite trans«» 
eondent Being* The substances in the v/orld may be indebted 
to their Creator for the gift of existence® but when they are 
given existence® they are given at the same time substantial 
independence. That is# the ©elf^^-exietejice and Independence 
of substances should be taken to mean no more than this— that® 
whatever their origin and whatever forces have combined to 
produce them# substances® onee they have come to be® are 
ultimate drops or unite of existence® which, since they transcend 
all other beings® can derpend® in the fullest sense of the term® 
on nothing but themselves ©
But even when one has made these qualifications ® Is it 
possible for a substantial being to be related to beings beyond 
itself? Do not the interrelationships of the beings in the 
world coaipel the drops of existence to coalesce into the ocean 
of being®which is alone an ultimate unit? This is a problem
?;hieh we have already encountered in Chapter IV* It is the
of a above# pp. 188^124® 14L*140.
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Bource of what is perhaps Bradley’s most powerful argument 
against the possibility of a plurality 03? ultimate' substantial 
beingBo
Bradley’s attack on metaphysical pluralism has® in fact# 
t?/o distinct levels# although these two levels ai?e not clearly 
dietingulsliad by Bradley himself* His fundamental argument 
derives directly from hie central thesis that discursive thought 
can never attain to the absolute and uneond 111 oned truth v/hich 
alone will satisfy the intellect. To construct a system of 
metaphysical pluralism and to assert the reality of many beings, 
one obviously requires .diseursêive thought— one requires the 
type of thought which may legitimately move fï?om the assertion 
of A to the assertion of B to the assertion of 0 and so on.
But according to Bradley® no system of discursive thought can 
possibly be true; a fortiori, no system of metaphysical 
pluralism can be true* We have explained ?;hy we believe that 
Bradley’s criterion of what will satisfy the intellect is too 
exacting* Thought does not aspi're to an unconditioned truth; 
for thought and truth make an essential reference to a reality 
beyond thought® and the truth of an assertion is necessarily 
conditioned by the external reality ?;hose nature it purports 
to articulate. And we argued that .Bradley cannot sustain
his objection that it is only possible for us to transcend 
thought and think of a reality beyond thought by recognising
•i* above® pp*116«llS*
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that thought# as we have it# is not Intellectually satisfaetory» 
But even If Bradley’b wholesale condemnation of dlBeuPBifcve 
thought 1b shown to be indefensible# Bradley may advance at a 
different level an independent argument against raetaphyeical 
pluralism© Bradley himself does not doubt the truth of his 
fundamental doctrine®and when discussing; relations between 
beings® he brings in considerations which cannot bo legitimately 
introduced if this doctrine is false* But even when these 
considératiens are excluded# there 3?emainB a very strong argument 
against the view that there are many interrelated substantial 
beings* The details of this argument were examined in 
Chapter ÏV,*-'*-’ and only a brief surmBary is now required*
The argument is that there cannot be real relations 
between Independent substances® no matter whether these relations 
are supposed to be internal or external to their terms# The 
relations between beings cannot be merely external, l*e© 
relations which make no difference to the terms they relate*
If the relation between two substantial beings is external to 
its terms# then these terms will not support it in existences 
it must either fall into nothingness# or else it must be iii its 
own right a quael»*sxibstantial reality. But if this external 
relation is an independent being, it must be itself related to 
the terms which it is supposed' to relate&l® and with the 
reappearance of the original problem, we have entered on an
above, pp;±§119**191, 109"»141 © 
above® pp. 199-194, 141-149.
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infinite regresG* On the other hand# if the relations between 
beings are Internal, the substantial independence of the terms 
will be destroyed. Internal relations make a difference to 
their terms; this means that the terms are affected from outside 
and cannot be independent substances* Thus® it would seem 
that the beings in the world are not substances # but Internally 
related.aspects of a substantial whole in which they are all 
included *
XI. The answer to this dilemma was briefly indicated above® 
but we must now develop it in more detail* The possible kinds 
of x^elation between two beings are not exhausted when both 
external and internal relations have been considered# It is 
not time that a el at ion must be either internal to both terms 
or external to both terms* This would be true, only if all 
relations between beings were ssymmetrical. But it is possible 
to think 'of an asyimietrical relation which is internal to one 
of its terms and external to the other. And this is no more
logical possibility, but a suggestion which may be applied to 
the world in which v/e live* The universe is no fixed and 
static system but is a flux of* coming to be and passing away.
The beings in the ?/orld are essentially time-conditioneds they 
are subject to a temporal process and they have temporal relat­
ions to their predecessors and successors* Now® temporal 
relations are fundamen,tally asymmetrical* Time has a
directions it moves forivard into the future and the temporal 
# Kx. I 4-1 " 141
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process cannot *bo reversed* The relation of a past being to 
a present being is not the same as the relation of the present 
being to the past being* Now® if we are prepared to maintain 
that a substantial being is directly related only to its 
immediate predecessor and its immediate successor in the temporal 
series# then we may be able to answer Bradley’s objection and 
to reconcile the substantial independence of a being with its 
relation to beings beyond itself* This means that con­
temporary substances cannot be directly related— relations 
between centemporax'*les® spatial relatione, must be indirect*
This is a rather 8w?prislng doctrine which runs counter to our 
common sense beliefs® but the conflict with common sense cannot 
be avoided# if the substantiality of the beings in the world is 
to be defended* For the relations between contemporarieB are 
symimatrleal; or at least# they do not have that fundamental 
asymmetry which would permit one to say that the relation is 
internal to one of its terms and external to the other*
To show that the relation between two beings which are 
not contemporary is, in some sense, asymmetrical is but- the 
fiiTBt stage in the argument. This "transtemporal" relation 
must be examined in more detail before one may conclude that it 
is neither intexuial to both terms nor external to both terms. 
Internal relations make a difference to the terms 'they relate, 
whereas external relations do not. Therefore® an asymmetrical
internal-external relation must make a difference to one of its 
terms and not m. to the other® No?/, the transtemporal relation
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of a past being to a present being meets this requirement#
A past being may make a difference to a present beings the 
ubiquity of causal conditioning bears witness to the influence 
of the past on the present* Therefore# the relation between 
a past being and a pi* es en t being is internal to the present 
being* But on the other hand® a present being cannot make a 
diffe3?ence to a past being. The present cannot affect the 
past: for® once the present has come into existence# the past
is fixed and unalterable© Therrefore# the relation betv/een a 
past being and a present being is external to the past being* 
There Is another way in which one can prove that the relation 
between past and present is an internal-exter-nal relation*
The relation between a past being and a present being comes to 
exist® only when the present being eornes to exist® When the 
past being was itself present® its suceeseor and its relation 
to its successor ?;ere as yet in the non-existent future. 
Therefore® this relation to the present being was not included 
in the internal character of the past being® when j^reeent and 
fully real® It is an external relation which the past being 
acquires only as it passes out of existence® But the relation 
Is internal to the present being® since it is involved in its 
coming to be as the succesBor to the past being v;hich it 
supersedes©
Bow® if such transtemporal internal-external relations 
are the only concrete and iramediate relations between the beings 
in the world® the relatedness of these beings will not clash
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with their substantiality. Bach being will have its moment
of substantial independence^o When present® a being will not
depend on its successor; for its successor does not yet exist,
and what exists cannot be eaid to depend on what does not exist#
Nor does k a being depend on its immediate predecessor. ' A
more elabotote arguraent is required to establish this point;
for a being is related to and affected by the being in its
immediate past. But a close examination of the nature of
this relation shovm that it does not damage the substantial
independence of the present being.
Although the past does affect the present# a past being
does not affect a present being in such a way he to impose upon
it the control of an external authority© We shall discuss In
detail how the present is affected by the past when we come to
coneider the problem of causality# and here ® we shall do no more
than indicate some of the most relevant points® The past does
not affect the present in virtue of any activity on the part of
the past# For by the time the present is in existence and
able to be affected, the past is no longer present and active.
The connection depends on the activity of the present being
which relates to itself the being in its immediate past* The
present being includes the past being in its o?;n constitution#
As incorporated in the present being® the past being does not,
of course® retain the full-blooded reality which it posseBsed 
when it was itself present® It is merely the skeleton left 
behind when the being has passed out of existence. Now,
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although a being is affected by the skeleton of the past which 
it ineorpox*at0S® this does not establish the ontological 
dependence of the present on the past. A substantial whole 
is affected by the specific nature of the parts it includes, 
but this negates neither its independence nor its priority.
But the most straightforward argument in favour of thp 
sub81an11a111y of the beings in the world is simply this, A 
present being which is not related to any of its contemporaries 
is an independent substance, because it surely poBsessee a reality 
which is possessed neither by the beings in its past, nor by 
the beings in its future® and therefore, it cannot be said to 
depend upon them# The beings which make up the world are 
certainly not eternal and infinite substances. They are 
limited in duration and in many other ways# But when it is
present® each enjoys its own moment of independent reality.
At this point we must consider a serious objection*
The independence of the substantial beings in the v/orld has been 
eatabllBhed, it may be urged® only because the interrelationship 
of these beings has been covertly denied* The interrelation, 
of contemporary beings has been denied, and the only relations 
permitted to a being are relations to what is in its past and 
in its future * But in fact, there can be no relation between 
beings which are not co-present* A» relation is reeil, only if 
both its terms are real# Now, when a px*aseiit being is real, 
the being in its immediate past is not real, and when the past 
being was real, the present being was not* This Msi fact wae
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used to prove that the two beings do not depend on one another, 
hut it really proves much more than this— that the two beings 
are not even isolated * One can understand how there can be a 
relation between beings which are simultaneotisly real, but one 
cannot understand how there can be a relation between beings 
which are never both real at the same time. It is only by 
assuming a relation v/hich is reqlly no relation at all that one 
can pretend to reconcile the relatedness of a being with its 
independence«
In answer to this objection® we may first point out that 
the recognition of a relation between past and present is no 
assumption specially introduced in ordex* to suit our own 
convenience * Al though the i^elation be tween a past being and 
a pi^esent being ie Indeed mysteriouG® any realist theory must 
assume a connection between past and p3?esent to explain the 
unity of the temporal continuum and the efficacy of causes.
Our view conflicts with common sense® not because v;e postulate 
a relation between %)as't and present® v/hich conmion sense aecei^ts, 
but because we deny that co3itemporary beings are directly 
related© And although® in this instance, we are forced to 
correct the verdict of the plain man, we may claim that ou)? vie?/ 
has the advantage of simx^licity. Gonmon sénse assumes tv/o 
very different types of direct relation—  a relation between 
contemporaries® and a trans-1emporal relation between past 
and present.
This, however® is an argument on which we cannot rely©
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It will not trouble those who believe that the impossibility of ' 
relating a past being to a present being is simply further 
evidence of the unreality of time* Moreover® the argument 
may be answered k even by those who are not prepared to deny 
the reality of time® if they maintain that the relation between 
beings which are not contemporary is mediated and indirect©
An indirect relation bet?/eeri past and jjresent may be derived 
from direct relations b@t?;een oontemporaries, if one assumes 
that two beings may both be contemporary with a third being, 
althoug;h they are not contemporary with one another. One 
must assume that a being may endure in such a way that it is 
co-present with one being during part of its existence, and with 
another being during another part of its existence* If this 
is so, this being may connect two beings which are not themselves 
co-present© And the theory which explains the relation 
between past and present as an Indirect relation mediated by 
direct relations between contemporaries has as much simplicity 
as a theory which explains the relation between contemporarieB 
as an indirect relation mediated by direct relations between 
past and present beings.
This suggestion Is by no means devoid of difficultles*
For example, how can one reconcile ?;ith its unity the temporal 
division within a being which is contemporary with things which 
exist at different times? But if we wish to maintain our 
view that the beings in the world are directly connected only 
with what is in their past and In their future— and this view
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cannot be abandoned without abandoning the substantial independ­
ence of the beings in the world— then we must overcome the 
apparent difficulties involved in the conception of a direct 
relation betv/een past and present* This relation® like all 
fundamental facts® is essentially obscure and mysterious, but 
it will seem Impossible only if one is assuming the existence 
of an independent temporal order in ?/hleh the past being passes 
out of existence before the present being comes into existence© 
If there is a temporal gap® however email, between the dieappear* 
ance of the past being and the appearance of the present being, 
the objection stated above cannot be answeredo One of the 
terms of the relation wl11 e have vanished before the other term 
comes to be* The past has no power to maintain itself in
existence# unless it be sustained by the p3?esent® Therefore, 
the terms of this trans-»temporal relation must be together in 
some senseo But this togethernees does not require that the 
durations of past and present overlap. The relation may be 
tangential! that is, the past being and the present being may 
be merely eontiguouBo Now, if one is aesuming the existence 
of an independent temporal continuum, the aesumption that past 
and present are temporàlly contiguous may seem arbitrary#
But this assumption is by no means arbitrary if one accepts the 
theory defended in the preceding chapter® that space and time 
as such are ftot independent, but are constituted by spatio- 
temporal beings v/hich are prior in reality© There can be no 
temporal gap between a being and its immedia te predecessor in
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the teriiporal series® if the temporal continuum is generated by 
. the series of temporal beings* Adjaoent beings in the temporal 
series are contiguous® because the distinction be Ween the times 
at which they exist depends on the trans-temporal relation 
between them. It ie this transtemporal relation between past 
and present which is responsible for the fact that beings exist 
at different times® and therefore, one cannot maintain that no 
relation between beings present at different times is possible©
The mtn ontological ground of the transition from past to 
present is the trans-temporal relation of a past being to a 
present being*
Thus, every being Is directly related to its immediate 
predecessor and to its immediate successor in the temporal series; 
for ?;ithout this relation, it could not be said to have a 
prededessor or successor* But in addition to these immediate 
temporal relations, there are also mediate temporal relatione® 
Every being mediates the relation between antecedent and 
subsequent beings© On the one side, a being is contiguous 
?/ith its predecessor and on the othei^ side it is contiguoue with 
its successor, but its predecessor and its successor are neither 
contiguous nor directly related. They are related only 
because both are diz>ectly related to the being in the temporal 
continuum which separates them, from whose point of view they 
are respectively past and futux=*e© And the temporal relation 
between two beings may have any degree of medlateneses two 
beings may be separated and connected in time by any number
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of Intermediaries #
In addition to the temporal transition from a past being : 
to a present being, we must also assume a quite different kind 
of temporal transition w3.thin every substantial being* If 
the universe as a whole is the raacroooBm and every substance In 
the universe is a micx*ie?sm, we may distinguish these two types 
of temporal transition by calling them respectively "maorocosmie^ 
process" and "mierécosmic process"* Macrocosmic process a 
builds up the temporal oontlnuum of the universes miorèeosrAio 
process is the inner temporality of every real substance*
The assumption of this second kind of temporal transition 
is certainly pus!?;ling and unusual, but it ie difficult to see 
how it can be avoided© The beings in the world come into and 
pasB out of existence, and one can hardly say that thex^ e ie no 
temporâl distinction between their origination and termination# 
Moreover, everry being must have a certain duration and temporal 
spread, if it is to keep apart the beings with which it is 
eomiected at its boundaries, if it is to effect a real separat­
ion between past and future* Also, every being, while 
present, has no real relation to mdiat is in its future* It 
acquires such a relation only when it becomes past, only when 
its own existence terminates. In ordex? to become related to 
its BUCcesBor, a being must undergo a process, a transition 
from presentness to pastnesa© These Internal transitione 
ivithln beings are the ground of the external transitions from 
being to being. Finally, we reconcile the independence of
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a being with its eonnection to other beings® onlj by assuming 
In effect that the being both is related to and is not related 
to its snocessor® And self-»contradiction is avoided only if 
one permits an internal distinction within the being~a 
dietinetlon between the present existence of the being and the 
termination of that present existenceo
We must be careful not to assimilate these microcosmic 
processes to the maerocosmio processes with which we are more 
familiaro In the ease of a maorocosmie process there is a 
transition from a past being to a present being® but we cannot 
suppose a similar transition from past to present in the ease 
of a miorooosmic proeeae. For this is a process occurring 
within a single substantial being® and al3. parts of a substance 
must be co^presento The whole can never be real if there is 
never a time when all its parts are realo One cannot maintain 
the unity of a substantial being® if one of its parts has 
vanished into the past® before another part comes into existence- 
If part of a being is present and another part past or future, 
then there is an ontological dietinetion within the being which 
destroys its indivisible substantia11ty@ If there is a real
division of this sort within the duration of any being® then 
that being is not a single substance® but two distinct beings® 
related as predecessor and successoro And if one does assume
within a single being a distinction between parts which are past 
and parte which are present or future, one is eomnitted to an
infinite regress® For one can explain the transition from
one part to another only ‘by aBBurning an inner temporality 
within eaoh of the parts originally distingulsheâ® and the 
same problem must be faced anew®
We must maintain that the present includes a certain 
temporal transition® that the present has a finite duration^
When a substance is present® notv/ithetandlng' the temporal spread 
which it contains® It is thewhole being which is present® and 
not a mere part of ito This is a very difficult doctrine to 
appreciate and accept® but it will seem impoBBible only if one 
insiste on interpreting this internal transition according to 
the pattern of the external transition from being to being®
And although it is difficult to accept a temporal transition 
which is not a transition from past to present, ± it is 
Impossible to accept the alternative* It is difficult to 
believe that the present has a duration® but it is impossible 
to believe that the x^resent is a punctiform instant which la 
a mere limit between past and future* In the first place.
If the prsent is to be real (and only the present fully real) 
it must have a certain thickness. If the present is a mere 
point without duration® it exists for no time and therefore 
cannot be said to eâist at all* A thing which dieappears the 
moment it appears does not really appear at all* And secondly® 
if every present is an instantaneous moment, the paradoxes of 
îâeno are insoluble* The underlying basis of J^ono^s argiments 
is the insight that no matter how many moments of sero duration 
are compounded, one will never obtain a finite duration,
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however short® If a finite temporal™ proeeee must be divided 
out into an infinite number of momentary proeeiite® in order 
to get from the beginning to the end of that process, one must 
complete an infinite series® which ie impossible»
The above account of time has by no means cleared away 
all the difficulties and obscurities connected with this problem^ 
But it is at least a possible hypothesis, and this is a very 
important recommendation in view of the fatal difficulties which 
rule out competing theories which have, perhaps, a greater degree 
of Buperficiaai plausibility* This hypothesis, however® is 
BO much at variance m?ith our ordinary ways of thinking about time 
that it will b e ‘worthwhile, notwithetrmding a certain amiount of 
repetition, to restate our position from a slightly different 
perspective, making the focus of the discussion the problem of 
the derivation of time from temporal beings, rather than the 
px’oblem of the relations between independent substances » The 
hypothesis seems absurd, if one ever loses sight of the 
fundamental tenèt on which it is baeed-^the metaphysical 
priority of finite temporal substances to the temporal contlnmum 
as sticho We tend to imagine time as an independent extensive 
ctotimmm within which the various temporal beings are positioned- 
We further suppose that this temporal continuum is infinitely 
divisible, which means, in effect, that it is actually divided 
out into an inf 1 hi to numitaer of instantaiieous presents » But, 
as was noted above, an instantaneous present is a nonentity 
which cannot possibly be real, and moreover, a finite %)eriod of
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time cannot be cone ti tu ted by a number of moments of !%ero 
duration, no mattex^ how many they may be* Also® in the 
previous chapter, we gave reasons for accepting the priority of 
temporal beings to time as such® Nevertheless® one must 
guard against the natural tendency, when examining the hypothesis 
at present under considération® to slip back into the accustomed 
ways of thinlting about timco Quite apart from the arguments 
%gainst the validity of these accustomed ways of thinking® it 
is clearly illegitimate® when considex^ing the possibility of a 
certain hypothesis, to assume without proof doctrines which that 
hypothesis explicitly denies* The present hypothesis will 
naimrally seem nonsemsleal if one retains in the back of one* s 
mind a belief in the independence and infinite divisibility 
of time® A just examination of this hypothesis must probe 
without praconceptions the internal consistenoy of this attempt 
to derive the tempox^al continuum from the nature of the temporal 
beings in the world, and must test the adequacy of this theory 
to account for time as it is encounteredl in experienee«>=*whioh 
is not necoBsarily the same thing as time as we are accustomecl 
to imagine it*
We shall now expound the hypothesis itself in as 
81raight__foiwvard a manner as possible* Every substantial being 
in the world comes into existence and passes out of existence* 
Therefore, every substance has a definite duration» It is a 
definite hapxxening or event® Without a temporal distinction 
between its coming to be and passing away® the conception of
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an ephemeral substance would Involve a contradiction® One 
must assume® as a ground which will make this conception 
consistent®"that the substance exista and endures between its 
origination and termination* And unless the substance had a 
certain temporal extension and duration® it could not keep apart 
the past and future beings to which it is related on different 
Bides® and the temporal extensive continuum would not be 
generated* This duration of a substance defines what we mean 
by the present* When a substance exists® it is indisputably 
present® and the nature of the substance will determine the 
nature of the present* How® the identity of a substance is 
the unity of a whole : and the real existenee of the whole
involves the real existence of its partes therefore® the various 
parts of the substance will be oo-present, and will all exist 
BO long as the substance exists* In spite of the internal 
transition from origination to termination, everything betv/een 
the two limits of the substance will be eo*=»presents a substance
is an indivisible unity which cannot bo broken up into teal parte
which are related as past to future* Therefore® the present
1b an indivisible temporal eontinuuàu
This doctrine certainly contradicts the usual view of 
the relation between time and an enduring substance* It is 
natural to suppose that there is an independent and infinitely 
divisible temporal continuum through^ which a substance endures. 
To endure, it is supposed. Is to remain present while the present 
ohangen* An enduring substance is a being which persiste and
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maintains Its identity throughout a nuniber of states or eventb
ed
which are hot oo-^^present* But we have jmst expiaIn^  why it 1b 
illegitimate to reject a hypotheois because it conflicts with 
our natural assumptions * One cannot refute one hypothesis 
simply by assuming the truth of an alternative* And the 
greater initial plausibility of the alternative hypotheelB 1b 
far outweighed by the grave difflotiltlms which It 1b seen to 
involve on closer examination*
Another consideration which may lead one to believe that 
the various parts of a substance are not contemporary is that 
at one boundary® its origination® a substance is related to 
what 1b in its past® whereas at the other boundary® its 
terminatioBp the subetaneo is related to what Is in its future* 
But why should we not maintain that the definite cleavages 
between things which exist at different times occur not within 
the limits of a single substance® but at the boundaries which 
separate one substance from another?
We must now take \in again the problem of the connection 
between beings w^hlch are not eo^present® the problem of the 
division between present and past* We may say® Indeed® that 
a being 1b contiguous v/ith the being in Its immediate past® but 
w§ must be careful to stipulate that this contiguity is 
eonstituèâd by the immediate relationship between the beingsî 
the relation does not occur in virtue of a prior contiguity*
If we say that past and present beings are connected tecauso 
they are contiguous, we are agâin illegitimately assuming an
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independent temporal order in which the beings are plaeecl^sido 
by Bide* It is only if one implicitly makes such an assumption 
that one will raise a question as to whether mere contiguity ie 
a sufficient basis for a connection between beings® or suppose 
that a real relation requires the overlapping or interpenetration 
of the beings related* If we maintain that it is a trans** 
temporal relation between beings which is responsible for their 
contiguity in the temporal order® we shall not be troubled by 
this consideration® But onoe we have postulated the trans«* 
temporal relation by which the temporal eontinmm is generated, 
there Is nothing more to be said* We cannot px^dvide a further 
elucidation of this conception of a relation between things 
which are not contemporary, or prove that a relation of this 
type ie really possible* The only justification of the 
postulate is the adequacy of the system which is based upoh it* 
The validity of the assumption can be tested only by Inquiring 
whether it enables one to escape difficulties which are fatal 
to systems based on other assumptions* We cannot appeal to 
an immediate intuition which would prove conclusively that there 
is a direct connection between past and present beings and which 
would make the nature of this relation fully eomprehensible*
But the absence of any such intuition does not prove 4hat this 
kind of relation is impossible, or even less likely than a
re.lation between eoïitemporaries» For we do not in fact 
possess an intuition which makes completely intelligible the 
nature and poseibility of relations between contemporaries.
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although we do not usually notice its absence beeauae the
eonceptioB is more familiar*
We were compelled to deny the existence of direct
physical relations between contemporary substances, since such
relations could not be reconciled with the Independence of the
substances* But it is not at all païausible to suggest that
BO two beings are contemporary, that the various members o f the
plurality of beings come to be one by one, so that there are 
two
never mxtmm in existence at the same time* One naturally 
believes that there are other beings contemporary with oneself 
and that there is a spatial, order in addition to the temporal 
order* We must now consider whether It is possible for the 
theory developed above to admit the existence of a plurality 
of Qora.tempQX^ary beings and to allow that there is an objective 
ground for the spatial order in which we ordinarily believe*
If there are many contemporary substances, these many 
BUbBtances must be interrelated* But they cannot be directly 
related, if they are to retain their independent substantiality* 
Therefore, one can maintain the existence of a plurality of 
contemporary substances, only if one can suggest an indirect 
relation which will keep the various members of the ^plurality 
together in the same universe* How we shall be able to 
explain the nature of the indirect relations between contemporary! 
beings if we correct an oversimp].if 1 cation in the above account 
of the immediate relations between substances* We talked as 
if every substance was directly connected with only one being
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in its immediate past. But there is no reason why this
should be so«*'^ ther*e is no reason why a substance should not be
directly comxeeteâ with many past beings* Also, we deseribed
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a ease In v;hlch a past being was Immedia'^y related to only one 
present being* But again, there is no reason why this should 
be 80, nooessarily and always» It is perfectly possible that 
several substances relate to themselves the same antecedent 
substance as it passes out of existence* How, if these 
suggestions are correct, there are two ways in which contemporary 
beings may be indirectly related* They may be related by the
mediation of a being In their past, or by the mediation of a 
being in their future* The various atranda which are separate 
in the present are gathered together in the past and in the 
ifaturoo If a present being relates to itself several beings 
in its immediate past, than these beings, which are not 
directly x’='elatecl because they are contemporary, are indirectly 
related in virtue of their common connection with the being 
which supersedes them* Also, if a past being is directly 
related to several beings in its immediate future, then these 
beings are indirectly related, because each is directly connected 
with one and the same past being* This second mode of
mediation is more important than the first* The indirect 
relation of contemporaries by means of what ie in their future 
will be a real connection only when the contemporary beings are 
in the past* For when the contemporary beings are present, 
their relatiohe to what is in their future do not exist*
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But the contemporary beings which are now present realities 
cannot be left completely unconnected* The present eontempor«* 
any xmiverse must be a unity now * and it cannot wait for the 
future to establish the required connections* Therefore, the 
unity of the present contemporary universe must be based on the 
relation of every present being to the same Interrelated system 
of past being©* A necessary condition which must be satisfied 
by every being which comes into existence is that it be related 
to the same antecedent universe as every other present being*
Every present being; must be related to the same past 
universe* But does this mean that every present being must 
be directly connected with precisely the same past beings?
This is certainly not neeessaryg there will be a relation 
between two present beings which are only indirectly connected 
with the same being in the very remote past» And the 
empirical evidence, for what it is worth, euî^geste that beings 
are not directly related to every being in their inmedlate past^ :^  
and that two contemporary being© are often connected only in 
virtue of indirect relations to the same being in the distant 
past*
In the first placep if the universe of contemporary
We are defining the immediate past of a being as the group 
of beings oontemporax^y with any past being to which the present 
being is dix’eetly related® If one chooses to restrict’the 
immediate past of a being to the group of past beings with which 
it is directly connected, sometimes one will still have to use 
beings in the remote past to link contemporariesi for one wi3.1 
have no justification for believing that all present beings 
have the same iïrimedlat© past*
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beings is as widespread as it seems to be® if there 1b a spatial 
eontinuum extending to the farthest galaxy® then it seems quite 
beyond the power of a single very limited present being to 
relate directly to itself the entire antecedent univerGe* 
Secondly, a being is iwxoh more forcibly affected by what is in 
its vicinity than by what is remote* And a convenient way 
to explain this is to suppose that a being ie clirect3,y connected 
with past beings in its imaediate vicinity and only indirectly 
with past beings which are far away# Indeed, one might even 
claim that the distance between two contemporary beings is 
determined by the number of intermediaries required to coimect 
them* Thirdly, the fact that even light and gravitational» 
foiJces take time to travel tends to confirm the view that a 
substance ia not directly rcelated to all beings in its Immediate 
past# Forces emanating from a distant star do not affect 
beings on the earth until after a certain interval of time has 
©lapsed, the extent of the interval varying with the distance 
of the star* This means that the physical relation in virtue 
of which beings on the earth are affected by the light and 
gravitational forces generated by the star is indirect* There 
must be a series of intermediate beings by which the forces 
exerted by the star are transmitted to the earth# For a 
present being cannot be related to or influenced by what has 
happened in the remote past without the help of intermediarioSo 
All forces exerted by any being are swallowed up by a temporal 
gap* Therefore, unless one makes the implausible assumption
1that a being on the earth has a dix*ect relatlon to a remote 
star in addition to the indirect relation whereby it is causally 
affected® onejmuBt admit that a present being 1b not x&rectly 
related to an event in its immediate past,mxxmiglng oceuwing 
in a remote region of sx^ aoe. A being is related only by a 
very devious route to a distant being contemporary with the 
past beings to which it ie immediately related* The two 
beings are related only because they sha:re a common ancestor 
in the very remote past*
To sum up, our position is that although all substances 
are necesBarily Interrelated, their relations do not infringe, 
their substantial independence* For a substance is directly 
connected only with a being or beings in its immediate past or 
in its imaediate future® And such connections do not prevent 
the substance from enjoying its moment of independence* In 
addition to these direct relations betvmen substances, there 
are also indirect temporal relations whereby a being is 
connected with another in its remote past or remote future*
And there are also indirect spatial relatiohs between 
contemx)orarles which depend on a direct or indirect temporal 
•relation to the same being in their past or iCixture* Thus, 
the unity of the universe is not an *^ all«»in<^ one*^  unity where 
the different members of the multix)licity are no more than 
incomplete aspects of a single substantial whole* Rather, 
the unity of the universe is the unity of what William James 
so aptly terms a ^^eoneatenation*^ The universe is, as it were,
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a chain, and the auWtantl&il Toeinge in the universe form the 
linke of the chain* Each link is directly connected with 
at least one link on ± either side, but it is connected with 
distant pa$rts of the chain only by means of intermediate links.
Ill* But before leaving the topic of space and time,
there is one further important difficulty which must be 
discussed-«^a difficulty which wqs examined, but not solved, in 
the previous chapter*'^* We have advanced a hypothesis which 
purports to explain how the extensive continua of space and 
time are formed by the direct and indirect relations between 
substantial beings* We have filled out the suggestion made 
in the previous chapter, that there are substantial beings in 
space and time which are prior to space and time as such»
But we have not yet answered Kant*s objection that since space 
and time are represented as infinite given magnitudes, they must
w* I I liMHHi fliipi ii;ir>n m# uw> mn i iim11 m i #  mi # nini mi n  m u■ in i i  iw miwi n , u     ni . fHiniHMÜiWiH l  ##  "
be prior to th© finite things In apace and time, and moreover, 
cannot be objectively real things^in«themaelve©«-«they are simply 
a priori forms of sensible intuition.
If one wishes to reject Kant*s conclusion that space and 
time are traxiscendentally ideal, one must reject his fundamental 
premise that space and time are represented as infinite In 
magnitude* Kent believes that any representation of a finite 
apace or time presupposes a space or time beyond, within which 
the boundaries of the finite extension are determined. If this
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is true, then apace and time ae such must be metaphysically 
prior to the finite beings in space and time» But is there 
evidence which will put beyond, queition the truth of Kant’ e 
belief? Inm ordinary experience, we certainly do assume a 
space or time beyond any finite extension or duration which we 
discriminate* For example, in visual perception, we recognise 
the existence of a space beyond the determinate objects which we 
actually observe* When we perceive an object with definite 
boundaries, we are also perceiving, however baguely, a x»eipoB 
beyond, within which the boundaries of the object perceived are 
delimited. But can on© draw from these facsts the conclusion 
that space and time are absolutely infinite® that a finite 
extension or duration, however large, presupposes a space or 
tiîiie beyond itself? Gan one legitimately maintain the 
universal validity of rules which hold good in the very limited 
portion of space and time with which we are intimately acquainted? 
Is it not rather the ease that the necessity of assuming a space 
and time beyond the limited parts of space and time with which 
we are directly concerned doea pqthing to deterniine whether 
space or time as a whole is finite or infinite? For even if 
space and time as such are finite entities whose limits are 
determined by what is not space and time, it will still be time 
that every finite space and time must be delimited by
a space or time beyond®
Thus, Kant’s assumption that space and time as such are 
infinite In magnitude has not been conclusively established
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by an appeai. to the evidence of experience * Nevertheless, it 
Is certainly difficult to imagine the limitation of a finite 
space or time by anything except a further space or time. We 
have shown that Kant’s position is not incontrovertible, but we 
have not nhoim that Kant is definitely wrong, and the inveetlgat-* 
ion must be continued* At the same time, it will be convenient 
to deal with another Kantian doctrine which we cannot accept, 
the doctrine that space and time are Infinitely divisible. We
wish to maintain that there are.indivisible substantial beings 
which Bet a real limit to the division of space and time. The
two problems are best considered together, because the argument 
against the infinite divisibili^ f of space and time closely 
parallels the argument against the infinity; of space and time.
Kant’s suggestion is that space and time are infinite 
and infinitely divisible extensive continua, , This means that, 
starting from a finite quantum space or time, he suppoeee . 
that there are two inf irri te series which may be eons true ted ^
We may add to the original quantim of space or time other quanta, 
no matter how many, without ever,reaching a complete and final 
totality of apace or time. And we may subdivide the original 
quantum as often as we like without ever reaching simple parte 
of space or time, 1,e, parts which are not open to a further 
subdivision, How, it ie certainly possible for one to 
struct in one’s mind these two kinds of infinite series, but is 
it true that the objective nature of space and time is such as 
to permit one to add finite quantum to finite quantum indefinite^ 
ly without ever coming to a boundary of space or to a beginning
03? end of time? And ie it true that one can go on dividing 
indefinitely a real extension or duration without reaching an 
indivisible atom of space and time, which although no mere point 
or instant, ie not really divided, into different' parts? Now, 
there is no reason why one should not admit that the series of 
time to coma is really infinite* One cannot seiF a limit to 
the future or assign a definite end to time. And since one 
need not, indeed must not® assume the actual existence of all 
the members of the series of 3hiture time, one is not embarrassed 
by the necessity of admitting the actual completion of an 
infinite series* When we assert the infinity of future time, 
we are asserting that the series of events subsequent to the 
present will never be completed* Indeed, it is necessary to 
presuppose the infinity of time to come, if one is even to make 
intelligible the notion of an infinite series* An infinite 
Bej?ies involves the repetition of a certain operation for ever 
and ever* And unless one admits the objective validity of 
the conceptiah ’’for ever and ever” the conception of an* infinite 
series will be strictly meaningless*
Now, if we are givexi a point of departure, i.e. a first 
te3?m® a specific operation to be performed, and the possibility 
of ï^epeating that operation by using the result of an antecedent 
operation as the a3?guraont of a subsequent operation, the ideal 
cons time tion of an infinite seriea is always possible* But 
if one asBtmieB that this ideal se>?ieB has an objectively real 
correlate, one has no guarantee that this objective correlate
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will be able to keep ùp with the infinite series postulated 
by a constructive imagination which considers itself immortal 
in the real infinity of futui'e time* For example® taking the 
present moBient as the first term of the series, and temporal 
precedence as the operation, and granting that the operation 
can be repeated by an application to the moment in the past whihh; 
is the result of a previous application® one may construct 
ideally an infinite regression of past time * But this does 
not prove that the real series of past time is infinite* The 
real regression of past time may kee%) pace with the ideal series 
for a certain time, and then it may come up against a boundary 
which is not to be transcended* Similarly® one may imagine 
an infinite series according to which a finite part of space or 
tlme^ is subdivided ad infini turn, but it does not follow that 
there is no ontological limit which will bring to a halt the 
real divlBlon of the extensive eontinuura corresponding to the 
ideal series#
And there are very powe3?ful arguments in favour of the 
view that the regraoB of past time is |mt Infinite and that 
finite extensions and durations are not infinitely divisible.
The underlying basis of these arguments is that it is illegitlm*^ 
ate to ascribe to the actual and complete a character which may 
be truly ascribed only to the potential and Incomplete.
Those who maintain the infinity of past time and the infini, te 
divisibility of finite quanta have attributed to what is past 
or present an infinity which may be properly attributed only
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to what Is future. One can form the conception of anl
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regress of past time and of the infinite divisibility of finite 
quanta® because one is referring to an infinite series of mental 
operations in time to come® But thei^  series of past time and 
the series of the actual divisions of a finite extension or 
duration cannot, in fact® be infinite: these series are actually
completed; whereas an infinite series is a series which can 
never be completed.
These arguments have already been touched on in other
contexts,**^ but they must now be reconsidered in the light of
what has just been said. 3?irst® let us take the problem of
the infinite divisibility of a finite duration or extension.
Xf the infinite ideal series of the divisions of a finite
duration or a finite extension is to have a basis in objective
factg if it is to correspond to a real series of divisions,
the finite extension and the finite duration must be actually
divided out into an infinite number of points or moments of
ioro magnitude. Certainly, a duration or extension may be
infinitely divisible without being actually divided out, if all
that is meant by its infinite divisibility is that one can set
up an infinite conceptual series of divisions. Although one 
may legitimately claim
nEyxkrigu±imi±Rktxîs±HTO that this conceptual series corresponds 
to real divisions for some time, if one claims that it corresp»» 
onde to real divisions all along the line, the real divisions
For the argument against the infinite divisibility of space 
and times ef. a"boves pp. S12-S15î for the m ’gisjnent against the 
infinity of past time, cf. al30ve»
of the extension or duration must be infinite in number and the 
end products of the division must be unextended points or 
durationless instants# How® it is impossible for a definite 
duration to be really divided out into a number of instants mdiieh 
are without an internal duration. Ho matter how many instante 
are added together, a finite duration will not be produced.
Ho matter how many Instantaneous moments are traversed by a 
temporal process, time will never move forward into the future g 
it remains exactly where it was® We can never reach a finit© 
quantity by adding together a finite number of îseroso One 
must therefore suppose that a finite duration ie produced by 
combining an infinite number of instante* But this supposition 
is equally impossible* Starting from the instants® one could 
never reach a finite duration, and starting from a finite 
duration, one could never reach the instante without presupposing 
the actual completion of an infinite series“*«*and this is an 
obvious contradiction® an infini te series being defined as a 
series which can never be completed. There is a similar 
argument in the ease of space» A definite spatial extension 
cannot be divided out into a number of imextended points®
If the number of points is finite, they cannot compose an 
extended magnitudes and the number of points cannot be infinite, 
since that would entail the completion of an infinite aeries*.
Let U8 now consider the problem of the rggress of past 
time# One can, Indeed® construct in imagination an infinite 
eeriies of past time, but is the real series of past time in fact
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Infinite? How, in spite of the appearance©, the ideal serie©
1b really an infinite .progression, in the same way as the series 
of negative numbers ie as much a progression as the series of 
positive numbers* That is® in each of these series, a term 
presupposes the term© which precede it in the series, but not 
those that follow it# In the ideal series of past time which 
we construct hy starting from the present and working backwards, 
a term présupposés those terms which lie between it and the 
present, but does not presuppose terms in the more remote past* 
But the real series of past time Is Indubitably a regression*
Each term presupposes all the terms which follow it in the series 
which starts from the present and moves backwards through time* 
Therefore® if we posit the real existence of the present moment, 
as we must, then we must posit the reality, in some sense, of 
all past toments which have ever existed. The actual series
of past time is a completed series® the present moment being 
really a termination and not a beginning* Therefore, the
series of past time cannot be infinite, since an infinite series 
is a series which can m  never be completed# The conception of 
an infinite regression involves a contradiction.
Finally, we must consider whether space is finite or 
infinite in magpaitude* The Ideal construction of an infinite 
spatial system is perfectly possible# Taking wherever one 
happens to be as the origin 0, one can imagine a point d which 
is at a eex’tain distance from 0 and another point b which is 
further from 0 than d is# One can go on to construct an
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infinite series of points, each of which is more distant from 0 
than its predecesBor*. But can one claim that this infinite 
ideal seigles corresponds to a real space? Is epeice really 
infinite in magnitude® so that we can continue the aggregation 
of finite spatial extensions without ever reaching the bousidarles 
of space? Nov; the whole of space is at any time present and 
actual* Therefore, if we take any finite extension as a unit, 
the series generated by the addition of these units must he ■ : 
actually completed# Therefore® the series cannot he infinite:
Gpa0 0 must he finite in magnitude#
The ahova conclUBion is subject to one possible 
qualification. If it is possible to compare the magnitude of 
space at one moment with its magnitude at another, if it ie 
possible for space to vary in sise,*^  ^ then we must maintain, 
Indeed, that space in the past and in the present is finite, 
but we may allow the infinity of space with respect to the 
future. That is, we may allow that in the future, space may 
grow to exceed any finite magnitude which is prescribed, however^ 
large# This is in keeping with our general doctrine that 
since the future is potential and Indeterminate, unlilce the 
present and the past which are actual and determinate, the 
conception of infinity may be legitimately apj^lied to what Is 
future#
Thus, these arguments would seem to prove that there are
We do not, howevex’, wish to eormnit ourselves to the doctrine 
that space itself may shrinic or expand.
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ultimate indivisible quanta of extension and duration, since 
space and time cannot ‘be infinitely divisible, and that the:re 
is a boundary to space and a beginning to time, since space and 
past time cannot be infinite in magnitude* One may concede 
the infinity only of what is future*^^-future space and the series 
of fi3 tui'e t ime *
But it may be urged that it is not legitimate to prove 
that space and time ai^ e finite and are composed of finite 
indivisible parts by showing the impossibility of a real 
.infinite and infinitely divisible spatio-->temporal continuum*
It may be objected that the opposition, e*g» between the 
propositions ”Bpac© is finite in magnitude” and ”Bpaoe is 
Infinite in magnitude is what Kant calls dia3.eoticalf^ » 
oppositions it is not the analytical opposition of true
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contradictories* The contradictory of the proposition 
”Spaee is infini te” is the proposition ”It is false that space 
ie infinite ” which is not equivalent to the proposition 
”Space is finite”* ”Bpace is infinite” and ”Bpae© is finite” 
are not time contradictoriess both may be false, for both 
share a presuppoeition which may be mistaken^-^-that thex^ e le 
such a thing as a real totality of space* Therefore, it is 
mijustlfled to argue from the falsity of the proposition 
”Bpae© is infinite” to the tx»uth of the proposition ”Bpace is 
finite”* And there are exactly similar objections in the 
other oasesQ
Orltique of Pure Reason, A 604, B 569*
At first sight this objection seems to have little force# 
For the common presupposition of the opposed proposition is a 
presupposition ?/hioh it is difficult to doubt* It Is 
difficult to doubt the reality of space, and if space is real, 
the totality of space must 'be real* But what makes this 
objection so very formidable is the argument that there are 
equal difficulties involved in the theory that space has 
boundaries® that time has a beginning,and that there are 
indivlélble atomic quanta of space and time* If this is true^ 
one has as much right to conclude that space is infinite because 
of the difficulty of maintaining that space is finite as to 
conclude that space is finite because it is impossible to hold 
that space is infinite# In this paradoxical situation, the 
only possible solution would be î!lo|deny the common presupposition 
made by both the apparent contradictories*»».that space is a 
real whole»
It may be alleged that the situation is very similar to 
the situation described by Kant in the first and second 
antinomies*"-' That there is similarity, one cannot, of course, 
deny* The first antinomy is concerned with the problem of 
finite or infinite totalities; the second antinomy is conceirAed 
with the problem of simple units or infinite divisibility»
But in spite of the similarity® there is also a very significant 
difference» In the first antinomy? Kant assumes that space 
and time are infinite in magnitude» The question debated in
Critique of Pure Reason? A 426*»443p B 4B4«-471.
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the antinomy Is whether the wox^ld® ox^  the totality of the
appear'/inces in space and time® is finite or infinite as regards
an Infinite space and time# The thesis proves that there
cannot he an infinlty of past beings in an Infinite past time ,
and that there cannot he an infinity of oo-OKistent beings in
an infinite space* The argument of the antithesis is first,
that the world cannot be finite with respect to the infinity of
past times for this would mean that the world has a beginning
preceded by an empty time® which is impossible; and second, ,
that the world cannot be finite with respect to the infinity
of space, since this presupposes an empty space beyond the
limits of the world, and this empty space is indistinguishable
from nothing* But the point which we are discussing is
W'hether space and past time as such are infinite or finite*
Bince we are not willix.ig to take the infinity of space and time
for granted® from our point of view there are two oommn
assumptions shared by both thesis and antithesis of the
first antinomy, which may be put in question* Kant identiflem
as the culprit the asBumptloxi that the world is a real totality;
but we would maintain that the mistake assumption is the tenet
which we have just been attacking, that space and the series
of past time are Infinite in magnitude*
And there Is a parallel difference in the case of the
second antinomy# We have been considering whether space and
time are infinitely divisible or are composed of indivisible 
simple parts* The problem of the second antinomy is whether
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or not there can be Indivisible and tincompouxided simple 
substances in an Infinitely divisible space» (Kant does not 
consider the related problem of whether there can be Indlvisible 
endui'lng substances with respect to an infinitely divisible 
time, but ho could have constructed a similar argument in this 
case, if he had wishecL) , The argument of the thesis is in
essence that a composite substance must be composed of simple 
substances, because® if In the analysis of a comi^OBite substance, 
we are unable to remove all composition, the composite will not 
be made up of substances, and therefore® will not be a composite 
substance* The argument of the antithesis is that a composite 
substance cannot be made up of simple parts? since evex’y part 
of a Bubatance® even if supposed simple, must occupy a space 
and whatever ”oecupies a space contains in Itself a manifold 
of constituents external to one another, and is therefore 
eompoeite*”#* Now® the argument of the antithesis is assuming 
the infinite divisibility of space-««^ t^hat space is not composed 
of simple indivisible parts# But we have been maintaining 
that this premiers is open to question# And this may be the 
illegitimate assumption which compels us to deny the truth of 
both the apparently contradictory alternatives*
Therefore? one might maintain with some justice that 
Kant’s antinomies, far from con^ltuting an instructive parallel 
to vdiich one can refer when attacking the above argument against 
the view that space and time are infinite in magnitude and
* » a 4S6 b 46s «
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divl^l'bllltyp really suppliy a valua"ble eonflmation of the 
truth of thlB opgxmlent^ There is ohviously something wrong 
In a situation where one can prove the truth of two ineompatihle 
px'^opositlonss hut why should one reject as mistaken the very 
natural as sumption that the world and whatevex’ exists in the 
world are thing in themselves g when In the course of developing 
the antinomies an aesmnption is made to which there ax?e many 
independent ohjcjctionsg namely that space and time are infinite 
Hte and Infinitely divisible^,
Bu'k this is a consideration which will not avail us Ifp 
in fact g theree is an antinomy in connectioxi wd.th the propositions 
which we have heen discussing: that is g if there ere as cogent
objections against the view that space and past time are finite 
and are composed of finite indivisible parts as there ax*e 
against the view that space and past time are infinite and 
infinitely divisible^ We have shown that our position cannot 
he refuted hy a direct appeal to Kant’a first and second 
antinomies, hut we have not yet shown that our view is not 
Involved in similar antinomies-«*antlnomieB which can he solved 
only hy abandoning our fundamental "belief in the reality of 
space and time* Therefore § we must no?/ examine possible 
argument© against the limitation of space and the series of 
past time and against the assumption of indivisible spatial 
and temporal quanta*,
At first sightp om^ position appears vex’y weak* For 
how can one assume a limit to space without at the sume time
aGBurning a space on the other side of this limit? How can a 
finite space be bounded by anything except a further space? 
Similarly5 how can one think of a limit to the series of past 
time without presupposing a time i)rior to the limit which defines 
the supposed beginning of time? And how can one ever succeed 
in putting a stop to the division of the spatioc^temporal 
continuum into smaller and yet smaller parts? These questions 
camiôt possibly be answered unless we have recourse to our 
doctrine that the substances in the ?/or3.d are metaphysically 
prior to space and time and are responsible for the constitution 
of bhe fôpatiô->temporal continuum» But if we do admit the 
priority of spatial and tempox*al beings to space and time as 
such g we now have a principle which will enable us to delimit 
space and time by a 3?eferenc3e to something beyond themselves*
In the first place5 if we were right in maintaining that a 
substantial being does not exist for a mere momentp but has a 
certain finite internal duration, we can explain the nature of 
the limit set to the division of the temporal continuum into 
smaller and smaller parts* For on account of its necessary 
unity, the internal duration of a substance cannot be divided 
into parts» One may divide up a period of time, only so long 
as one does not split the intex»nal durgition of a eiibstantial 
being. The internal durations of substances are the atoms 
out of which the temporal continuum is compounded and each atom 
of time5 notwithBtanding its internal complexity, Is a real unit 
which cannot be broken up into parts* A similar argument is
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pOBBible in the case of space* One may argue that any 
Bubstantlal being which has a finite spatial extension cannot 
be divided into parts,’ and it therefore constitutes a real 
limit to the series of the divisions of a given volijme of space* 
And just as substantial beings %mt an end to the internal 
division of space and time, so in the same way, they may put 
an end to their indefinite extension# If space and past time 
are to be finite, there must be a reality by which they are 
limited» They cannot limit themselves, since the mode of 
limitation which is peculiar to space and time always presuppose© 
a further space or time on the other side of the limit* But 
is there any reason why the Bpatio«*temporal continuum as a 
v/hole should not be limited by the substantial beings by which 
it is constituted? There seems to be no reason in principle 
why substantial beings should not determine the boundaries of 
space and past time* Nevertheless, it is not easy to under** 
stand the nature of such limiting beings, nor to explain in 
detail how they fulfil their function* We shall therefore 
investigate# more carefully the problem of the beginning of 
tiiae, and we shall try to thro?/ some light on this very 
obscure conception*
If time is to have a beginning, something must exist 
prior to the beginning of time by reference to which the moment 
of origination is determined., But if this thing is supposed 
to exist before the beginning of time, It would seem that one 
is implicitly assuming the existence of a time before the
supposed origination, of the temporal aeries. This conelneion, 
however, may be eeoaped, if the account of temporal proeeeses 
given above is eorajeot* V/e maintained that what was called 
maorocoBiaie time is constituted by the activity whereby a 
subsequent being relates to Itself an antecedent being and that 
the two beings are determined as respectively subsequent and 
antecedent by the relation between them# Now, if time has a 
beginning, time will begin when one substance related to itself 
an antecedent substance, which is not itself related to a 
substance in its past* That isp time will begin with the 
coming to be of a second substance in the universe, and the 
first substance will be prior to the second substance and hence 
to the beginning of time, although it will be determined as 
prior only when it becomes related to the second, substance, 
i»e# only when time comes to be* Therefore, this first 
substance may :functlon as a limit to time and may put an end 
to the regress of past time* Since time is essentially a 
relation between two beings, time may be limited by the% 
earlier of the two terms which it arr»anges in temporal order*
The first being in the world is significantly different 
from all subsequent beings» All subsequent beings essentially 
involve a relation to antecedent beings, whereas the fi:#at 
being does not* But it is difficult to determine exactly 
how far this difference will modify its internal structure.
For example, does the first being involve an internal transiti 
The intei^nal transition of the other beings in the world la a
p.940#
transition from a stage when they are related to antoeedent 
beings to a stage when they are related to subsequent beings* 
Therefore, the first being cannot have an internal transition 
exactly like the transition within the other beings in the world* 
But it may have, nevertheless, some sort of Internal transition 
and duration, and if it does, this will be perfectly compatib3-e 
with its role as the limit to time, since every substantial 
being determines the limits of Its own internal duration»
This argument proves that there is a first being, significantly 
different from the other beings in the world, b^t it does not, 
of course, p©ove the existence of tlod# If one has other 
grounds for believing that 0od exists, one may find a reason 
for identifying with God this being at the boundary of the 
universeo But all one can say definitely about the first 
being in the universe is that it is different from all other 
beings, and one has no means of telling how radically different 
it is* We have been assuming that there is only one substance 
which determines the limit of time* The argument against a 
plurfiü. ity of such beings is that a plurality of beings prior to 
the beginning of tifee v/ould originally be unrelated, and a 
plurality of unrelated beings is impossible*
Kant shows that he,is aware of the possibility of 
objections along these lines in the Observations on the 
Antitheses of the first and second Antinomies* He is attempt*» 
ing to answer objections from the side of Leibnlv.ian Monadiem» 
His- arguments are very relevant to the account of the limitation
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or space and time which we have been suggesting, since our 
doctrine is a kind of Monadism, although unlike LeibnlB, we 
admit the possibility of real relations between monadic sub^
8tances* The Leibnizian answer to the problem of the limit»*
ation of time is to substitute "for the first beginning(an 
existence preceded by a time of non«-0xistence) an existence in 
general which présupposés no other condition v/hatsoever’’®^
The Leibnisîian answer to the problem of the infinite divisibility 
of space is to deny the applicability of the infinite mathemat«* 
ical sériés to the real world and to deny the priority of space 
to substantial beings, taking instead ’’the dynamical relation 
of substances as the condition of the possibility of space”*
It is clear that those answers are basically the same as the 
solutions suggested above. Kant’e objection to the IjOlbniaian 
position is that it employs the concept of objects which are 
not subject to the conditions which must be satisfied by 
anything which is a possible object of sensible experience* 
lîîvery existence which is a possible object of experience must 
have a beginning and must presuppose a time p]?lor to the time 
of its begi'nnihge Therefore, the existence in general 
postulated by the Monadlsts is not a possible object of 
experience* Also, the Monaclists have been assuming that 
substantial Bodies are things in themselves which may impose 
u%)on space their indivisibl© unity, and not mere appearances
Kant, Orltlque of Pure He a son, A 453 B 461»
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which must necessarily conform to the infinitely divisible 
nature of the space in which they are placed and which they 
presuppose® But Kant maintains that the concept of an object 
which is not an object of a possible experience, the concept of 
a thing in itself which does not eonfom to the conditions 
which all objects of experience must obey, is an ^ ^ t ^  concept 
to which there is nothing correspbndlng in intuition, and with 
respedt to which no synthetic knowledge is possible* This ' 
means that we cannot make any assertions about such an object, ■ 
even that it exists® Therefore, we earmot assert the 
existence of a being which determines the limit of past time, 
nor can we assert the existence of things in themselveu which 
are the ontological basis of spatial relationships »
But the Kantian answer-to Monadism depend© on the 
validity of the argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic»
Kant calls the hypothesis of the Monadists an ’’evasion of the 
issue #1 ich has already been sufficiently disposed of in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic’''^ but admits that ”the argument of 
the monadists would indeed be valid if bodies were thing© in 
t h e m s e l v e s T h e r e f o r e ,  the antinomies do not constitute 
an independent argument against pluralistic realism® And we 
have already shown that Kant’s arguments in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic are by no means foolproof. -N- We have maintained
that an experience of substantial beings which are metaphysical!
Orltlque of Pure Eeaaon, A 441 B 409«
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prior to space and ± time is perfectly possible, so that there 
JfS an intuition of an object corresponding to the concept of 
a thing in itself® The most formidable of the arguments on 
behalf of the priority of space and time was answered in the 
present chapter when it was shown that the eyidenoe does not 
T/arrant the conclus ion that the original representations of 
space and time are representations of infihite given magnitudes.
Therefore, Kant’s arguments against the very possibility 
of beings which can function as limits to the spatial and 
temporal continua and against the possibility of beings which 
can contain within their unity a finite spatio-temporal guamtum 
are not cogent» But nevertheless, it must be admitted that 
the nature of these entities ie extremely mysterious, How, 
for example, can a thing contain temporal and spatial distinct,* 
ions without the disruption of its unity? Part of the 
difficulty in conaection with these conceptions may be due, as 
we explained, above, to an attempt to understand the notions 
while assuming a theory of the nature of space and time which 
is being explicitly rejected» However, even when we have 
guarded against this misunderstanding, a fundamental mpstery 
remains » But the existence of such mysteries is no fatal 
objection-to our system» No philosophieal system can explain 
everything» One alv/ays comes up against an ultimate which 
cannot be explained in terms of more :fandamental concepts.
The element of mystery is not b o  conspicuous when a basic
cfo above, pp;
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assumption is familiar and such as we are aoeiistomed to, but 
it is the3?e all the same® Oertalnly, this appeal to the 
ultimate mystery of things must be handled X^ery carefully®
3?‘or a system, no matter ho?/ ridiculous, can maintain its gam 
ground, if it is allowed to gloss over all its difficulties 
by claiming that they are mysteries which must simply be 
accepted on faith, just as an absurd theory will still be 
coherent if it is allowed to appeal to an omnipotent God as 
a detis ex machina to patch up all the discrepancies* But 
the fact that an appeal to God or to mystery can be used to 
make every system Impregnable does not prove that a true system 
of philosophy will contain no mysteries or can dispense with 
an appeal to God®
o i m m m  sbtoh®
GAÜBÂL COHNFOTÏOMo
I® In the previous chapter, we examined the nature of the
:pelationshipB which may connect the beings in the world without 
compromising their substantial indopendence, and we came to the 
conclusion that substantial beings cannot be directly connected 
with their contemporaries, but only with what is in their past 
and in their future® That is, the fundamental physical 
relations between eubstances are transteBiporal relations, and 
it is these transtemporal relations which are responsible for 
the generation of the temporal continuum, ?*;hich depends onto-* 
logically on the substantial beings which it incorporates»
These basic relations between substances establish their terms 
as contiguous in time, and they also account for the unity of 
the univerae in which every dietinet individual is included.
In the present chapter, \ye wish to show that the Immediate 
physical .relations betw^een different sub stances have yet 
another/important funation-^'^they are also causal relations®
The direct connections between past and present beings 
are intera.a3.^external r el a t i ons»*^ =r el a t ions which are- :lnte.rnal 
to the present and external to the past* How, internal 
relations make a difference to their tesima, whereas external 
relations do not» This means that the internal-^external
cf® above, pp« 202*^805«
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relation between a past being and a present being makes a 
difference to the present being and does not make a difference 
to the past being® Howi, the relation between cause and 
effect is also a transtemporal relation ?vhere the past cause 
does make a difference to the nature of the present effect,: 
v/hereas the present effect does not make a difference to the 
nature of the past cause*. Therefore,, there are very good 
grounds for identifying the relation of causality with the 
transtemporal relation between past and present described in 
the preceding chapter The fundamental physical relation 
between, different substances is,, indeed,, something more thai^ 
the relatioh of causality», as it is usually understood*. For 
this relation is the ground of the temporal contiguity of the 
related beingswhex^eas, according to the usual notion,, causal 
connection the temporal contiguity of the terms
involved® Nevertheless, causal efficacy may be one aspect 
of this zfTundamental relation between independent beings
If one refuses to accept this identification of the 
relation of causality with the transtemporal rel€ition between 
independent substances examined in the previous ohaptex", one 
will be faced with a dilemma, ISither one must deny the 
reality of causal connections, thereby dismissing peremptorily 
the evidence of ordinary experience, or else one must postulate 
the existence of two different kinds of immediate physical 
relations bet?/een substantial beings, and this will introduce 
into one’s theoretical system oomplleatiens which it is
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difficult to explain or justify® Such oompllcationBp however, 
will have to be accepted, if one can produce good reasons which 
prohibit the asstoilation of causal connection and the relation 
of a present substance to what Is in its immediate past® The 
simplicity of the view suggested above will not save it, If it 
is inadequate to the faeta, and we must now deal with two 
objections which purport to show that the relation of causality 
is essentially different from the relation between past and 
present beinge with which it has been identified*
The first objection is that \?hat has been taken to be 
the fundamental relation between' substantial beings fails to 
meet all the specifications of causal connection because'' this 
relation Is essentially a relation between a being and its 
Immediate temporal predecessor, whereas causal relations may 
on occasion connect contemporary beings* Now, if there are 
causal relations bet?;een contemporary beings, these beings 
cannot be independent substance©, since Bradley’s argument that 
the interrelatedneBB of beings is incompatible with their 
independence can be answered only by denying the oo«»©xiBtenoo 
of the terms related»*'^ Aleo, since there are certainly case© 
of causal connection where the cause i^s in the past of the 
effectp to assume in addition causal relations between oon«^  
temporaries is to suppose that causality may operate in tw^ o 
very different contexts* Although this is not impossible, 
it is a complication which makes it much more difficult to
of6 above, pp* 200<*»808«
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comprehend the nature of causal connection.
In Gpitô of these difficulties, causal relations hetvireen 
contemporsiries mufat *be accepted, If the empirical evidence puts 
it ‘beyond question. The empirical evidence, however, is far 
from conclusive. In eases where cause- and effect seem to be 
contemporary, scientific investigation generally shows that the 
apparent eontemporeaielty of cause and effect is an illuBion#
The correlation between the contemporary beings really depends 
on causai relatioxxs between beings which are not contemporaryo 
Let us take as an example a case of apparent causal relations 
between con temper ar ie s used 'by Kant-«»«**the case of a heated stove 
which is warming a room. ”The stove, as cause”, Kant 
maintaine, ”ia simixltpneous with its effect, the heat of the 
room# Here there is no serial succèseioh in time between 
eauBOE and effect# In this case, the apparent c on temper ane 11 y
of cause and effect can be explained away, even without an 
appeal to the eeientifie account of the nature and transmission 
of heat^ It is not the present, but the past condition of 
the stove v/hich is responsible for the warmth of the room*
There will be no immediate drop in the temperature of the room, 
if the stove is removed* And if a heated stove Is suddenly 
Introduced into a cold room, the remoter cornera will not be 
affected for some time® There are, of course, more formidable 
examples of causal relations between eontemporarl0s«-»«fo3? 
instance, the gravitational forces which determine the relative
Critique of Pure Reason, A 808 B 348*
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pOBitionB of celestial 'bodies. But even in this case, the 
contemporaneity of cause and effect :l© illUBory# Recent 
scientific discoveries have indicated that gravitational forces 
take time to trav€ïl and have their effect*
Thus, the fact that two contemporary beings are correlated 
in a definite way does not prove that there ie a direct causal 
eonnection between them® No matter what correlations between 
contemporaries are discovered in experience, these correlations 
maybe explained in term© of the causal relations of the 
contemporary beings to theiijanteeedenta, and the above examples 
show how In practice this may be done* Mere empirical
evidence does not, of course, prove that there can never be 
causal relations between contemporaries * But the evidence 
of experience never compels u b to assume causal relations 
between contemporary beings,and in view of the considerations 
mentioned above, it is su3?ely unwarranted to make this assumption 
gratuitously*
One asemption which we have made in the course of this 
ar§;ument is that some causes are in the past of their effects* 
Now, if it could be shown that there cannot be a. direct causal 
relation between a being and what is in its past, the situation 
would be completely changed* Instead of explaining the - 
apparent causal relations between c ont empor ar ie © in terms of 
causal relations between jfckingx past and present, it would be 
necessary to explain the causal relations between things which 
exist at different times in terms of the direct causal relations
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between oontemporarles® Mow, if one accepts the usual view of 
time as an independent extensive continuum, it is certainly 
difficult to explain how a being can be causally affected by 
what ie in its past* But there ie no difficulty if one admits 
the account of the nature and generation of the temporal 
continuum given in the previous chapter# A being may be 
directly related to an immediate predecessor, because it is the 
direct relation between them which determines the two, beings 
as respectively predecessor and successor?#
The second objection is more formidable* In the 
previous chapter, It was necessary to maintain that the 
comiection between a past being and a present being depends on 
the activity of the present being® For the present being 
could not be an independent substance, unless it were the active 
partner in its relationship ?vith the past® The relation 
betv/een past and present is Internal to the present and maken 
a difference to the present* If this relation depends on the 
activity of the past, this ?/ill mean that a present being 
depends on the beings in its Immedieite past, and is therefore 
not an independent substance. Now, although we must maintain 
that the eoimectlGn between past and present depends on the 
activity of the present, if we are not to abandon our fundamental 
belief in a plurality of independent substances, It would seem 
that in a case of causal connection, it is the past cause which 
ia active, and not the present effect* We normally ©p:ppoBe
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that a cause possesses some sort of power or force and that It
may exert an influence beyond its own boundaries, acting
directly on another being. We think of an effect, on the 
other hand, as the passive result or outcome of the activity 
of ite cause* Therefore, it would seem that the relation 
between cause and. effect cannot be properly identified with the 
relation between past and present described in the last chapter. 
In the one case, it is the antecedent being which is actives in 
the other ease, it is the subsequent being which ia active,
The only way to answer this objection is to reject the 
common sense belief that causal connection depends on the 
activity of the cause. It is, perhaps, a bold step to deny 
a belief which the %)lain man would defend so vary tenaciouely, 
but it is a step v/hieh can be abundantly justified by phllo«» 
aophical argument* Our first argument is, In essence, very 
simple. A cause does not really act on it© effect, since
the oaxiQo in in the past of its effect, and the past cannot be
active in the present® When a being is past, it is fixed, 
unalterable, lifeless and inert* A past being may affect 
a present being only if the present being acts in such a way 
as to related to itself what is in it© immediate past®
This argument depends on a doctrine established in the 
previous chapter, that every real being must have a definite 
duration® This means that the production of any being is 
a process which takes time, a px*ocesB contemporary with the
of® above, pp®
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being In question and hence in the future of any antecedent 
cause# Therefore, the production of a being which is an 
effect cannot be an activity of its cause. It is only if an 
effect were instantaneous, which it can never be, that one could 
suppose it to be the outcome or terminus of a process of
%)ro duet ion which is an activity of ite cause*
This argument is not to be evaded by supposing that the 
cause is responsible for the production of the beginning of the 
effect, from which the rest follows* The continuation of a 
being does not follow automatically upon its beginning* A 
principle is required to account for the continuation of what 
has begun to exist* This principle will supplement the 
efficacy of the cause, and this means that it is not the cause 
by itself which ie responsible for the production of the effect* 
The activity of the cause supplies no more than the initial 
datum which must be processed by the activity of the effect, 
if the effect is to develop into a real substance*
The second argument against the common sense view of
causality is that eosimon sense cannot explain how a being is
transformed from the passive product of an antecedent cauee 
into the active producer of a subsequent effect* The beings 
in the world are both effects and causes: they are the effects
of what is in their past, and they are the causes of what is 
in their future* Now, common sense explains the production 
of an effect by a reference to the causal activity of an 
antecedent being, but this leaves unexplained what is, in this
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system, the most important novelty in the imiv0 rsoo»*«th0 novel 
eaueal activity ?/hich is staperadded to the passive effect 
of an antecedent cause*
Thus, the arguments In favour of a distinction between 
the relation of eausality and the relation between past and 
present beings analysed in the previous chapter are not 
conclusive: indeed, they have very little force, if any.
Therefore, since there are no obstacles to the identification 
of these two relations, one should accept wbat is the simplest 
eolutioai* Now, this identification has one most Important 
consequenceo It establishes the universal validity of what 
we shall call the Principle of OauBality, v/hieh lays down that 
every being in the world is the effect of an antécédent cause 
or causes® Everything Is necessarily subject to causal 
conditioning*
The proof of the Ib;»inciple of Oausality is quite eiliple* 
Every being which comes into existence must be directly related 
to at least one being in its irmiiediate past* Without such a
connection to the past, the being would, not form part of this 
universe, and therefore could not exist, since a plurality of 
unrelated universes is impossible. Mow, this relation of a 
being to its InimediatÆ past ie the relation of oausalityg it is 
a relation wiiich is internal to the being and which makes a 
difference to it. It follows, then, that all beinge in the
Strictly speaking, there is one exception to this principle^ 
the First Being or First Cause which is the real limit to the 
regress pf past time* Of# above, pp® 258<**340*
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world are neceesarily involved in causal relations with their 
antecedents•
This does not, however, establish the truth of Determlm»» 
Isms it does not prove that the nature of everything Is 
completely determined by the nature of its antecedent causes»
We have shown, that all beings are neoessarlly involved in 
causal relations with their predecessors, but we have not yet 
specified the nature of these causal relationships* It is 
very often assumed that the very meaning of the concept of 
causality is such that an effect follows necessarily upon its 
causes in accordance with a definite rule® But we maintain 
that the concept of eausality implies no more than that a cause 
must affect or make a difference to the being v/hieh is regarded 
as its effecto Of course, if one chooses, one may always 
define the term ’’causality” in such a way that there is causal 
connection, if and only If the nature of a being is completely 
determined by its causes and similar causes have similar 
effects# But the existence of this kind of causal connection 
has not been established by the above discussion. We have 
therefore adopted a less stringent definition of causality, 
which provides a term to describe, v/ithout committing us to 
assertions not warranted by the evidence, the relationship 
between two beings in a case where the one is affected by the 
other* The Principle of Oauaality, whose universal 
applicability we have defended, does not affirm that an effect 
1b completely determined by its causes, and it does not affirm
the uniformity of nature, or even that there are any general 
causal lawe* It 1 b  no contradiction to maintain both that 
every being is affected in a definite way by an antecedent 
cause or causes and that there ie no connection between the 
ways in which any two beings are affected by their causea.
II* . There is, however, good empirical evidence that there
is a certain order In the natural world, and the systematic 
science which assumes the regularity of nature has been 
conspicuously successful. Therefore, we must consider 
whether it ie possible to formulate a Law of Causality, which 
will supplement the above Principle of Oaueality* The 
Principle of Causality merely affirms that every being has 
causal relations with its antecedents : the Law of Causality
would prescribe a rule to which all cases of causal connection 
must conform: it would determine, in general, the way in which
a being is affected by its anteeodenta.
The two verslone of the Law of Causality which have been 
influential in the history of science and philosophy may be 
epitomised as followD-««*the effect la like its causey and, , 
like causes, like effects®
The first version is the Aristotelian view. Aristotle 
held that a being and its efficient cause are always alike in 
epeelee* This theory works quite well in biology, and it 1b 
borne out by the fact that an animal generally reproduces its 
own kind® But the main weakness in Aristotle’s theory is
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that it can explain only a very limited portion of the phenoraena* 
We have argued that every being in the world ie affected by am 
antecedent efficient cause* But Ariatotie can reconcile hie 
account of the nature of efficient causality with the facts of 
experience, only by toposing severe limitations on the range 
of its operation* Aristotle must abandon to chance and aceid^* 
ont all pï^oeesaea where a Bubsequent being does not resemble 
its immediate antecedent® This me ana that Aristotle rauet 
concede that almost the entire field of noh^^biologiGal phenomena 
is inexplicable by the scientist in terms of efficient causality* 
In the case of nearly all processes In the inorganic world, 
the results do not neeemble their antecedents* For example, 
water is produced through the combination of hydrogen and 
oxygen in combustion, but water resembles neither the hydrogen 
nor the oxygen from which it has been produced* And even in 
the case of biological phenomena, the range of efficient 
causality is very limited® An efficient cause is responeible 
for the eesential eharaeterietlcB which define the species of 
a beingé but the other charaeterlstieB«-*the accidental 
charaoteristiC8«**are due to chance and cannot be explained by 
the scientist* For example, father and son are alike in that 
they are both human beings* The father is the efficient 
cause of the essential charaoteristica of his son and determines 
the species to v/hlch he belongs* But a son has many 
accidental eharacteristiCB which may differ from the correspond^* 
ing char ac ter Is t ie s in his father* The son may have bromi
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hairj v/hile the father has hlaok hair: the boîi may he tall
and the father short. These eharaoterietics, Aristotle must 
say, are not due to the efficient causality of the father.
There Is another important objection against the 
Aristotelian view. Even if one admits M±k that it is in 
principle legitimate to make a distinction between essential 
characteristics which are involved in efficient causality and 
accidental characteristics which are not, Aristotle’s theory 
will not be plausible unless he can supply some independent 
basis for the distinction between the essential and the 
accidental characterIstic8 of a being. If the Aristotelian 
merely says that the essential characteristics of a being are ^ 
those characters which it shares with its immediate antecedent, 
then the distinction will be simply an ad ..hoc assumption, 
specially designed to get round, the obvious fact that a being 
rarely resembles its predecessor in .every respect. How, 
Aristotle does attempt to provide an independent ground for 
his distinction, maintaining that the essential characteristics 
of a being are those which define its biological species.
But Aristotle himself recognises that there are biological 
facts which cannot be easily reconciled with this suggestion.
He is embarraesed by the existence of hybrids, e.g. the mule, 
??here the offspring seems to differ in species from both its 
parents. And the evidence now available which suggests that 
the various biological species at present In the world have 
evolved from ancestors very unlike themselves confirms that
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living beings domi not always reproduce exactly the species of 
the beings which we naturally take to be their efficient causes®
These weaknesses in the Aristotelian account of the 
nature of efficient causality led modem scientists to formulate 
a different version of the Law of OauBality. Scientists 
could not be forever satisfied with a universe in which the 
scope of soient if ie knov/ledge was bo Severely limited and in 
which BO much v/as left to chance® Modem scientists do not. 
claim that an effect must necessarily resemble its cause: they
are satisfied by the more modest principle that similar causes 
have similar effects® But their modesty in this respect is 
compensated by more far reaching claims with regard to the 
jurisdiction of the Lav/ of GauaaXity# Unlike the Aristotelian, 
the modern scientist leaver nothing to chance; he maintains 
that all natural processes and phenomena are govexuied by causal 
law® This seeopd version of the Law of Gausality was 
justified by the aueoesB of the predictions which were based 
upon it# The Aristotelian, who abandoned to the vagaries 
of chance the bu3,k of what went on in the world, was in a weak 
position when confronted by rivals who could usually predict 
every detail of what was about to happen.
We shall argue that neither of these two important 
historical versions of the Law of Causality is strictly valid, 
although both do contain an element of truth# Our method 
will be to attempt to thro?/ light on the question of the Law 
of Oausality by making a closer invastigetioh of the nature
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of causal eonneetion® In the course of our enquiry, we shall
utilise two die tine t Bounces of information# We may distingua* 
iah the two sources from which we get evidence about the nature 
of eausality by calling one the a priori source, and the other 
the empirloal source. The terminology is not strictly valid,
since both sources of information really depend on experience*
No a:p priori analysis of the concept of eausality is possible 
without an experience of the fact v/hich this conce%)t denotes® 
Nevertheless, one may make a generalised analysis which is 
based on the experience of a single case of causal connection, 
and it is helpful to call this an a priori analysis in order 
to contrast it with the account of causality which makes use 
of a wide range of empirical obseryations-‘»whieh surveys all 
cases of causal connection which have come within our experience* 
We shall first appeal to what v/e have called the a priori 
source of evidence and we ©hall attempt a diredt analysis of 
the nature of causality» The first stage in this analyo1b 
has already been carried out and It has been established that 
in a ease of causal connection, a being is affected by the 
being or beings in its imiediate past® The next stage is 
to explain how it is possible for one being to affect another 
which is not contemporary with it# If one can explain what 
makes it possible for one being to affect another, it eeeme 
quite likely that at the same time one will discover a rule 
governing the way in which one being may affect another«»*®and 
such a rule would be the desired Law of Oausality* Of course.
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any La?; of Oausality derived from this a priori analysis must 
be eonsietent with the information about oausality provided by 
the second source* We must be %)repared to modify the Law of 
Oausality which is extracted from the direct analysis of the 
concept, when such modifications are required in order to avoid 
a clash ivith the information derived both from eowaon sense 
empirical observations and from the investigations of Bystematie 
science*
The first principle which we take to be established by 
the direct analysis of the nature of causal coimeetion ie that 
a past being can causally affect a present being, only if that 
past being somehow persists in the present. Causal connections 
are due to the persistence of the past in the present.
No one can deny that if the past does persist in the 
present, it will affect and make a difference to the present.
But one might suggest, perhaps, that this is not the onlg way 
in which it is possible for the past to affect the present*
One might argue that the past may affect the present in much 
the same way as a mould affects its cast, vis. by providing 
from the outside, boundaries and limits to which the present 
must conform, without being in any way an ingredient in the 
very stuff of the present.
This suggestion is plausible because it ie based on an 
analogy drawn from a common situation in ordinai'y experience.
The plain man assumes a continuum of co«»existenc6 In which a 
being Is affected by contemporaries which circumscribe the
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field of its existence without having any accesB to ite internal. 
^®M±±îï constitiation* Beinge maintain hoimdarieB whleh may 
not 'foe GTOssed and they limit and affeet other foeInga in as 
much as they resist and prohifoit any intrusion into their own 
domain*
But this analogy cannot withstand c)?ltlcal examination®
In the first place, the very foase of the analogy 1b insecure*
The common sense account of the relations between contemporaries 
is not ultimately valid® We argued in the previous chapter 
that there can foe no real and direct relations between 
contempopaz’ioas Gontemporariee can foe related only foy the 
mediation of what is in their past and in their ifiature® And 
secondly, even If one were to admit that a foeing; may affeet 
ite eon temporaries from the outside without entering into their 
internal constitution. It does not follow from this that a 
foeing can affect in a similar fashion what is not contemporary 
with it® There is a very significant difference foe tween the 
two eases and one has no warrant for assinalng that this 
difference is irrelevant ® If contemporary foeinge form a 
oontinuuiîî of co-^existenee, it is at least possible to imagine 
how one foeing may affect another from the outside foy its very 
occupation of a p apedlfie region in this continuum® But 
one finds it difficult even to conceive how one foeing might 
affect another without penetrating its internal character, 
when the two foeings are not contemporary and do not co-exist*
With the reifutatlon of the afoove suggestion, one finds
that there 1b no plansilole alternative to maintaining that the 
past affedts the present heaansë It somehow penslots in the 
present® However, one elearly cannot hold that a past being 
as such may persist in the present® à past "being is restrict­
ed 'by its very nature to the time at which it existed, and it 
cannot he significantly said to exist at any other time*
Thus, when say that the paet persists in the present, we 
must mean no more than that an element in the constitution of 
a past being may persist in the present* This is sufficient 
to explain how the present may he affected hy the past, and 
no more may he demanded without violating the very conception 
of the past®
The problem is now to identify this enduring element*
The element in question must he such that it is not tied domi 
by any necessity to the particular occasion when the being In  
which it 1b included is a present reality® there is In
every real being an element which meets this specification—  
the element which may be called alternatively the natu^^e, 
chEiractor, eseenè® or définitenesB of the being* Every being 
has two Bides to its it hem existence, which determines that 
It and it has a definite character, which determines what
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it iSo The existeneo of a being is by its very nature 
restrietod to the particular time when the being fictually 
exists, but the definite character or essence of the being is 
not necessarily restricted in this v/ay® Mow, we are not 
asBuming that the définiteness of a being is a universal
charaeter which may in fact be repeeited. by another distinct being* 
The mere analysis of the concept of the definiteness of a 
substantial being does not reveal that this definiteness is a 
universal character and not an individual essence® But on 
the other hand, this analysis does not establish that the 
definiteness of a being is an individual essence and not a 
universal eharactera This means that it is not in principle 
Impossible for the definlteness of an individual to be a uni-. 
versalo The proof that the definite character of a being is 
in fact a universal, an element which may persist so as to 
determine the character of a subsequent being, is that the 
existence of causal ooimeetions requires the persistence of 
some element in the cause, and the definiteness of the cause 
is the only available candidate for the position* This proof 
is not a logical demonstration, since it is always possible 
that there is some other element in the past cause which persists 
in the present effect and which is responsible for the causal 
connection® But in the absence of any concrete suggestion, 
this general possibility la of little importance®
If the above argument is correct, an extremely impoi^tant 
conclusion has been reached; for the argument establiaheB the 
existence of universala. The. unlverulil âs an entity whleh is 
vex»y useful for many philosophical purposes# Por example, 
uni versais provide an objective basis which will explain the 
formation of general concepts* But many philosopherb are 
unwilling to admit the existence of unlvereals, because they
are siaturally reluctant to postulate the existence of an 
element so radically different in character from the individual 
and particular beings which constitute the physical world*
They wish to avoid the dualism involved in such a postulate 
and the conBequexit problem of explaining the relationship 
between the two fundamental modes of being, universale and 
particularso But we have no?/ shown that the existence of 
causal connectione; between individual substances implies the 
reality of universale and have also explained, to some 
extent, the nature of the relations between universals and 
partleulare, by showing that universais have an essential role 
and function in the world of individual beings— they are 
neeesearily involved in the real physical relations between 
different indlvidualB® We have not, indeed, made the 
eonneotion between universals and particulars completely 
intelligible, but this is probably something ?/hioh is beyond 
the power of the philosopher* The co-presence in the universe 
of universale and particulars must be accepted as a fundamental 
facts the relation between these two basic elements is sui 
generis and cannot be exhaustively explained in other terms*
But the abomrea account of causality has at least brought 
together the t?/o main problems which confront a philosopher 
who believes both that there are universals and that there are 
many substantial individuals in the v/orld— the problem of the 
coherence of universale and individuals and the problem of the 
coherence of the many substantial individuals in the one world®
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For we hEwe shown that universals are implicated in the eausal 
relations between eubstantial 'beings*
Causal connection, then, involves the persistence in the 
effect of the uhlversai character of the cause® Mow, If we 
maintain that the character of a cause is always reproduced 
exactly by its effect, we shall be accepting the Aristotelian 
account of the nature of efficient causality, while refusing 
to agjf*ree to the limitations which Aristotle puts on the range 
of its operation® We shall be endorsing the Aristotelian 
version of the La?; of Qausallty, but our general position will 
be much more extreme, since we also accept a Principle of 
Oausality v/hioh lays down that every being in the world is an 
effect of some antecedent cause* Bineâ we cannot allow that 
things may come into existence by chance ?/ithout causal 
relations to any prede^cessor, we shall be committed to the view 
that every being is the exact replica of an antecedent cause# 
But immediately one takes account of the evidence supplied by 
our other som^ee of information about causal relations— the 
empirical source— this vie?/ is seen to be clearly untenable *
In the first place, if every being is the replica of an ante­
cedent cause, then every stage in the history of the universe 
must be a simple repetition of the preceding stage, so that the 
world will never change in character— and this is obviously 
untrue® Secondly, there is overwhelming empirical evidence 
that beings may be causally connected although they are not 
identical in character» Occasionally, an effect does seem
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to resemible its oause® And if what the %)lain man deBcrlbes 
as the persistance of a material substance, e®g# an atom of 
hydrogen® is to be interpreted the continual re-enactment 
of the same definite character by every member m in a*se3?ies of 
ephemeral beings, each related to its successor as cause to 
effect, then there will be a considerable number of eases where 
an effect reproduces the character of its cause* But one 
cannot reasonably deny that there are also a very large number 
of eases where two beings are causally related although not 
identical in character®
It seems, therefore, that there is an 1rrooonei1able 
conflict between the in3?ormation about causality derived from
the a priori and empirical sources® The ax) priori analysis
reveals that the character of a cause must persist in its effect, 
whereas the empirical evidence sho?/s that the characters of 
causes and effects are by no means alv/ays identical* But one 
may arra|?ge a compromise betv/een those two apparently contra­
dictory conclusions if one maintains that the chaînacter of a 
cause does indeed persist in its effect, but that it may be 
altered and modified by its new context# The a priori 
examination of causality establishes that the character of the 
cause must somehow persist in the effect* but it does not 
establish that this character must persist unchanged*
This compromise becomes much more plausible once we 
correct a serious oversimplification in the original account 
of causality® For the sake of simplicity^ we have been
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describing situations inhere a cause has but one immediate effect 
and an effect has but one immediate cause® But in the real 
world, causal situations are gene%‘ally much more complex than 
this* The evidence of experience is that many beings are 
causally affected by several immediate antecedents* For 
instance, a human being is causally influenced by his own past 
states and by many external factors. Moreover, further 
evidence that a being has more than one immediate cause was 
supplied in the previous chapter, where in order to explain 
the existence of the spatial continuum, we had to assume that 
a being may be directly connected with many beings In its 
immediate past® Since a being is necC^esarily affected by 
its relations to the past® this shows that a being may have 
many causes,.
If a being may be the effect of several distinct causes, 
one may deduce, without consulting the empirical evidence, that 
an effect cannot always be exactly like its cause— so long as 
one rules out the improbable suggestion that the various causes 
by which a being is influenced are themselves always identical 
in character. One and the same individual cannot be a 
reproduction of the characters of several different causes*
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It may be suggested, hov/ever, that the character of an effect 
is an aggregate of the different characters of its various 
causes, bo that the definiteness of the cause, although not 
identical with the complete definiteness of the effect, does
■ ,whi I# ^  m n  iMÉrtia ^
ef« above, pp® 918-990»
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persist in the effect as a component in its character*
This view would reconcile with the fact that a being may 
have several different causes the thesis that the universal 
character of the cause is preserved in the effect® But there 
are two very good reasons why this view should not be acceptedo 
In the first place, it conflicts with ordinary experience no 
less than does the view that an effect is always exactly like 
its cause® A survey of the various causal situations which 
we encounter in experience makes clear that the character of an 
effect is rarely, if ever, a mere aggregate of the characters 
of its causes® And in the second place, the unity of an 
effect is the unity of a substantial being, so that even v/lthout 
8tudying the empirical details one can see that it is most 
unlikely that the character of an effect will ever be simply 
an aggregate of the characters of its causes® For a substan'b-^ 
ial being has an intimate organic unity which makes a difference 
to the items which it organises» An individual substance is 
no mere aggregate® since its reality is prior to the reality of 
its parts, and not vice versa» This means that the characters 
of the causes of a being® as included in the constitution of the 
effectj, are not exactly the same as they were when they defined 
the natu'ree of the separate causes? the characters are altered 
by the novel context in which they are placed*
Therefore® the theory which best accounts for the facts 
revealed both by a analysis and by empirical observation
is this® Past beings are capable of affecting present beings®
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because and only because their characters have the power to 
persist in the present® These characters, hov/ever® do not 
persist unaltered; for the present being carriee out a 
synthesis which modifies the elements contributed by its past 
causes® This theory does not conflict with the evidence of 
experiences! for it does not imply that the character of an 
effect either is., always identical with the character, of its 
cause or else is a mare aggregaté of the various characters 
of its several causes* Mor does it conflict with what is 
discovered by a generalised analysis of the causal situations 
it allows the persistence of the past in the present and yet 
gives due ?/&ight to the concrete novelty of the synthetic 
unity by which the persistent elements are combined*
The one difficulty in this theory is that it involves 
the assumption that the character of a being may reappear 
else?/here in an altered form# One must assume the reality 
of an entity ?/hieh can exist .in different contexts and 
?/hlch can maintain its identity, although modified by its 
various situations* Mow® this is certainly a very pu^^1ing 
conception* One can sho?; why such an element must exist by 
pointing to the facts which it 1b required to explain® but one 
cannot fully comprehend its nature, nor can one understand 
in detail how it coheres with the individual substances which 
make up the physical world» This obsoxarity® however® is not 
surprising# If the conception of such an entity is valid® 
it ie certainly of bo fundamental a nature that one cannot
.fr»
reasonably demand that it be explained in other terme*
III* There is® however® In experience additional evidence
eonfiming the existence of elements of the kind diseussed
above® Because of the extremely pu^siling nature of these
entitles® this is evidence which must be investigatedf even at
the expense of a slight digression from the main theme of the
present chapter* The evidence in question is furnished by
the existence of the general concepts which are used in thought
and language# There must be some sort of g2?ound which
provides an objective justification for general eoneepts and
this ground® it seems, is much the same sort of entity
as has been assumed to account for the influence of the past
on the present* If different individuals may all be properly
described by one and the same concept, then these different
individuals must share one and the same characteristic, which
must therefore be a universal identity amid difference*
When w© examine In detail the use of general concepts
to describe the physical world, we discover a fact which i©
of the utmost signifloanee in view of our contention that the
character of a cause persists In its effect in an altered form*
This is the fact that the same concept may be used to describe
beings which are not exactly identical in character* There
are two different ways In which beings may be partially identical
in character® Since the characters of the beings in the
v/orld are generally very complex, it often happens that two
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beings are identical in sonie^espeots and different in other 
respectso For example, a red sphere and a "blue sphere are 
identical, in that they are both spherical, but different, 
in that they differ in colour® But it is not this kind of 
partial Identiy which is significant in the present context® 
Obviously, one can apply the same concept to two beings which 
are exactly IdentieaD. in some respect, even although they are 
not identical in total character® But sometimes, one uaeB 
the same concept to describe beings which are not exactly 
identical, even in one respect» One may legitimately say 
that two things are red, even although the one is brick red 
and the other ie pillar box red® When wé investigate the 
realm of general concepts, ?/e discover that they are not all 
on exactly the same levels rather, they are arranged in a kind 
of hierai^chy® We may describe the structure of this hierarchy 
by/saying that some concepts are generics^ and some concepts are 
specific, or more precisely, that some concepts are more 
generic and some concepts are Biore specific* To give an 
example, colour is a very generic concept under which may be 
subsumed the various more specific kinds of colour such ae red, 
blue, and green® And under each of these various kinds of 
colour may be subsumed all its completely specific shades*
There is an alternative terminology which makes ued of 
The definite character of any real being is fully determinate, 
the notions of determinate and determinable* ^  For example, a
particular tomato is a completely determinate shade of red®
But one is not obliged to describe an individual by using
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coxicepts which refer exqltislvely to its various determinate 
Gharacteristics® It is legitimate, and in ordinary life 
usual, to employ concepts which refer indifferently to a number 
of distinct determinate charactera® These concepts are
determinables# They are, in a sense, ambiguoue? they must 
receive an added determination before they will refer exclusive­
ly to a spécifie kind of determinate character, and there are 
alternative ways in which the character of each determinable 
may be further determined® W© should also notice that there 
are various grades of determinables» A determinable character"
istie may be itself a determination of some higher determinable» 
The various kinds of colour are detarmiaiables with respect to 
their determinate shades, but they are also determinations of 
the higher determinable, colour in gnneral*
Two beings which may be properly described by the same 
concept must be in some way identical* That is, there must 
be an objective basis of Identity in the things described which 
justifies the identical description* Therefore, when two
beings are to be described by the same determinable concept, 
they must be in some degree identical in character, even 
although their determinate characters are not the same* Mow, 
this seems to be very much the same sort of identity in spite 
of difference as we were forced to assume in the analysis of 
causality» In a case of causal connection, the effect In 
some way reproduces the eharaoter of the cause, although cause 
and effect are not necessarily exactly the same in determinate
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charaoter®
We are not, however, attempting to explain the transmutation 
in character which takes place in causal corniection in terms of 
the distinction between determinable and determinate® We are 
not claiming that the identity in character between cause and 
effect is simply the identity of the determinable under which .. 
the characters of both may be subsumed® For it is poeeible
that it is the transmutation of character involved in. the 
concrete physical relation between different â individuals 
which is the more fundamentalo The determinable concepts 
used by conscious subjects may be by-products of the causal 
relations bet?/een different substances® But for our present
purposes, it is not necessaî^y to solve the very difficult px^oblem 
of the exact relations between the two type© of identity in 
difference* We have referred to the existence of determinable 
concepts, only in order to show that there 1b evidence from 
another source of the existence of the same general sort of 
identity amid difference as we discovered in causal eonneetion®
But some philosophers would object that the existence, of 
determinable concepts cannot be legitimately used to confirm 
the existence of universal identities in difference® We have 
been maintaining that the same determinable concept .may be 
applied to ^ every member in a certain group Of distinct 
individual©, only because of a universal identity which permeate© 
the group* Mow, the existence of such a universal identity 
would certainly justify one in predicating this concept of all
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members of the group, hut some philosophers believe that an 
alternative justification is possible— a justifications moreover, 
?/hich does not involve the potstulation of peculiar entities 
which maintain their identity in spite of the plurality of their 
instantiations* It has been suggested that the reason v/hy 
one may predicate the same determinable concept ( and the seme 
determinate concept, too) of different individuals 1b simply 
that these different individuals are similar in character®
When this suggestion is exaininecl, however, it turns out that it 
does not have the advantages which it is supposed to have®
The reel son why the similarity theory has attracted empiricisits 
is that unlike its rival, it does not seem to require the 
postulation of any unusual metaphysical entities® But the 
similarity theory must assume objective unanalysable relatione 
of similarity existing between the different individuals which 
may be described by the same concept® How these objective 
relations of similarity are surely entities of some sort, and 
the existence of these 3?êlatiens requires explanation and 
justification just as much as does the existence of the 
universals aesmied by the alternative view®
Thus, the supposed advantage of the similarity theory in 
respect of simplicity is only apparent® Both theories equally 
require the assua^aption of some entity to serve as an objective 
groimd which will justify the classification of different 
individuals by moans of general concepts* The disagreement 
between the two theorios concerns the proper description of
tille this objective ground » The partisans of
similarity az»e anxious to avoid the imputation that the 
objective ground is a thing— that it is at all like the 
individual bein,gs which exist in the world® But the supportera 
of universals are quite prepax^ed to admit-^»indeed, they ins 1 sty- 
that universals differ in many important respects from substantial 
bélngs; In the fl2:'st chapter, we resolved the initial paradox 
of the one and. the many by ciistinguiehing between different 
modes of being*î/k± There is a primary mode of being— substantial 
being— which we suppose to be enjoyed by the real, concrete, 
physical things in the world® But there are also secondary 
and derivative modes of being v/hioh» although ontoD.ogically 
de-pendent on substantial being for whatever reality they -possGss# 
are nevertheless distinct modes of existence® These derivative 
inodes have a considerable importance in a system of metaphysical 
pluralism; for although they cannot exist unless they depend on 
some substance or other, they are not x*e strie ted by any necessity 
to a dependence on this or that particular' substance* The 
same entity may depend on several different substances and it 
may therefore serve to b#ind together the plurality of Independ­
ent substantial beings® The universal is an entity of this 
sort: it cannot exist without the support of some substance,
but it ï'^ etains its identity, even when it qualifies several 
ci ifferent sub b t anc es®
Both the above theories, if stated.carefully, can account
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in their own way for the facts of oxperience* How, then, 1b 
one to decide between them? First, one may seek to determine 
the IntrinBlcî plausibility of the competing views• Which 
theory offers the more convincing deecription of the objectivé 
element which jiistlfies the use of general concepts?
The second i?elevant consideration is which of the two view is 
superioB? As an explanatory hypothesis* Does either suggestion 
account for other facts over and above the facte which it has 
been specifically invoked to explain?
It is by no means easy to assess the relative inherent 
plausibility of the similarity^^ theory and the ’haniversalB’^ 
theory. One’s decision, wd 11 rest on an intuitive judgment 
as to what sort of element is likely to be ultimately real®
The proponents of universale may argue, with a good deal of 
cogency, that their adversaries, in their anxleêy to avoid the 
hypostatisation of the element justifying the existence of 
general conceptb , have asouraed something which is tog insubetant» 
ial to be an ultimate ingredient in reality® An imanalysaMe 
relation of similarity between different substances is not the 
sort of thing which might be a fundamental element in the 
universe*
But although this argument might be accepted by those . 
who are already sympathetic to universals, it would not convince 
those who are committed to the similarity view® To them, it 
would seem to be relying’ on what they consider the basic 
superstition behind the theory of universale, the supposition 
cf. HJi, Price j Thinking and Experience, Chapter I,
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that the objective ground underlying general concepts must be 
some sort of thing® ■
But if the supporters of univei^salB adopt the second
line of approach, they can present a case which their opponents
will find more difficult to answer. As an explanatory
hypothesis, the theory of univel^sals is very much superior*
The theory of ultimate similarities is an ad hoc hypothesis
Which will explain only the formation of general concepts®
But the theoz'y of universals can also explain a wide variety of
other phenomena. As we have seen, universals may also be
I q I q
used to. exp^in causal efficacy, to exp.%&in how the present
may be affected by the past® And we shall discover that in
solving the problem of causality, the theory of universals also
provides a solution to a number of other important philoBopHlcal
explain
problems® Universals are Required to sxpsMn the expei^'ienee f 
of other beings, memory, personal identity^and. the element of 
permanence in a changing universe®
The arsqament at this point may appear to be elroular®
We appealed to the evidence :rur:aiBhed by the use of general 
concepts to confirm our account of the function of universals 
in causal eonneotion* And now we are appealing to our account 
of causal connection in order to establish that the justifying 
grounds of general concepts are universals and not ultimate 
relations of similarity® But the procedure is not as 
illegitimate as it might appear at first sight* We are trying 
to show that the same fundamental exi>lanato2?y hypothesis v/ill
cover two very different kinds of empirical, fact® Therefore, 
the fact that universals are capable of supplying an objective 
ground for general eoneepts will confirm the theory that 
universal© are involved in causal eonnectiom, and vice verea.
A solution which needs to postulates only one kind of entity in 
order to explain both sets of facts ?;111 have the advantage over 
BOlutione which require separate postulates for each set®
IV* ' Eeturning from our digression, let ns first point out,
In passingD that the fact that one and the same being may have
several distinct causes, which explains why the character of
an effect cannot always be an exact replica of the character
of its cause, also supplies a valuable oonfimation of a doctz^ine
defended above, that in a case of causal connection» the
relation ie constituted by the activity of the effect and not
by the activity of the cause. An effect ie a novel synthesis
of the contributions of its various causes® Mow, this
u
synthesis cannot be due to the activity of the ca^eo, since 
these are intrinsically eeparate and disunited® The synthesis 
must therefore depend on the unity and activity of the effect«
It is the effect v/hieh is responsible for the relations 
whereby it relates its causes to itself and brings them to 
a unity v/hich they did not possess before®
Although the Aristotelian version of the Law of Oaueality 
must be rejected as it ©tende» it doe© contain an element of 
truth, in that the character of the cause Is re«»enacted by
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the effect, even if it foe altered, perhaps very toastieally,
In the procoBBo But although the Aristotelians have indicated 
what la the ultimate ontological foundation of causal eonneetion-« 
the pereistenee in the effect of the character of the oauee—  
their theory ia of little use for the purpoaee of science and 
prediction, since we have no means of foreseeing a_^priori the 
nature of the modification imposed on the character of the cause 
when it ia included in Its new context#
We must now examine the version of the Law of Oausality 
aBSumed foy mo d e m BcienoOo The sc lent 1st postulates a 
detexmninietic universe In which the nature of everything is 
necessarily determined foy its causes and similar groups of 
causeB invariably have similar effects# The prestige of the 
scientific version of the Law of Oausality has 'been bo great 
that there is now a natural tendency to believe that the very- 
meaning of causal connection 1© euch that the nature of an 
effect is inexorably determined foy the nature of its causes®
But, as we have already pointed out, all that is involved in 
the fundamental concept of causality is that an effect must foe 
influenced and affected foy its causes*
One reason why the scientific account of causality tends 
to seem bo plausible is on account of the assimilation# implicit 
or-explicit, of causai connection and logical implicitlorn*
It Is supposed that the relation of causality Is a relation 
between things in the real world which parallels the relation
c above, p® 254*
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of logical implication 'betv/een things in the abstract realm of 
concepts and propositions* In the case of logical implication, 
a consequent is necessarily determined foy its antecedent*
But the character of this ÏTalationship in the static world of 
afostract ideas does not justify the conclusion that there is a 
similar necessary determination in the relations ‘between 
antecedent and eonaaquent In the dynamic woz'ld of real eoî^rete 
snfostaneoa*
W© eetablished.that the relation between cause and effect 
depends on the activity of the effect and not on the activity 
of the caizse,*’ and this Is an extremely important result for 
anyone who ?/ishes to ohallgnge scientific de termini em* If it
were the causes themselvQe which were responeifole for the 
Synthesis of the characters which they contrifouto to the effect, 
then the nature of an effect w o u M  foe ne.cessarlly determined 
in advance foy the nature and activity of its causes, and the 
Da termini st thesis would foe ineonti?overt ifole. But since this 
synthesis depends on the activity of the effect, it may well foe 
that# although the éléments to foe synthesised are determined 
foy the past causes, the peculiar mode of synthesis employed 
depends on the freedom and initiative of the effect* This# 
however# does not prove that Determinism is false* For it 
ie also pOBSifole that the mature of the synthetic product is 
completely determined foy the nature of the elements synthesised. 
It may foe that the mode of synthesis open to the effect Is
o f .  afoove, pp. 250-2135 and p . 278.
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determined by the nature of the material© ?/hieh it must 
incorporate® If the effect ia compelled by its causal 
Bituation to adopt just one specific mode of synthesis, then 
Determinism will be true# notwithetarading the activity of the 
effect® , But on the other hand, if the effect has a certain 
appAneity and may choose between alternative ways of eynthesis» 
ing the elements contributed by its causes # then Determinism 
will be untrue®
The only way of deciding between these two paBsibilitieB 
1b by referring to the empirical ©videncé. On the side of 
Determiniam, the main evidence is the de facto reguiirity of 
nature® Boientifie investigation and the siaceeeseB of 
scientific prediction have shown that effects respond to their 
causal situations in a very regular and predictable v/ay®
But the evidence of reg^^alaMty in nature is not sufficient 
to warrant the conclusion that the character of an effect is 
always necessarily and completely determined by ite causes »
Even if scientists discover a perfect regularity in thc^  past 
history of the universe, BUoeesBfully eliminating all cases 
zvhere a possible irx^egularity might be auspectod, there ie no 
guarantee that this regularity ?/ill necessarily persist in the 
future * And in any ease, scientists at present are very far 
from establishing that the regularity of nature Is complete, 
even in the limited portion of the world process v/hieh is open 
to detailed scientific Investigation* There is, Indeed, 
m. impreeaive regularity of behaviour in the phenomena studied
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t>ar the physicist and the ohemlst. But even in this ease, it 
is poBslhle to suggest that the regularity is partly due to the 
operation of statistical laws governing the behaviour of a mass 
coaprlslng a very large number of individual belnge, some of 
which may act in most erratic ways without disturbing sigalficaat- 
ly the behaviour of the whole mass. And in the ssciences of 
biology and psychology, the regularity which has been diaoovered 
is by no means complete. There is, for example, no exact
, human behaviour which would make possible an infallible
prediction of what a human being will do in a given se* of 
oircumstanees. The failure of the scientist to predict with 
consistent Bueoess exactly what men w i l l  do  d o e s not, indeed, 
prove that human behaviour Is undetermined and spontaneous! 
for the scientist may fail only because the situations are so 
complex that he cannot identify all the causal factors involved. 
Btit we are not maintàining that the shortcomings of scientific 
psychology make Determinism untenable; we are merely pointing 
out that the actual evidence of Mm regularity in nature does
no-G establish that Determinism is the only possible or reasonable 
view.
The main empirical evidence on the raide of Indeterminism 
is the evidence of the freedom of the human will, Every human 
being naturally believes that ha is a free agent, that he does 
very often have the power of deciding between alternative 
courses of action, even although the linos of action possible 
in a particular situation may be severely restricted by the
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©mviremiezit. The plaira man’ b Intuiti-ye conviction that ho is
a free agent ?/lth a real power of decision may# of course, 
turn ont to be an illusion» It may be# as Bpinosa suggests, 
that men consider themselves free only because they are ignorant 
of the causes determining their actions® Therefore, the 
eommon sense belief in the freedom of the ?/ill is by no means 
an iziBuperable obstacle to De termini am, and this belief may be 
disregarded if Determinism rmst be accepted on other grounds.
' But since the arguments by ?/hich Dateivainiete support their 
thés is are far from eonolusive, the natural belief in the 
freedom of the human will may be accepted at its face value 
as evidence in favom? of Indeterminism»
Moreover# there is a much stronger argument for the 
freedom of the v/ill which is based on the evidence of moral 
experiencep There are two pï*opositions which a moral agent
cannot easily deny: first, that one has sometimes done what
one ought ziot to have done: second, that one is under an
obligation to do only what one can do— ought implies can»
From these propositions, the coneluBion folio?/© that one is 
sometimes free to do what one does not in fact do® On 
occasion# one has a real choice between genuine alternatives*
One may choose to do ?;hat dufy prescribes ; or else, one may 
choose to folio?/ one’s strongest desire* Borne philosophers, 
©pgp Eantg have been so impressed by the evidence of moral 
experience that they have been prepared to exempt the moral 
will from the causal deteramlnlsm which they suppose to govern
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the rest of the imlverse* Th©2?efore# the evicienoe of human'
freedom imst be very persuasive in the ease of'those who do 
not believe that DeteminiBte have estafoXiehed their thesis 
even with respect to the behaviour of things in the non-human 
vmrld*
The best way to make clear exactly Y/here we stand in 
the controversy. Determinism versus Indeterminism# is to 
consider briefly the initial paradox confroziting those who 
tackle this problem® There are three principles which a 
preliminary examination of exper'ience seems to justify; and 
yet these principles are not compatible— they cannot all be 
true, There is the principle that the human will is free. 
There is the principle that there is nothing in the universe 
in so special a position that it is not involved in the causal 
relationships which apply to other things. There is the 
principle that causal oonn.eetion implias the necessary determin­
ation of an effect by its causes. The Determiniets resolve 
the paj?adox by denying the first of these prineiples— the 
freedom of the will® But we have just seen how well sub­
stantiated this principle is* Many Inde terminis ts reject 
the second principle, maintaining that the moral will is not 
subject to the causal la?/s ?/hich reign in the rest of the 
universe. But this involves establishing in the universe 
a radical dichotomy bet?/ëen the things which are governed by , 
causal law and the things which are not.
Our view is that there is no necessity to resort to
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either of the above expedients! for it is the third of the 
incompatible principles which is false® This principle# that 
an effect is completely determined by its caizseo, is usually 
taken so very much for granted that it is not even explicitly 
recognised as one of the assumptions involved in the initial 
paradox» If this principle is rejected, then the fx»eecTora of 
the will is perfectly compatible with the doctrine that every 
real being ie involved in causal relationships with its 
predecessors* We have argued that two beings are eausally 
related if the cause affects and makes a difference to its 
effect* If one wishes to go further and claim that the 
nature of an effect is completely determined by Its causes, 
one must produce the necessary evidence— and this evidence 
has not been forthcoming®
To summarise the account of causality ?/hieh we believe 
to be correctI all beings are subject to causal conditioning 
and have to deal ?/ith data provided by their antecedent causes® 
But the Y/ay in which a being deals with these data is not 
determined by its causes* Evej/y being has a certain spontan­
eity and it is responsible for the particular ?/ay in ?/hich It 
synthesises the elements contributed, by its antecedents*
This theory of causality is extremely BuoceBsful in 
explaining human action* Wo must notice that the phrase
human actiosf’ is cmbiguous* It may be used to denote the 
sequence of events in the external ?;orld ?;hioh folio?/ upon the 
agent’s act of volition. But it may also be used in a
♦na3?FOwoi? Bonse to only to the Internal activity of the
human emhjeot. Everyone would agree that human action^ In
the wider sense^ is suhject m to causal conditions which set 
limits to what can he done3 while at the same time the agent 
is free to choose between the alternative courses of action 
which are physically possible# For examplep in a particular 
Bltuations> a man might be free to v/alk north or east or vmst, 
but not to vmlk south» because of a stone wall which blocks hie 
path» beterministe would» of course» maintain that this 
freedom poBBOBBOd by the agent la merely nominale The agent 
is said to be free because normally» he is not compelled by his 
physical situation to follow a certain designated course of 
action; but this does not mean that his choice between the 
physical possibilities is not determined, by psychological 
factors beyond his control. To describe the situation in 
terms of the theory defended above» a human agent can influence 
the fixture according to the character of his own activity» 
because the character of the agent is an element which su.b«« 
sociuont beings must incorporate» But a human agent has not 
an unlimited power to mould the future in accordance with his 
wishes g because of other causal forces operating in the 
environment which also supply data to be incorporated by 
subsequent beings» The freedom of action of a human being 
is limited» because he has no control over the contrIbutions 
of hie contemporary neighbours » which also help to determine 
the nature of the future»
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But the peculiar virtue of our theory ie that it can also 
allow the eomhination of freedom and determination in the case 
of the internal activity of the human agent# An agent does 
not have an absolute control even over the nature of his o m  
activity» lie is limited by the data contributed by his 
imedlate past. A man cannot have the experience of seeing 
a rôd patch» unless his sense organs have just been sttoulated 
in a certain way» nor can a man understand a passage from Homer 
if he has never learned Greek» But there ie nevertheless a 
certain area within whloli the prerogative of free oho lee may 
operate. For the agent determines the particular way in 
which the data jprovided by antecedent beings are synthesised»
But although our theory of causality can explain how 
spontaneity and causal determination are combined in human 
action» can it explain the enormous de facto regularity which 
scientists have diseovered in the rest of nature? How can 
the same aeeount be stretched to cover both the activities of 
human beings» who show a good deal of initiative» and the 
behaviour of inorganic matter» which actè in a perfectly 
regular way? This Is not a serious difficulty. Although 
all beings are Involved in the same kind of causal relationships » 
and although in all case#» the synthesis of the contributione 
of the causes is determined by the activity of the effect, 
one can admit wide differences in the degree of originality 
and initiative possessed by the beings affected by antecedent 
causes # There are high-*grade entities » such as human beings»
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where the element of originality and decision in the heing^e 
response to his causal situation is very important. And 
there are also low-grade entities, such as the things studied 
by physics and ohemlstry» which lack the initiative to perform 
any but the most obvious synthesés of the data contributed 
by their causes. In the case of such entitles» there is a 
very marked regularity of behaviour » bo  that it is very often 
possibleg on the.basis of past experience» to make an accurate 
prediction of what will happen in the future# But even in 
the ease of entities of the very lowest gi*ade, there is no 
necessaw connection between the nature of a cause and the 
nature of an effect. And there are 063?tain phenomena, even 
in the natural world, which the rigid system of sclentifie 
determinism cannot explain as conveniently as can the more 
flexible account of causal connootion given above, e.g. the 
origin of life and the evolution of higher from lower forme 
of being.
Thus» there is no conclusive evidence that Determinism 
is true, even in the ease of non«liylng beings» and an alter»» 
native explanation of the do facto regularity of nature is 
possible. And on the other hand, it ie difTieult to maintain 
that the iron rule of necessary determination holds good even 
in the ease of the moral choices of human agents* It is, 
of course, possible to argue that there is a fundamental 
difference between the relatione of conscious and unconscious 
beings raBpaetively to their causal environments and to
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distinguish causal relations which are compatible with freedom 
from causal relations which are not* But since the causal 
relation Is the baelc structural relation in the universe, one 
should avoid, if it is at all possible, the radical dualism 
Involved in a distinction 'between different types of causal 
connection. It is better to assume that in all eases there 
is in principle a certain spontaneity, even if the degree of 
epôntaneity actually exercised is often negligible.
V* This complétas our account of the nature of causal
comieetion» but before concluding the chapter, it must be 
pointed out that in this system» the causal relation has a much 
greater importance than It has in most other systems. Many 
metaphysicians have assumed the reality of enduring substances 
which maintain their identity throughout a number of passing 
states. These substances remain present for a period of time» 
perhaps for ever, although their various states come to be and 
pass away. We do not accept this account of substance» and 
we take as the ultimate substances the entities regarded on the 
other theory as passing states® Our view has the adH^antage
of simplicity: the opposing theory rmst postulate the existence
of two different fundamental types of particular being«»»^  the 
enduring substance and the transient states and this gives 
rèse to the problem of relating these two types of being in a 
H±st satisfactory way® But there is another more Important 
reason why we wish to challenge the conception of permanent
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substances^ Thé Independence of substances may be reconciled 
with their Interrelatedness only if there are no real direct 
relations between éontemporaz^y b e i n g s . H o w ,  if subs tances 
are permanent things which persist through time, one cannot 
easily deny that contemporary substances are often interrelated. 
For example» if two enduring material objects are in collision, 
they are obviously related and affect one another® One can 
defend the view that there are no direct relations between 
contemporaries, only if one is prepared to break up each common 
sense material object into a series of ephemeral substances* 
How, if one denies the reality of permanent substances, 
one must use causal relations bety/een past and present to 
explain the phenomena y/hich others would attribute to the 
persietenee of substantial beings® In the ease of a human 
person, for example, there Is a massive identity in character 
between - two states which are not y/idely separated in time#
If a human person were a single enduring substance, then this 
identity in character could be explained by the Identity of 
the substance# But since the human person ie a series of 
transient substances, this identity in character must be k 
explained as resulting from the causal relations between 
different terms in this sez^ies. We are able to give a 
plausible explanation of the very great similarity betv.?een 
contiguous terms in such a series because of our doctrine that 
the character of a cause persiste in its effect in a modified
ef® above, pp® 201^202.
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form* In this case, the degree of modification 1b very
Blight.
It is natural to feel that this analysis does not do 
justice to the identity of an enduring being such as a person*
One feels that the identical self which persists throughout the 
vicissitudes of life is something very much more than can be 
explained by a theory which breaks up the self into a series of 
causally related substantial states and which must reduce the 
Identity of the self to the repetition of the same universal 
character# One feels that the identity of the self is 
something more concrete than the abstract identity of different 
instantiations of the same universal• But this feeling is 
due% to a misconception of the nature of the universal• The 
universal is often regarded as something rather abstract because . 
one thinlts of it as a universal ooncept* But although the 
universal is the ground which justifies the formation of general 
concepts, in this system it has another funotion-«and a more 
important iteiction. The universal is the element of permanence 
in the univez^se. It is an entity which may survive the 
disappearance of any particular substantial being in which it 
1b incorporated* Therefore » one should not reject the above 
analysis because one feels that the universal is not adequate 
to perform the role assigned to it. Instead, one should 
revise one’s idCa of the universal#
The situation is briefly this# There is an element 
which is responsible for what is permanent amid the flux of
the miiverBe# It is this same element whioh is the objective 
ground of general concepts. We can understand the nature of 
this element only by considering its functions* We have no 
j^^riorl knowledge of what a universal must be like. Any 
preconceived idea which would lead one to suspect that the 
universal is not competent to perform its various functions is 
derived from an inadequate and incomplete exaraination of these 
.ftmetioîis«»«*from an undue emphasis on the role of the universal 
as the foundation of. general concepts® One cannot deny that 
the universal is sufficiently concrete to carry the weight of 
explaining» for example, the identity of the self, for the 
only way of assessing the degree of Oonoreteness possessed by 
the universal is by considering the conereteness of the 
identities in difference whioh it is invoked to explain#
CHAPTBE
BXPERXEHOB,
lo The main purpose of this chapter Is to re-exa.mine the
e:pistemologioal problem discussed in Ohai)ters II and II in the 
light of the metaphysical theory developed in the last few 
chapters. In Chapter II and Chapter III» we argued, that there 
is no need to abandon, in the face of epietemological criticisms» 
the common sense belief that the experiencing subject exparieneee 
independent objects beyond himself® In the following chapters, 
we moved from epistemology to. metaphysics in order to answer 
the objection# that the experiencing subject and the objecte 
experienced cannot be independent substances# The commn 
sense belief camot be defended unless one can establish a 
system of metaphysical pluralism^-^oa system which reconciles the 
plurality of substances with their interrelatednesB® But the 
development of a ebherent pluralist system merely satisfies a
q
necessary condition which must be s^bisfied if one is to maintain 
that an independent substance may experience other independent 
substances: there remains the problem of^wÊKing that substances
are related in such a way that it is in feet possible for one 
substance to be experienced by another#
This z»emainlng problem, however, is by no means as 
formidable as it may appear, since the basis fox" its solution 
has already been provided by the particular metaphysical theory
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sketched in the preceding chapters. In Ohapter VI and 
Chapter VIÏ» ?/e established the existence of a clix^ ect relation 
which is the ilmdamental liialc connecting different substances 
In the one universe without destroying their independence.
This relation is responsible for the generation of the temporal 
eoîitinuujrt» and it also enables one being to have a causal effect 
on other beinge— »in one appect, it is the relation of causal 
connection. How, all that is necessary in order* to prove that 
an experience of external- beings is possible is to shov/ that 
it is. legitimate to identify the relation between experiencing 
subject and experienced object with the fundamental relation 
whose existence has been already established.
A metaphysical system which assûmes only one kind of 
direct relation between Independent 'beings in order to explain 
the source of the temporal series» causal efficacy, and the 
experience of external beings, is clearly in a strong position 
on account of its extreme Biraplieity and coherence® But the 
economy of this system will not save it, if it is inadequate 
to the facts and confuses relations which are demonstrably 
different® Therefore, we must now consider several objections 
to the identification of the relation between the experiencing 
subject and the object experienced with the relation bet?/©en 
cause and effect® If these objections can be sustained, it 
will follow that the experienced^ relation is also different 
from the trana-temporal relation connecting independent 
substances® with which the causal "relation was identified In
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the prevlôTis ohaptei*.
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But before examining these objections, let us first 
point out that the causal relation and the relation between 
experiencing subject and experienced object have the same fonda» 
mental structure® Both relations are internal-exte-TOal 3S 
relatione. Both relations make a difference to one of their 
tejftms and not to the other* The causal relation makes a 
difference to the effect, but not to the TCause* And when 
one being experiences another, the relation between them makes 
a difference to the experiencing Bubjeet, but not to the object 
experienced* A being is modified by its experiences, but
experience does not change its object®*-^  Thus, the relation
of experiencing and the relation of causality are similar in 
structure, the experienced object eoxn'»esponding to the cause 
and the experiencing subject corresponding to the effect*
An effect is affected by its causes, and the experiencing; 
subject ie affected by the external objecte experienced*
But in spite of this underlying basis of similarity, 
there are certain apparent differenoes betweezi experiencing and 
causality which must be removed if one is to assmm the identi 
of these two relations* One m important objection against
This can be challenged only by those who fail to make a
clear distinction between the content of experience and its 
external object. The content of experience, as we showed 
in Chapter II, Is eubjeotively conditioned and is affected 
by its relation to the experiencing subject® But experience 
has also an external object which, as we normally believe, 
is not altered when it ie experienced®
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the identification of experiencing and causality has been 
ansY/ered, in effect, in the preceding chapter* When one 
being expcï^ienees another, the active partner in the relation- 
ship is the experiencing subject and not the ©xparienced ôbjeet* 
This means that one cannot identify experiencing and causality 
if one accepts the common sense belief that, in a case of 
causal connection, it is the cause which is active and not the 
effect* But w (b have shown that this common sense belic^f is 
mistaken and that causal relations really depend on the 
activity of the effect*'*'
The principal objection remaining against the idezitl- 
fication of causality and experiencing is that one seems to 
experience what is eonteinporary» whereas a being is causally 
affected by what is in its past* Experience» it Y/ould seem» 
is by definition experience of what is present g any awareness 
of Y/hat 1b past is not experience proper » but memory* But 
the evidence that the object of experience is contemporary Y/ith 
the subject is zzot conclusive* It may be that the eommosi
sense belief that we experience contemporary objects is mistaken 
and depends on an illusion* The plain man does not make the 
sharp distinction revealed by analysis between the content 
and the object of expe'rienee® Now» the content of experience
is certainly contemporary with the experieneing subject» since 
it is an element in the constitution of that substantial being# 
Therefore » if one confuses the content and object of experience» 
one may have the Illusion that the object ie also Gontemporary 
cf. above j pp. 250-853.
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with the subject9 even if this is not the ease# Moreover, 
on account of his practical, interests, an experiencing subject 
is generally eonoerned, not simply with the characters of the 
ephemeral beings v/hich he direetly experiences, but with 
features which are likely to persist in the external world for 
some time* Even if the evidence for the existence of these 
features is provided by the Immediate past and not by the 
present, this fact may very well escape the notice of ûn 
experiencing subject who, in virtue of his practical concerns, 
is orientated towards the future®
This argument does not, of course» establish that the 
object experienced is not contemporary with the experiencing 
subject® It mei'ely explains how it vmuld be natural to 
believe that the object and subject of ex:perienee are co­
present » even if this v/ere not the case, and therefore it shows 
that the actual existence of such a belief is ajot Inconsistent 
with the hypothesis that the subject in fexet expeiJienoeG only 
beings in his past® But if it is at all poBsibl^e to reject 
without implausibility the plain man’s belief that he experiences 
contemporary beings, it is surely advisable to do so* For 
if this belief Is accepted» not only will it be necessary to 
construct a more complicated system» it will also be necessary 
to reject a belief which the plain man would be equally 
reluctant to abandon— the belief that the experiencing subject 
and the experienced object are Independent beings. For 
the independence of beings can be reeonoilod with their
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interrelatedness » only if the related beings are not con- 
tempoz^ ary.
There is, moreover, a certain amoimt of scientific 
evidence eonfirmlng that the objects which we experience are 
not always contemporary beings, as we naively suppose* There 
are certain exceptional oases where an object which the plain 
man supposes to contemporary can be clearly shown to be in the 
remote past of the observer® When we look up at the heavens» 
we naturally suppose that we are seeing contemporary stars®
But astronomy has shown that the observer does not witness what 
is going on at present, but only what was happening a long time 
before# How, if the plain man is mistaken in this case, on© 
may reasonably suspect that he ie mistaken in all cases, when 
he supposes that the beings which he experiences are his 
contemporaries® In the case of terrestrial observations. 
Indeed, the temporal gap between the time of an event and the 
time of its observation will be very ameill, and for practical 
purposes negligible* But bo long as there is a gap, however 
small, the plain man will be the victim of an illusion whan he 
supposes that he observes what is going on at the present time.
Thus g one cannot reject the identification of the 
relation of causality and the relation of experiencing on the 
ground that in the case of experiencing the terras az’e muiimpem 
contemporary, whereas in the ease of caziBality they are not. 
There is, hoY/ever, another objection to this Identifie at lozi
*  G i*. a-bove, p p .  SOl-SOS.
whleh we must now consider briefly® One may az»gu.e that it 
is Impossible to asBlmilate a relation like experiencing, 
where one of the terms must he a human being or at least one 
of the higher animals, to a relation like causality, which 
connecte even the most primitive of beings* If causality 
and experiencing are the same, it should be legitimate to say, 
for example, that one atom experiences another— but this la 
an extremely odd use of language*
This objection dra?/B attention to a valid» though obvious, 
point— that a low grade entity, such as an atom» cannot 
experience other beings in exactly the same way as a conscious 
subject experiences the world around him® Atoms do not have 
that conBciousness T/hich we experience in ourselves andmlhich 
we are reluctant to admit even in the casa of the higher 
animal©* But this does not disprove the main principle which 
we wish to defend, that the relation of experiencing is 
fundamentally the same as the relation of causality* Granted 
this :ITundamental identity, we are willing to admit very great 
variations in the relation when it is established by the 
activity of a Jmman being and v/hen it depends on the activity 
of a being of very low grade* A human being may respond to 
his causal situation by a conscious experience of the beings 
Y/hich affect him, but such a response ie beyond the po?/er of 
atoms and similar entities® It is perhaps best to say that 
experiencing is a particular form which may be taken by causal 
connection in a ease where the effect ie a high grade organism.
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That Is, experiencing is one specific type of causal connection, 
although there are other cases of causal connection which it is 
not appropriate to call experiencing* But if one adopts this 
terminology, one should hear in mind that it may he impossible 
to draw a hard and fast line between those cases of causality 
which are propez»ly classed as experiencing and those which are 
not. One should also remember that causality in general has 
one character is tic (and there may be others) which we would 
normally ascribe to ex.pez‘ieneing; and not to eauBality* In 
causal connection# the relation depends on the activity of 
the being whioh is affected*
Since it is both possible and plausible to identify 
the relation of experiencing with the relation of causality 
and hence with the fundamental tranetemporal relation between 
independent substances» we have vindicated, in terms of our 
general metaphysical system, the plain man’s belief that h© 
experiences external objects® The general answer to the 
problem, *’How is it possible for one being to experience another 
beyond Itself?" Is that such an experience is possible in 
virtue of the relation which must exist between them if they 
are to be together in the same universe*
II* Thus, the identifioation of causality and experiencing
enables one to justify the common sense belief that there are 
external beings* This identification also makes possible 
the justification of another common sense belief, that we have
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some knowledge of the nature of these extezmal beings® We 
shall now j^roeeed to a discussion of this point»
Although we know the existence of external things Toy a 
di??ect Intuition through our contact with them, it ie not easy 
to defend a similar direct intuition of the detailed nature
r tW icc jiB W H ia fcM fe - t*
of external things» Therefore, if we have any knowledge of 
the character of the external world, it must be through the 
contents presented to eonBciousnees» W© naturally B'pppas© 
that the sense-contente given in immediate experience do 
provide us with information about the external world» For 
example, when a red seneo-datum is presented to conBoiousness» 
V/© assert straightav/ay, unless there are spécial reaBone fox» 
caution, that there is a red object in the external world#
In the second chapter, it was conclusively established 
that the contents given in consciousness are not, as such, 
objective qualities of external things— Naive Realism ie an 
untenable view# Therefo??e, if* Bense-contents supply evidence 
with respect to the characters of external beings, this must 
be in virtue of some relation which connect© the sense-oontento 
with the external things# According to the Theory of 
Representative Perception# this relation is the similarity 
of the BubjeetivG sense-eontents and the objective character»* 
isticB of the things in the vmrlda Now, we noted, again 
In the second chapter':', that, on account of mediating 
conditions and the subjective conditioning of the content of
cfo above, pp«
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experience, the presented sense-contentB are often very 
different from and may never he very olMlar to the objective 
qualities of the external things concerned# We could not, 
indeed, rule out categorically the possibility that the sub- ; 
jectivQ and objective elements are some time 8 very similar in 
hbaraeter# but it is quite clear that normally# any supposition 
that the character of an external being closely resembleg a 
presented sense-content is extremely precarious.
The only other possibility is that the relation bet?/een 
the content and the external object is the relation of 
cauBality# If this is so, the contents presented to eon- 
soiousnesB will supply us with information about the e.xternal 
world, referring us to the causes which are responsible for 
their production# How, the contents presented In consciousness 
are elements in the constituHtion of the experiencing subject; 
for they are not objective features of external substance© 
and they must be incorporated in some substantial being, if 
they are to exist at all# We have seen that the relation 
between experiencing subject and experienoid object is the 
relation of causality. Therefore# senee-contenta age the 
effects of external causes# and from the presentation of a 
certain sense-content » one can infer that thei'e is in the 
external world a being v/ith the power to produce' that sense- 
content in the eonsciouBneBS of the experiencing subject.
Thus @ the nature of an external being may be inferred 
from the nature of lie effect on the experiencing subject»
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which is the specific content presented to consciousness#
The contents immediately before the mind yield information 
about the external world because they bear witness g to the 
nature of the external powers which are responsible for their 
production# This means that our knowledge of the nature of 
the external v/orld is much more limited than we normally 
believe® We have no knowledge of the intrinsic characters 
of the things in the worlds we cannot say that they actually 
possess the qualitites immediately present to the mind# but 
only that they have the power, in suitable oircumBtanooB# to 
produce such qualities in the consciousnees of an experiencing 
subject# For example# we cannot say that sulphur in and by 
itself poBseaseB the property of yellov/nesBs all that we are 
strictly entitled to say is that sulphur# when Illuminated by 
a suitable light, has the power to produce a yellow sense- 
content in the. conaciousnesB of a person with normal vision®
Our knowledge of the external world# however# 1b not confined 
to a knoY/ledge of the powers of external beings to affedt 
directly the oonsciousness of human percipiente; we ha%e also 
an indirect knowledge of the powers of external beings to affect 
other things in the world® We can detect the existence of 
such powers by registering the change in the effect which the 
affected being has in its turn upon the normal human observer® 
For example# we know that acids have the power to affect litmus 
paper, because, after being in contact with an acid, the litmus 
paper produces a sensation of red in a person with normal
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violon instead of the sensation of blue which it produced 
before® The construction of a systematic science depends 
on the possibility of recognising in this indirect way the 
exercise of power in the natuz*al world#
Thus» the percipient subject’a Imowledge of other things 
is severely limited on account of his external point of view.
He has no insight into the internal natures of the things in 
the world.» But this limitation of human knowledge# although 
disappointing to the speculative thl3ilcer, makes little difference 
for the purposes of practical life and scientific prediction*
It ie possible to know the po\?3rs of external things and to kno?/ 
how we az^ e likely to be affected in the future and this is all 
that need concern us* All that scientists can do is to 
identify the various powers of the things in the world; they 
cannot discover what these things are really like in themselves* 
This explains why the entities to which scientific theories 
refer-:^  ^atoms, sub-atomic particles# electrical forces and the 
like— seem so m'yaterious to the plain man* The plain man is 
expecting an explanation of these entities which will compare 
them to contents presented in conBOiousneBB, and this explanation 
cannot be given# since the scientist has no justification for 
claiming that these entities az*e similar in character to any 
sense^data# and he can identify them only by their powders to 
affect other things*
This is no more than a rough and prellmina3?y sketch of a view 
which Y/ill be examined in greater* detail below.
It will be clear that the theoziy of perception outlined 
above is a version of the causal theory,, The causal theory 
of perception is attractive and plausible, once the defects of 
Halve Realism and the Theory of Eepx*esentative Per dept ion are 
z’ecognised and once the evidence of physiology is given due 
weight. This was the theory accepted by Locke# although 
Locke was willing to compromise with the Theory of Representative 
Perception in the ease of the ideas of primary qualities®
But in spite of its apparent plansibl1 1 ty# the causal 
theory of perception, as stated by Locke, was not accepted by 
Eume and most modern empiriciats# because it was exposed to a 
simple but fatal objection. Locke argues that all simple 
ideas ’hmst necessarily be the product of things operating on 
the mind. But how can he justify this inference from the
given idea to the external cause which is supposed to produce 
it ? Locke is not entitled to assume the Principle of 
Causality Y/hich he employs® If the mind has other 
im m ediate object but its own i d s a s t h e n  one cannot extract 
from these ideas a principle v/hich will enable one to infer to 
transcendent causes Y/hich produce them* The concept of 
causality can refer only to the regulaiîities of sequence in  
the ideas presented and the principle of caushlity can be used
Our account of the pOY/ers of external, things to affect 
directly or indirectly the consciouBness of a human being is 
very closely parallelled by a passage in An Essay Ooncerning 
Human Understanding» Book XI, Chapter xxlli# 10* 
op* oit» 0 Book IV» Chapter iv, 4® 
olt* 9 Book IV» Ohaotar 1 » 1 .
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only to predict what ideas will he presented in the :futux**e*
If the mind has a direct awareness of nothing hut its own ideas 
OP senBOc^-presontations# then one cannot escape hy inference 
from the closed circle.
But the argument which refutes Locke’s version of the 
causal theory does not damage the theory to which we suhBorlhe® 
For Y/e do not attempt to infer the existence of external oaUsoB' 
from the sense-Gontents presented to conseiousnesB* We do not 
require to make use of suoh an illegitimate procedure hooaus© 
we do not restrict the immediate experience of the suhjeot to 
the given ideas or sense-data* We mainteilix that the subject 
has an immediate awareness of external and independent beings 
beyond the contents appearing in oonseiouBness® Moreover#
In virtue of the identification of experiencing and causality# 
the subject is causally affected by the beings which he 
experiences» It is this primitive awareness of external 
beings whioh is the true source of the concept of causality®
It is not necessary to extract a principle of causality from 
the z^egulasbitiee of eequence in the sense-presenta1 1 ons*
The existence of evidence concerning the nature of causality 
which 1b derived from our immediate contact Y/ith external things 
explains our instinctive dissatisfaction vt/ith the viev/ that 
causal connection is no more than regularity of sequence®
Professor R®I* Aaron argues that Locke himself would answer 
his critics in a ve3?y similar way (of* Aaron# John Locke@
Chapter VII# Section III) * Aaron maintains that# althotjgh 
in some passages Locke’ b explicit doctrine Is that we lmo\7
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Although W0 have now answez»ecl the main objection to the 
cauBal theory of perception, other difficulties remain® We 
'normally believe that wo know a good, deal about the nature of 
the external world® But how is this knowledge poseible and 
hoYif is it to be justified? We are certainly entitled to say 
that the Bense-»dontentB presented to eoiiscloizsnesB are generally 
the effects of beings in the external world« But the bare
knoY/ledge that there are external causes responsible for the 
production of the content of consciousBess reveals nothing 
about the detailed character of external things® A little 
more is laiOY/n if one admits the plausible supposition that the 
different features in the content of consciouBness are for the 
most part the effects of different qualities of different 
external beings. For example# our visual eense-^data are
/
organised in a visual sense«»fielcl# and one may plausibly claim 
that the structure of the visual field corresponds# to some 
extent# to the structure of the external reality and that 
different areas in the visual fittld are the effects of different 
areas in the outside world.
But even if ono admits that there Is juBtification for 
difôtinguishing different pOY/ero of external beings correlative
Oa»!?’*  ft*n a - # EM»WMI f A» fwr* tt.H  c r *  / «> < 5 ? ? cp»
directly only our own ideas and muet infer to the external 
things respOneible for the production of these ideas (e®g>
in the Book IV# Chapter Iv# 4), in othej? passi
Locke BUgge^B that we know directly the existence of external 
things by sensation (e.g® in Book IV, Chapter xl, 1-8) »
Even if one does not agree that Locke seriously accepted a 
view in so startling a contradiction with his main thesis, one 
may agree that this is the sort of thing Locke shoulû have said.
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to the different effects discovered in consciousness, our 
knowledge of the nature of the external world will he neither 
extensive nor of any use for practical purposes® If one’s 
knowledge of the outside world is to be of any importance# 
one must find some basis for inferring other properties of an 
external being in addition to the property of affecting one’s 
present consciousness in a specific v;ay«
How Buch inferences are possible because the universe 
is not a mere aggregate of unrelated entitles. On the 
contrary, the ihzinoiple of Gausality established in Chapter VI 
states that everything in the world is causally connected with 
other beingso In virtue of the causal interconnedtions of 
the things in the world# we can infer from the nature of the 
beings which are affecting us at present the nature of other 
beings, e.g. the beings which will affect us in the future.
Inferences based on causal connections# however# do not 
have the secure justification which they would have if we were 
able to accept the De termini st account of causality. But 
although there la no strict and necessary Lav/ of Gausality which 
will permit one to deduce the nature and powers of one being 
from the nature and %)ow0 z^ s of another being# nevertheless# 
our analysis of causality does show that there is likely to be 
a good deal of order in the universe. In the first place# 
we found that an effect must repz^oduce the character of its 
cause®''' This character may# indeed# undergo a certain
efo above, pp. 260-265®
p. 509.
transmutation when reprodueed by the effect, but it is probable 
that in many cases this transimtation either will not occur or 
will not be very radical. Thus » it seems quite likely that 
the beings in the world will have successors which, in the main# 
will preserve their characters. Secondly# even when the 
character of h the cause is substantially altered when reppoducdd 
by the effect# it seems probable that this alteration will not 
be completely ax»'feitrary. The main reason why the character 
of a cause is not exactly reproduced by its effects Is that 
the effect is often compelled to synthesise charactez‘e contribut­
ed by several different causes. These characters cannot be 
brought to a real unity without being changed in the process*
How# although the particular mode of synthesis is determined 
by the effect and although it is in x>rinoiple possible for the 
effect to choose between alternative ways of synthesising its 
data# nevertheless it seems very probable that in most cases 
effects which are presented, with similar data will synthesiBe 
them in a sirailar way.
Thus# one can say a miiori that there is likely to be 
a fair measure of constancy in the character of the world—  
things will not change much from day to day* Also# the 
changes which do occur v/ill generally follow a regular pattern—  
similar combinations of causes will produce similar changes*
But these a ^ priori considérâtions are very far from justifying 
the degree of reliance v/hich we actually place on the regularity 
of nature® We feel extremely confident that in the future
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things Y/ill remain much the same ae they vmre in the past and 
that any changes will he in accordance with regular laws*
The reason why this is bo is that we have# iii fact, discovered 
such a regularity in past experience. The predictions which '
we have made# assuming the regularcity of nature# have been 
remax%ahly successful, and the success of these predictions 
confirms the truth of the assumption on Y/hich they depend* 
Mistaken predictions can usually he attributed to our ignorance 
of the causal factors involved rather than to any irregularity 
in nature® Thus# the main justification for the belief that 
nature will be regiilaz» in the future is the regularity actually 
diecovered in the past»
The régula]^!ty which we have found in past experience 
does not, indeed® provide a foolproof justification of any 
inference with respect to the future. Any prediction which
we may make is certainly fallible. But we have good reason 
to believe that, for the most part# things v/ill not behave 
in unprecedented ways #
It is sometimes ax^gued that the actual regularity of the 
past does not entitle one to assume the regularity of the future# 
since there is no rational basis fo%= the belief that the future 
will resemble the past. V/e are in a better position to reply 
to this argument than are those who reduce causal connection 
to a phenomenal a?egularity of sequence, attempting to infer the 
regularity of what will be presented in the future from the 
regu-larity of phenomenal présentât lone in the past. For in
Po 611,
terms of our metaphyBloal eye tern g there is a justifieatioi). for 
aGauming that the future will he liÿe the past. It is a 
general metaphysical principle that whatever? comes to he must 
he causally related to \¥hat is already in existence® Thereforet
the future will resemhle the past at least in this'«>*^ it will he 
B'uhject to causal conditioning hy its antecedents» We cannot 
say* indeed* that the causal connections in the future will ;
necoBBarily follow the same pattern as in the past* hut since 
their general structure will he the same* it does not seem 
likely that there will he any radical alterations in the law^ e 
which have held good hitherto«
III* We have now shown that the sense^-data presented to
consciousness are* in. general * the effects of beings in the 
external world and that the regularity of causal connections 
BUpplies a basis which makes it possible to infer the other 
powers of these external beings. If our arguments are 
correct* we may claim that we have solved the fundamental 
theoretic Ell problems concerning the knowledge of an external 
world beyond the given sense^eontents. There remain* however*' 
many uni^esolved difficulties with respect to points of detail*
VVe cannot hope to deal with all epistemological problems in 
the detail which would be necessary* but we shall now discus8 
briefly some of the most important*
A good way to approach several epistemologieal problems 
is to attempt an analysis of common sense statements about the
external world* To take a simple example^ what le the proper 
analyslB of an assertion like *^Thls object is hrowif’? One 
can hardly maintain that such an assertion attributes to the 
external object the brown content given in conBoiousness*
If one accepted this analysis* one wouàd be forced to admit 
that all* or nearly all* cominon sense statements about the 
outside world are false* For investigation has shown that 
Be:ûBe««data must be normally very different in character from 
the qualities of the external beings which produce them,
The kind of analysis which we hope to provide is not 
a simple translation of what Is ^Blicitl^ meant by a particular 
common sense statement* In many cases* when the given 
statement is clear enough* no such translation would be help:fifl| 
and even when a translation would elarify what was meant* we 
would still be left with a common sense statement which* 
although clear at the level of common sense* would, yet be 
philosophically obscure* What we are attempting* rather* 
is to elucidate what is implicit in eoïmnon sense statements*
emfi riM 1 MiM.l
To put it in another way* we are trying to show how a philosopher# 
who is av/are of ©pisteraological problems * must rephrase conmom 
sense statements* If he wishes to be absolutely preciseg the 
philosopher must explain how eomiaon sense statements must be 
interpreted* if they are to be trae* when normally thought 
true.
In the light of what has bean said above* the moot 
obvious analysis of common sense statements about the wrorld 
* cf. above. Chapter II,and pp* 301-308.
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would, aeom to be thioo Statements like object is brown*^
should be translated '*Thie object has the power to produce brown 
Bonse«--*data in the experiencing subject”. We cannot know the 
internal charactea?s of other beings, Dm? only knowledge of 
their nature is that they possess oea?taih %aowers to affect the 
experiencing subject, These power© may be detected by the 
way in which the subject is actually affected«*=*«by the character 
of the aense^data presented to conBeiouenëss,
Similar analyses can be given In the case of pore complex 
examples such ao ”This object Is a eat”, Buoh statements are 
to be translated as followsi ”This object has the powers to 
produce in the experiencing subject various sense^data of certain 
(specified) kinds®” In this case* the power possessed by the 
object in question 1b a complex power® It is perhaps more 
accurate to say that the object possesses a p;roup of powers 
to affect the experiencing subject in more or less specific 
wayss it has the power to produce specific visual sense-^data* 
it has the power to produce specific tactual sense^data and so 
on. We do not specify exactly* the sense^-data which must be 
produced by an object properly clasBified as a cats some 
variation is permissible * but the aense«=»data produced must fall 
within certain limits if the proposed classifieation is not to 
be rejected® The fact that these limits are rather vague 
la of little practical Importance * since one so rarely encounters 
borderline eases®
An extremely important point which muet be noted in
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GonneetioB with this example is that what is being asserted is 
that the objeet is a material thing of a particular kind®
The assertion is not merely that there 1b an external being 
which at present possesses certain powerss there is also an 
Implicit claim that the being in question has a history and is 
likely to have a futare. When one say© that this object Is 
a eatp one implies that the thing was once a kitten and that 
it will continue to be a eat unless it i© destroyed by some 
accident. The common sense belief 1b that material things 
can maintain themeelveci in exiatonee in spite of the passage 
of time * 8 0 that statements aeserting the existence of a material 
object of a particular kind can be readily verified or proved 
false by future observations.
How* In the previous chapter* we argued that the real 
substances in the world are ephemeral beings which do not persist 
through time,'-* Therefore* if material objects are taken to be 
enduring Bubstane.es* all oommon sense material object statement© 
must be falseo If one is not prepared to accept this eon«* 
elusion* one must provide an alternative account of the facts 
which material object etatemente are used to describe, This 
account may be offered as the’ correct translation of the com'mn 
sense statemente.
The plain laan supposes that there are enduring substances 
in the physical world because certain oharaetere and groups of 
characters constantly reappear, How * the real reason why
of® above* pp, 889°*891®
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these oharaeters' reappear is that there are in the world certain 
chains or series of causally connected substances* where each 
member repipoducee* in general* the character of its Immediate 
antecedent® When the plain man aeserte the existence of a 
material object* such as a cat* he must be taken to refer * not 
to an enduring substance * but to on© of these chains, If 
material object statements are analysed in this way* they will 
not necessarily be false® They will be judged true or fftloe 
according as the empiz*ical evidence confirms or disproveo the 
existence of a causal series of the kind in question®
To rettt|sn to the main a3?gument* it seems very plausible 
to maintain that a statement like ”Thls object has the power 
to produce brown Bense<«data in the experiencing subject” is 
the philosophically accurate tranelntion of the common sense 
statement ”This object is brown”# But this translation has 
one serious weakness $ The translation will be imprecise*
unless one can specify the conditions in which the power will 
actually be exercised# To establish this 3?oint* one must
reflect on what :1b meant by sayrlng that an object possesses a 
certain power, A thing has a specific power* when it will 
produce a Bpeci:tie if certain conditions are :ful:fillod.
If one supposes that the being In question is a free agent* 
then one might say that the condition to be fulfilled is that 
the agent should decide to exercise his power® But In the 
case of most beings in the external world* one makes no such 
supposition# In such cases* the conditions to bo specified
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are the other* beingo in the world whose oo^operatlon Is 
required in order to produce the effect In question.
There would be no need to epeeify particular conditions* 
if every external being automatical3,y produced its character*-- 
Istic effect on every euhject by which it is experienced.
All beings would exercise certain powers in all circumstances 
and any conditions® But the world is not bo simple as
this. For example * a brown object does not always produce a 
brown sense-^datum in the experiencing subject® If the 
ciroumetances are unfavoui*able* e»g@ during the hours of 
darknesOp or if the observer is abnormal* e,g® if he Is colour 
blind* the usual senso^^datum will not be produced#
Therefore* if one wishes to give an aecm’ate translation 
of the statement* ”Thia object is brown”* one must say ”This 
object will produce* In suitable conditionB* a brown sense™ 
datum in a normal experiencing subject®” But again there is 
a difficulty® What do we mean by ”?mitable”conditions* and 
what do we mean by a ^normal” observer? It Is eerta^inly 
possible to specify some oases in which the conditions are 
unsuitable and the observer ie abnormal® But on any particular 
ocoaeioBp one can never be sure of making an exhaustive list 
of.the circumstaneee which are unsuitable or of the possible 
abnormallities in the observer® Bloreover* in specifying 
inappropriate conditions when the external being wil3. not 
produce its usual effect* it Is necessary to refer to the 
character of other external beings/ Since the character of
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these being© also cannot be known directly* but only through 
their effects on the experiencing subject* the original problem 
of guarding against abnormal conditions recurs.
Thus* the above translation meets v/ith exactly thé seme 
difficulties as the Phenomenalist translation discussed in 
Chapter The statement ”This object is brown” is not
logically equivalent to the statement ”This object will produce 
brovni 8 one Gm. da ta in the experiencing subject* granted certain 
specified conditions.” Ko matter how detailed i© the list 
of conditions f, it is always possible that something* has been 
left out® Therefore* we can always conceive of the possibility 
that the original statement ”This object is brown” is true* 
although its supposed translation is false. This proves that 
the original statement and its translation do not mean exactly 
the same thing®
^Bince the attempt to analyse conmon sense statements 
about the world by using the conception of ”power” has broken 
down* we must consider again w^hat Is the most straightforward 
analysis of all* that the concept used in the predicate of a 
eoimnon sense statement refers to a quality which the statement 
attributee to the external object in question® In the case 
of ”This object is bz^own”* the concept ”brown” ï^efers to the 
brown quality, which is attributed to the subject of the pro»* 
position. The reason why we oz'^iginally supposed that such an 
analysis is w^rong is that the concept ”brown” refers to the 
brown quality of certain senB6«*data immediately given to 
above* pp« 83^84.
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oonsciouBnesso How* sine© it la so very difficult to defend 
the belief that the characters of external objects are identical 
with the characters of the given sense contente* it seems that 
if one accepte this analysis* one is forced to admit that all 
common sense statements about the world are almost certainly 
false0
But this objection makes an assumption which is open to 
question® It assumes that because the concept ”brown” 
Indisputably doe© refer to a specific quality pOBsessed by 
certain senBe‘^clatai. the concept must refer to this quality when 
used in judgT/ients about thejexternal imrld. But is it not 
possible that the concept ”brown” is ambiguous and that there 
is a systematic ambigu.ity in the case of all similar concepts?
The fact that the concept ”brown” refers on occasion to the 
brown^ness of sense^data doe© not in itself rule out the 
possibility that* on other occasions, it refers to another 
quality®
Therefore* if one is uœilling to admit that all common 
sense statements about the external world are mistaken, one 
must interpret these statements in auch a wpy that the predicate 
concept refers to a quality different from that to which it 
refers vjhen used to describe the content of immediate experience* 
It might be said that this interpretation is not simply an 
analysie of what is already implicit in the common sense 
statement* but rather lnvo3,V0 S a correction of a systematic 
error inevitable at the level of eormîion sense* We would
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answer that the function of eommon sense statements about the 
world is to Identify external objects for practical purposes: 
the plain man does not commit himself to the assertion that 
the charaete'Ps of external things are identical with the 
qualities presented to consciouBnesB® This ie not* however* 
a point of the first importance for our general epistamological 
theory® Whether or not one accepte our view of the matter 
will depend on v/hether one accepts the earlier argument that 
the plain man cannot properly "foe said to be a Halve Realist, 
What is of greater importance is to determine %hu± the 
nature of the qualities denoted by the predicate concepts of 
common sense statements* if these qualities are not the 
qualities presented in immediate experience. It is clear 
that we have no Imowlecige of what these characters are in 
themselves. All that we have at our disposal is evidence 
which suggests that external beings Bometimes have the same 
qualitiee^ *''-’ and sometimes have different qualities, the 
evidence being the effects which these external things have 
upon our co n sc io u sn e ss . This means that Btatemante about 
the world like ”This object is brown” are raeaningless In 
isolation and can be neither true nor false# Bignifieant 
statements about the world must be of the form ”This object % 
has the same quality as this other object Y.” We have often
of. above* pp. 16^16.
Wo can maintain that different individuals may share the 
same qualities or characteristics because we accept the 
reality of universals. Of# above* pp*
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VG??y good reason to believe that some such statements are true 
and that others are false* although we can never he absolutejLy 
sure that we are right,
This is a very surprising conclus ion* Ho\? can one deny 
that statements like ”Thla object is brown” are meaningful and 
may be either true or false? The ansm^er to this problem ia 
that In actual practice* such statements are not really isolated: 
they form part of our syetematio knowledge of the external world 
and implicitly refer to other judgtnents. In the course of 
experience* one notices certain identities in the contents 
pz®esented to oonsclouBnees and one supposes that there are 
eorroBponding identities in the external world. In order to 
handle these I d e n t i t i e s  in a convenient way* one makes use of 
eomieepts by means of which one refers to the character of all 
beings which are identical in a certain respect# Because 
objects A* Bÿ 0* D all produce brown aenee*«data in one’s 
consciousnesfs* one believes that they are all identical in 
this respect and one refers to their common quality by means 
of the concept ”brown”# Therefore* one Is entitled to say 
”A Is brown”,'^ B is brown” and so on® Now* suppose that one 
discovers evidence which suggests that one of these objects* 
say D* does not* in fact* have the same quality as the rest#
For instance* one might discover that object D* which originally 
produced brown sense«data, does so no longer: the only reason
one can find for the change is that the object has been moved 
away from an unusual artificial light into the natural light
P$ 321#
Of the sun* where the other objecte were observed. One would 
then claim that the statement ”D is 'brown” is false# It might 
seem that this claim is illegitimate<««.that all one is strictly 
entitled to claim is that the statement B* 0, B share a 
eonmion quality” is false# But b o long as the group of beings* 
whose identity in character gives meaning to the concept, is not 
substantially disrupted* one ie entitled to victimise the odd 
man out and to say that a statement is simply false if it 
predicates ”’brown” of a being which has 'been discovered to be 
different from the other menibers of the group#
Thus, colour concepts and other similar concepts do not 
neoeesarily refer to the character of the data given in immediate 
experience. Borne confirmation of this doctrine is provided 
by the fact that colour concepts may be used quite correctly 
by men who are blind or colour blind and who have never ex« 
perienoed the colour qualities directly presented in the 
eonBOiousness of normal observers# Granted, a blind man 
must depend on other people for the information which makes it 
possible for him to say when external beings are identical in 
colour, but the point is that a blind man does not find an 
assertion like ”This object is brown” meaningless, although he 
has no experience of the quality to which the predicate concept 
sometimes refers® This proves that a concept like ”brown” Is 
not always used to refer to a quality given in immediate 
experience#
The original analysis of statements where the predicate
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eoneept is more coynplex, e.g. "This object 1b a oat” must also
bo revised. For the meaning to "be glvezi to complex concepts
Xike”eat” depends on the meaning given to simple concepts like
”brown”# The îlàtement ”Thls object ie a eat” asserts that
the thing* in question is similar to certain other external
beings# These similar beings are similar in a number of
spécifie ways and not just in one way. They share, not one,
but several common q u a lit ie s ®  Just as simple concepts are
all
used  to refer to^beings which share a single common quality, so 
complex concepts are used to refer to beings which share a 
group of common qualities. We saw that the assertion that 
an object has a certain quality* such as brown-ness* is 
meaningless In isolation. Therefoi^e* the assertion that an 
object has a certain group of quailtiee and is a eat ie also 
meaningless in isolation# But in the context of one’e 
experience as a whole? the statement ”Thie object Is a eat” 
is meaningfo.1 and may be either true or false. Bo long as 
there is a group of beings identical in the respects in terme 
of which the concept ”cat” is defined, one may legitimately 
claim that an assertion ”This object le a eat” is false, if 
one has reason to exclude the object in question from this 
elasSo
This X is a very rough and incomplete account of the way 
in which the predicate concept© function in common sense 
Btatemente about the external world. But we must now turn 
our attention to the subject terms of such propositions.
How does one specify the particular eubjeots to which one m. 
attributes the various qualities denoted by the predicate 
concepts? One very often specifies the subject of a particular 
proposition by using the other qualitiee of the thing in 
question. For example, in the case of the assertion ”This 
table is brown”, one can identify the subject because ondjknows 
that it is a table, possessing the defining characteristics 
of a table. But ultimately, the subject of a proposition 
cannot be specifled in thés way. In the first place, this 
method will not single out the unique individual subject*
There are, for instance, many tables in the world, and to say 
that the subject is a table does not indicate which table is 
meant. Beeondly, one can identify the subject of a proposition 
by its other qualities, only if one accepts the assertion that 
a certain thing possesses thene other qualities, and the subject 
of this assertion must be identified in some other way*
Ultimately, one spécifiés the subjects of propositions 
about the external world by means of a spatio^^temporal framevmrk 
within which one locates the things in question* One may use 
this 65patio™temporal system even if one does not pin down the 
exact position of the subject of the proposition® For example, 
when one says ”This table is brown” without saying exactly where 
the table is, one implies that it is nearby® The "this” has 
the force of ”h0 ro«now”* The statement means, in effect,
” The re is in the immediate vicinity an object possessing; the 
characteristics of a table and this object is also brown*”
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Bo long as there is only one stich object in the imediate 
vicinity? the subject of the proposition has been specified 
qu1te unamb igud u bly ®
Tims * the problem of specifying the subjects of pro-- 
positions résolves itself into the problem of juetifyihg the 
Bpatlo^^temporal order in which we arrange external beings#
We discover a spatial order in the external world by assuming 
that there is some correapondence between the organisation of 
the sense-content given to consciousness and the organisation 
of the external reality# By comparing different observations, 
by checking one sense against another, and by using measurement 
techniques, we are able* as v;e explained above*^% to remove 
distortions due to abnoivatsil oonditione or the particular 
perspective of the experiencing subject#
Such techniques are practicable and successftil because 
the character of the external world is relatively stable: ito
various features reappear in much the same spatial relationshipe 
as beforeo And it is the actual succèsa of these preeedures 
which confirms the t3?uth of the original assumption of a 
correspondence between the structure of the given content and 
the atructux^e of the external world. The original aestxmption, 
although by no means unreaBonable, was merely suggested by the 
evidence at our disposal before the assumption was tested in 
practice® The temporal order in the universe ie discovered 
in a somewhat similar way* and we shall discuss it 3.ater when
pp. 45“»4B*
dëailing with memory.
We have been dealing mainly with the general theoretical 
difficulties concerning our knowledge of the external world*
We have shown how we can know that external beings exist and 
affect our consc1ousness. We have shown that, in view o f
the rggularlty of nature, wo can Infer how omther beings will 
be effected by the beings which affect ourselves. And we
have analysed common sense assertions about the e x te r n a l world, 
explaining the function of the predicate concepts and showing 
how their subjects are s p e c i f le d .  We must now discuss the 
main practical difficulties in the way of identifying the 
external beings responsible for the nature of the contents 
presented to conscloumness#
IV. The first difficulty is that many of the contents
which we find in consdiousness are produced, not by any external 
being, but in virture of the past history of the experiencing 
subject himself. When there is no external cause, we call 
our experience memory or imagination. We can usually tell 
when, contents are not to be attributed to external causes*
There is a discernixble difference between what we imagine and 
what we perceive* as may be discovered on introspection* But 
occasionally* one may make a m is ta k e *  When one suppose a that 
a figment of imagination Is due to something in the e x te r n a l
Strictly speaking* the past states of the experie.noing subject 
are external beings from the point of view of its present state# 
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world* one ie said to be suffering from a hal3-uoination®
In an abnormal state, an imagined content may aeouiz*e the 
vividness etc® usually possessed by contents produced by extere 
mal cauBes, and on© is deluded into attributing an external 
origin to an imaginary product. How* although lialluoinations 
are extremely rare * there is always the possibility, in any 
particular case* that we are M a  taken when we suppose that ourr 
sense^^data have been produced by external beings operating on 
the sense8 in the normal way#
There are, however * certain tests by means of #hlch one 
can detect halluoima11one and correct one’s original mistake#
For example? Eîacbeth suspects that the dagger which he sees 
before him is ”but a dagger of the mind” * because he is unable 
to feel and catch hold of it» But no such tests can be 
absolutely conclusive* and although in many cases it is extreme»* 
ly unlikely that we are mistaken? the poBeibility remains®
The second difficulty is more important* Bven if one 
is correct in assuming that certain sens ©«^contents have been 
produced by external beings * how can one be sure of identifying 
the particular beings responsible? We naturaUy tend to 
attribute the reeponsiblj-ity to the beings in which we are 
©Bpeeially Interested, namely coirmion sense material objecte 
like tablasÏ cats, trees* and so on# These things? however*, 
lie outside one’b body and affect consciouBness not directly, 
but only through the mediation of other beings.<<
ef® above? pp .lS ^S l#
tn o rd e r  to clarify the situation, it is necessary to 
make a slight digression concesming the relatione between mind, 
body* and external objects proper# We maintain that the m ind 
and the body are different eubstancess indeed, the loody 
associated with a particular mind is an aggregate of a very 
large number of distinct substances® Two points in connection 
with this require explanation# In the first place* the mind 
which we take to be a substance in Its own right is something 
more than consciouBnase® Beeides conscious mind, there in
uneoneclous mind® Oonsclousness does not have the clear cut
boundaries of an independent substance® In experience, we 
find a focal centre of which we are lb.lly conscious gr^idually 
shading off into a periphery which is but dimly apprehended 
and which points to a background of experience of which we are 
not really conscious at all# Moreover, if one does not 
recognise the existence of the unconscious mind, there eæe 
many things which it ie difficult to account for, e.g. the 
retention In memory of facts which one is not actually 
recollecting; at the time®
The second point which must be discussed Is the claim 
that the body Is an aggregate of substances® Ourely, it may 
be urged, an animal body has an organic mjity not possessed by 
a mere aggregate such as a heap of gtones® 33ut can the unity 
of a number of substances be anything more than the unity of 
an aggregate? A more intimate unity would be the unity of 
a subBtanoe^c=.and this would be incompatible with the
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substantiality of the elements unlfledo But the various 
parts of the body must be independent substancee* since they 
are not eiraply annihilated when separated from the body in 
which they are incsopporated# Another difficulty for those 
who suppose that the body has an organic unity is the difficulty 
of deciding what should be included in this unity# For it is 
sometimes not easy to say where the body stops and the external 
\7orld begins® At what precise point* for example, in food 
incorporated in the body?
Nevertheless, one cannot deny that there is some diffère 
enae between the organisation of an animal body and the organise» 
ation of a heap of ©tones® T h is  difference, however, may be 
explained ivithout having to suppose that a number of substances 
ean form anything but an aggregated The diffex^enee ie simply 
that the eleroents in a body are more dependent on their 
neighbours for their continued existence than are the elements 
In a heap of stones^-^^the difference being a difference in 
degree and not in kind# Another difference is that associated 
with the animal body, there is an additional substance of a 
higher g;rade™«*a ”dominant monad” ? to use l*eibnl?i’ s terms™*- 
nothing analogous being present in the ease of a heap of etones®
Therefox*e? since the mind and the various parts o f  the 
body are distinct substances, the relations between them are  
tranatemporal causal relational for these are the only direct 
relations which may connect independent substanceso Just as 
the organs of the body are causally related to antecedent
events in the external world , b o  the ooneeioue mind is causally 
related to antecedent events in its associated body® Thus, 
external things affect the Blind indirectly by affecting the 
sense organs which* in turn? affect the mind through the 
mediation of the nervous system and the brain#
To return to the main argument, the causal antecedents 
of any content given In e x p e rie n c e  are  extremely compllea 
almost infinitely complicated® The beings which affect one 
directly are affected by things in their immediate past which 
are affected in tux*n by things in th^r^ immediate past and so 
on to the beginning of time® Therefore? it is out of the 
question to concern oneself w ith  all factors which make a 
contribution, direct^ or indirect, to the nature of the given 
8 ens e-content » For practical purposes ? however* it Is not 
necessary to take account of a3„ 1 beings which indiz’ectly affect 
the experiencing subject, since every member in the series of 
past causes sums up, as it were, the contrlbutione of its 
predecessors*
But the beings in which we are especially Interested 
are publicly observable external material objects which, as we 
have seen? affect the subject only through th e  sense organs and 
o th e r  physiological or physical intermediaries. low* although
we may disregard* if we wish, causes more remote than these 
material %» objects? we cannot treat external material objecte 
as the sole causes of sense-data, disregarding the contribut ions 
of beInge lying on the causal route between the material object
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and the experiencing mind# If one wishes to extend one’a 
ourvey to a given point? one îBust take account of all the 
interne di ar i e s #
Thus * if one tracés the eausEil antecedents of one’s 
©enee«»data as far ae the coBjmon sense material objects which 
are usually considered of primary importance, one imzst deal with 
a rather complicated situation* since there are so many intere 
mediate factors between the external ibbjeete and the mind.
One cannot specify particular material objects as the beings 
with sole responsib 11 ity for the character of the given aenBe<i^  
contents# But one can be more specific* if one attempts to 
identify? not the causal factors which are somehow involved in 
the production of sense^^data, but the f a c to r s  which change when 
there is a change in the sense»*data presented to GonsGiouBnees» 
One Is usually justified in attributing changes in the given 
sens 0^-0 ont ent to changea in common sense material objects* 
since the mediating conditions generally remain fairly eonstant* 
fh© justification for assuming that the sense organa etc® 
intermediate between the external material objects and the m ind  
will not normeilly change in character is the actual succès a of 
the systematic investigation of the extexmal vmi^ld based on 
this assumption#
?\fe do not, however, have any guarantee that the beings 
through which external material objects affect the subject will 
never alter in character® In some oases* indeed* we have 
good reason to believe that these beings do change? and the
1  p . 3 3 1 .
alteration has Its effect on the expereienced contentu#
Therefore, just as there is alA^ays the risk of error when we 
suppose that a content has been produced by external causes and 
is no figment of imagination, so there la always the pOBBibiXity 
of a mistake when we a s s e r t  that a change in the content 
presented to conselouBness Is due to a change in material 
thingB and not to a change in the mediating conditions*
The things which separate the mind and external material 
objects may be grouped under two headings* although there is 
no reeilly fundamental difference betweeen the members of the 
two clasaes# Theixe are the things which form part of the body 
associated with the experiencing mind and there are the things 
which do not® The members of the first class may be called 
the physiological conditions of perception® How? variations 
in the senee-^data indirectly produced by an external material 
object may be due to variations in these medlati%% %)hyslologlcal 
conditionso This point may be illustrated by adapting a 
weHi3.-known example used by Locke o’^’ Lukewarm water feels cold 
to a hand which has been exposed to the heat, and hot to a hand 
which has been exposed to the cold® Therefore? the different 
BOBBe-data produced at different times by a certain pail of 
water may be dôc to a difference in the condition of the hand 
with which one tests it* and if one believes that there has been 
a change in the temperature of the water, one may be mistaken®
There are always physiological conditions mediating one’s
of# Essay Concerning Human tinder standing* Book XI, Chapter vili 
SI.
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experience of external material objects, and in some cases* 
there are also additional physical conditions® Except in 
the case of contact senses such as touch and taste, there are 
physical intem©diax»iee which lie between the material things 
and the sense organs of the body. Thus, the sense contents 
produced in consciousness by material things may be altered by 
an alteration in these physical conditionBo We laay refer 
again to an example used in Ohapter IX»’*' A stick, which 
appears straight ivhen the physical medium he W e e n  the stick and. 
the eyes is simply air, appears bent when partially immersed in 
water. The change in what appears to oonsciousnesB is not due 
to a real change in the character of the stick hut to a change 
in the physical conditions of perception®
But these variations in the physiological and physical 
conditions of perception do not necessarily mislead us* since 
there a re  many ways in which they may he detected® We may 
correct our mistakes by further observât ions ? and we may &  low 
for distortions on the basis of past e x p e r ie n c e . For example* 
we can discover the real cause of th e  variation when different 
sensations az^ e prodxteed by vmter which has not changed in 
temperature by checking the readings on a thermometer. And 
one can verify *by touch that the shape o f  a stick has not 
altered when it is put in water® It must? h ow e ve r, l3e 
admitted that eueh tests are never absolutely con&luslve* 
although v e ry  often? they will put the matter beyond reasonable
c above « n .51*
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doubt.
But the great majority of the mistakes which we make in 
ordlnai’y life concerning the nature of the external world are 
not due to any of the causes diseuBsed so far. They are clue 
to the fact that we often make claims which go beyond what our 
observations strictly justify® If the sense content before 
the mind testifies that an external object has a certain quality* 
we often assume that the object also possesses other qualities 
which we have generally found in past experience to be associated 
with the quality in question® We also predict what will happera 
in the future on the basis of the regular laws discovered by 
experience® Thus? it is clear that we shall sometimes make 
mistakes, especially since the exigencies of %)raetioal life 
often compel us to make snap judgments without a full invaetig»» 
at ion of the situation® It may be that in a paz^tlcular ease 
quality a does not, accompany quality b* even el though in past 
experience we have always found that these two qualities go 
together# And although ghallty c has always been followed 
by quality cl in our past experience § this does not mean that 
quality cl will necessarily follow the particular instance of 
quality e sîat present before us® Quite apart from the fact 
that one cannot prove that the regularity of nature is necessary 
and complete, one can never be sure that the situation ia the 
same in two different oases® The more thorough one’s 
investigation of the situation* the more justification one will 
haye for dieregwdlng the possibility that the interference of
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imtisuaX oircumetaneoG will bring about an unusual Boquenoo of 
events, but this is always a theoretical possibility wliioh 
cannot strictly be Ignored®
Moreover? in practical life* we often do not base our 
predietiozlB even on what we have always found in past esrperiencet 
we base our predictioras on what usually happens* on what happens 
in normal oIrcimstanoes. And we either do not have the 
opportunity o r do not take the trouble to cheek whether the 
present eireumstaneeB are normal® lo one would doubt that 
the white oval object in the egg eup is an egg# And yet* 
until one tries to crack it open? one cannot, strictly* rule 
out the possibility that it is a perfectly made china imitation® 
And we often make confident assertions on the basis of much 
flimsier evidence than this»
From what has been said above? it is clear that there is 
a considerab le  reisk of error in the case of a single* mieorrobore 
ated observation® But the risk of error can be greatly reduced* 
although it ean never bo completely tDllminated* by using one 
observation to check up on another® The comparison of diffère 
ent observations makes possible a much more accurate assessment 
of the powers of external beings® Every content presented 
to consciousness is a smiiiple indicating the powers of the 
external reality? and. our judgments concerning the outside world 
may be confirmed or corrected by taking fu r th e r  samples* The 
assertions which we make about the external vforld on the basis 
of our present experience may be verified (or shown to be false)
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by further observations »
There is, however ? no way in which we can get ovideuce 
which will eBtahlish eonclUBively? beyond any poBBihility of 
doubt? the truth or falsity of a matter of fact p.roposltlon with 
respect to the outside world# In any particular case? one 
can never he absolutely certain that one ie right, although the 
risk of err03? Is often negligible® We cannot at present 
diseuse the very tricky question as to whether it is even 
possible for the experiencing subject to be mistaken in all 
caseso But at least? we ean point out that this does not 
follow from the fact that it is possible for the subject to be 
mistaken in any particular ease# To suppose that it does is 
to commit the fallacy of composition^^*'*
Our experience ae a whole Is generally reliable* although 
we may make mistakes from time to time® We have shomi that 
the Be:aee«-.ï»eoBtents presented to conseiousnosB are the effects 
of external causes# We have not been able to prove a priori 
that the various methods which we use to infer the character 
of the external causes from the character of their effects are 
necessarily justified* but we have seen that the asBiimptions 
which are made are by no means unreasonable. And the absence
of an a priori justification does not invalidate the methods 
employed: for these methods are justified by their actual
success@ For example ? although one cannot know a priori
cfe above? pp. where we discuss a ve'ry similar
example of this fallacy®
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tliat natwal ‘pr^oeessee will follow regular laws ^ the juotlfloat^*
ion of this asstrmptioii is the coherent system and the BticeeBSful
precllctiOHB which are haeed ttpon it« These enccossfnl
predictions cannot he merely fortnitonss they show that our
asBumptiona mmst 'foe in keeping with the character of the
universe6 We could not have foretold that oui? attempts to
know the. nature of external things would attain their actual
degree of success^ hut since they have^ in fact, heen successful^; 
Y*no father gustlfloatlon can he given or should he required.
One can always ^ indeed^ entertain a philosophioa1 douht with 
respect to any proposition which is not Belf«**ovidently true or 
which has not Toe en rigorously deduced from so If ««evident 
propositionsÿ hut an effective soepticism comcernlng thc5 
general validity of our knowledge of the external world must 
point to failprras in prediction or to contradictory restilS'ito 
reached on the hasis of different accredited methods* It is 
only if one ie unahle to resolve euch eontradietions hy refining 
one’8 methods that one’ b knowledge can he eaid to he radically 
defective,
Vo Although the knowledge of the external world which liae
now heen justified is in one respect very extensives* in another 
raapect it is extremely limited^ For it has not heen ehown 
that we have any concrete knowledge of what the characters of 
external things are really 1ike: all that has been estahllshed
is that we can often detect when the characters of different
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beings are identical and when they are different. We must ndw
consider whether it 1b posBihle in any ciraurastances to form a 
valid idea of the real nature of external things *
We know by a direct intuition the nature of the contents 
actually given In consciousness hut the nature of external 
beings cannot he known in this way. It is^ howeverp possible 
to achieve some under et and iaig of what other things are really 
like If one has grounds for believing that these other things 
are similar in character to what is presented In eonsclousneas. 
We shall now try to show that there are certain similarities 
between our ovm character and the characters of other things,
The discussion falls Into two main parts. Firstp we 
shall^ examine the reasons for believing that all beings In the 
world without exception have a fundamental similarity In 
character, Becondlyp we shall consider whether there are 
some other beings in the world similar in their more specialised 
charaoterloties to a given experiencing subject.
One cannot even assert the existence of external things 
unless one can f o m  some positive conception of their nature,
To assert the existence of something whose nature is completely 
unknown is impossible and meaningless. One mist know® at the 
very least® that the entity which one supposes to exist is a 
thing or a being. One can understand the natxire of external 
things® in b o far as they are beings® because one is oneself a 
being and the meaning of this conception is given in immediate 
experience. This argimient is® in effect® that one cannot
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assert the existence of anything without supposing that it 1b 
similar to oneself in :fimdamental charaoter, Wow® the oommon 
sense belief in the existence of an external reality is® as we 
have aragued® valid, and legitimate. The conclusion follows 
that there are other "beings which are not totally different in 
character from the experiencing suhjeet.
Another argument confirms this conclusion. All beings 
In the universe must he® to some ex teat® similar in character® 
since they mist all satisfy the necessary conditionB® if they 
arcî to he included in the same imiverse. All "beings have this
in common«=»«*eaeh is related directly or indirectly to all other 
heingso
We must now try to identify the absolutely generic 
characters which are common to all. beings. What features of 
one’ B own nature can one confidently attribute to all other 
beings® and what features are peculiar either to a more 
restricted group of beings or even to oneself? At this level 
everything is obeeurë and it ie impossible to be dogmatico 
But it ie difficult to deny that the other beings in the uni^* 
verse are equal to oneself in ontological status: that is® they
are eubstantial beings and possess the eharacteristicB involved 
in subs t anti all ty« They are ultimate unities which cannot 
be divided into real substantial parts and they are active 
beings with a measure of independence,
There are also several other features of our existence 
which we may reasonably suppose to be shared by the be Inge which
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we enoount(âr In the world. But we shall deal only with a
characteristic which Is of particular importance in our general 
theory, This oharaoterlstio is the relation of a being to 
its immediate antecedents, It is not eosentially involved
in the very notion of Biibstance that a substance be directly 
related to antecedent beings. Indeed® if the speculations in 
H Qhapter VI with respect to the origin of time are correct^ :'® 
there must be on© substance which is not related to anything 
antecedent. Nevertheless® our relation to antecedent beings 
is a fundamental factor in our character® and it is reasoraabS.© 
to supposé that there are a great mimber of other beings® 
related to antecedents in a similar way.
On this supposition depends our belief In indirect 
temporal and causal r e l a t i o n s W e  maintain that we are 
causally affected® directly by things 1%\ our Immediate past® 
and indirectly® by other things which have a causal effect® 
direct or indirect® on the things which affect ub directly®
But all we really know is the existence of the immediately 
antecedent 'beings which directly affect iWo The justification 
for extending 'back the temporal aeries and the causal series 
beyond the immediate antecedents which ire actually encounter ie 
the belief that these antecedent beings are similar to ourselves® 
and therefore are also involved in causal relations with 
antecedent beings® tepirical confirmation is provided by
above® pp. B66««»Ë40& 
ef® above® pp®
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the BUocoBB and. coherence of the aeientifio aecoimt of the 
world which asBornes the reality of these temporal and causal 
aeries.
Since we are aaBurning that all iDeings are like ourBalves 
in their fundamental character® it might he objected that our 
description of reality ie too anthropoffiorpliico We are 
‘blurring® It may he urged® the sharp disèiiietion between 
spiritual and material suhetances: Whatever differences in
degree we may admit ® we are wrong to euppose that material and 
spiritual suhatances have the same fundamental kind of activity 
and stmctureo We may retort® however® that it :1b really our 
orit:lcB who are guilty of an anthropomorphic fallacy. For the 
covMon conception of material svibstanee is derived from the way 
in which external things appear to the human observer. Ami 
it is Biir*ely less anthropomorphic to say that all beings ax^ e® 
in their fundamental nature® similar to human beingo® rather 
than that the things in the world really are as they axipear to 
be from the limited and external point of view of the human 
observer®
Thus g certain properties which we discover in our own 
character may be reasonably attributed to all other beings® 
and the conclusion of the first part of the discussion is that 
we have a general knowledge of the concrete nature of other 
things* We must now deal with the second part of the problem® 
which 1b whether the more specialised charaeteriaties ivhlch we 
possess may be legitimately attributed to some other beings
FIn the universe0
If the theory of causality developed In Ohapter VII is 
correct® It is reasonable to euppoae that there are « on ooeasion® 
similarities between an experiencing subject and Wings in 3aie 
immediate pastg for causal efficacy is due to the perBistenee 
in the present of the character of the past, This character 
may ce3?tainly undergo a very serious transmutation® b o  that® 
as incorporated in the eonsGiousneoB of the experiencing; subject® 
it may 'be very different fro m  what it was when it defined the 
nature of the external object® and it will therefore famish 
no idea of what the external thing was really like. But on 
the other hand® the character of an antecedent cause may he 
reproduced %y Its effect without any radical alterations® and 
when this is so® what we find presented in our oonsciousness 
will he a good indication of the real nature of the antecedent 
being.
The plain man accepts ® on the evidence of his memory of 
the past® the existence of a persistant and suhstantial self® 
which endures through time® passing through a number of 
transient states. We camot admit the existence of enduring 
substances# as we have already explained-*^ ® but we must give 
our own account of the facts which the plain man la describing 
in this way, I7e replace the substantial self which maintains 
Its identity from bil^th to death by a eericB of ephemeral
above® |>pc 289^291-» Of« . also the above analysis of 
mates?ial objects® PP^ 314^^3100
Bubotanoesp each of which ie causally related to its predecessor® 
and to a large extent reproduce© it© character. That is# we 
are clistinguishiBg two Bounces from which the character of a 
present subject of experience is derived. The character is 
largely derived from a single antecedent being® which common 
sense would regard as the preceding state of the identical self® 
and there are also contribution© from other beings® representing 
the effect of the external onvironmont. But the memory of 
one’B own past states is not different in principle from the 
awareness of external things. In both easee® the experiencing 
subject 1© causally affected by antecedent beings which are 
substances distinct from himself*
But we eamiot strictly prove that the past states of the 
self are similar to its present states for one thing® we can 
never get into a position where we can compare past and present* 
To put the point more accurately ® we can never ££oye that there 
1b an antecedent being which may be usefully regarded a© a past 
state of the present self. But the nature of one’n present 
experience suggests very forcibly that there la a ©ingle 
antecedent being similar to oneself from whlMti m c h  of the 
given content is derived. The plain man® at least® ha© no 
doubts about it® And in this caee® there are no philoBophieal 
reasons which lead one to dispute the verdict of common sense $ 
Oausal connection® we have arguedog  i© eesentially the 
persistence of the character of the past in the present.
above® pp. 260‘-^265o
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lyauallyp the elements ira eomsc 1 ouenese are not similar to the
causes by which they are produced. The oharactere re-enacted
are radically altered In the xïroceâo® because they are included
In an organic unity which is very different from the organisation
which they originally constituted. But when the present state
of the self incorporates the characters of the preceding state®
the usuall tx^ansmutatiora will not neeeaearily take place®
because the new context in which the charaetex»© of the past
cause ereï preserved is basically similar to their original
context. This means that although the contents presented in
conecioiranesB usually give no idea of the nature of other things
as they are in themselves® there is one case which 1b an
exception. The past states of the self were roughly similar
to it© present state® and we are not forced to refer to our
own past states as merely the miîcnowh correlates of cex^tâin
effects in our consciousness*
Thus® in we are aware of the real nature of certain
past beings® vis. the past states of the eelf. When I say®
’^Yesterday I saw a red patchf $ I know what my past experience
was like. I am not simply identifying its character with the
equally unknown character of another being® on the basis of
the similar effects which the two things produce, Granted®
our memory of our past states® like oxu? knowledge of the external 
world
certainly fallible: our picture of the past may be mistaken.
But when our memory of our past states is accurate® we do have 
a genuine pie$Ore which reproduces l;he concrete detail of the
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past. We have more than an ah a tract scheme of difference 
and. similaï?it:le8if vA loh is what our knowledge of the external 
world amounts to«
Having introduced the topic of memory® we shall how 
discuss briefly some of the main pro'blrame rlh connection with the 
memory of the past® and we shall.©how how these problems are to 
he ans?/ered in terms of the present system* Also® we shall 
now consider g as promised above® the di£40overy of the tempora], 
order In the tmiverse-.«^a discovery which is dependent on one’ e 
memory of the past.
The problem of memory would seem to be particularly 
baffling If one refuses to assume a persistent self which might 
somehow preserve what .happened in the past and in this way make 
possible the 3?eoolleetion of past events* But nevertheless® 
our theory is in a strong position® because we can admit that 
an expe.riencing subject has a direct experience of the past*
All experience of other beings ie an experience of jQast beings® 
which is possible in virtue of the contiguity of the present and 
the Immediate past* It is only if one supposes that the 
Objects of normal experience are contemporary beings that one 
ha© to maintain that the experience of the past ie a second and 
special kind of experience.
?/e directly experience® however® only our immediate past® 
and memory is usually a memory of what has happened in a pant 
which is comparatively remote* But granted a direct experience 
of the irmnediate past® an indirect experience of the remote past
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ie also possible. For each of the constituent substances in 
the series which is equivalent to the self or person may pass 
on to its BUGcesfsor what it has learned from its predeceasoro 
We can also get information about past events which are not 
members of the series which conetituteB the self* For each
membex’ in this series experienoGS an external world® and he
may transmit to his suoeessore what he has diecovered about it* 
But even if a knowledge of what has happened in the past 
may be handed dovm to a prextent subject in this way® how can one
teihl which of two past events is the more remote? This is the
problem of arranging the past in a temporal system, The 
answer to the problem is that the past experiences aacumulatod 
in the present do not f o m  a completely unorganised collection* 
Every member in the series which makes up the identical person 
organises his experience® contrasting what has been transmitted 
from the preceding member with what has been contributed by 
other sourcee. Therefore® there is a distinction between what 
îaas happened at different times® in the material which he 
transmits to his successor® and this distinction the successor? 
retains® adding in turn a fresh distinction. If it is argued 
that this series of distinct ions would soon become too eoraplic-’» 
a ted to be retained without the blwrlng of the earlier 
distinetiojiSs one may reply that this is what we actually find 
happening* One’s knowledge of the comparative remoteness 
of past eventa is not very accurate or extensive unless one 
invoke© the aid of special devices. We can often tell which
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of two events is the more remote because we know the natural 
order of a larger proeesB in which they are both Included*
For example® one knows that one’s arrival in a (sertaln towns 
visited only once® mist haYe preceded one’s departure® even if 
*bèth events feel equally remote* And men have used regular 
and recurrent processes in the universe to establish an 
objective and systematic measure of past time® namely® the 
cycle of the seasons and the sequence of day and night* It 
is possible to fix exactly the time when something has happened 
by remembering its date® that is® by asBoeiating the event with 
a certain conventional number in the system determined by the 
revolutioii of the earth on its axis and the revolution of the 
earth ax^’ound the sun*
There is one final objection to our aecoijnt of memory 
mdiich must be answered before v/e pass on to the next topic* 
According to our view® a subject can remombar only what has 
been handed on by his immediate predecessor. But one can 
often remember® it seems® things not present to the eonsciousness 
of the antecedent state of the self * One can even remember @
on occasion® what one’s past self has previously tried to 
remember without success*
The answer to this objection is that the subject is not 
necessarily eonecrlouB of the eleraents he retains in his mejno'rs?’ 
and transmits to his successors* There is a common sense 
distinction between what one is actually recollecting or 
remembering and what one somehow retains in one’ b memory*
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We normally ‘believe that our memorie© retain a great, deal of 
information of which we are not conseiouB at the moment, 
although this information could usually be produced on demand* 
This retention of information in the unconscious background of 
experience will embarrass only those who believe that an 
experiencing subject is no more than his consoiour>neBB''^ «»a view 
which we have explicitly rejected,
Thus, there is a great deal of justification for the 
belief that one’s present self is a member of a series of 
causally connected beings which are® to some extent, similar 
in character— the series constituting what the plain man would 
describe as an enduring person* How® if one is aware m that 
there are certain past substances in the route of one’s personal 
history Rin soma respects similar to one’s present self, one 
has a concrete, if partial, knovifledge of what these past 
subs tances were really like in themselves*
We must now consider whether there are any other beings 
like oneself in addition to the constituents of one’s own 
personal history* We normally believe that there are— that 
there are many other people like ourselves in the world*
How is this common sense belief in the existence of other 
minds to be explained and justified? What entitles one to 
suppose that there are other beings similar to oneself® not only 
in respect of the general characteristics common to all beings® 
‘but also in respect of certain special charaeterieticB® such as
above, p,627*
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consciouBnesB® which one would not think of attrihuting to all 
'being© without exception?
There are two distinot Boureee of the common sense belief 
that there are other conscious beings in the world. We may 
distinguish these two sources by calling them the jajgwlorl and 
the empirical sources of the 'belief In other minds * What we
are calling the ajriori source ie the belief that It is too 
great a presuiiiption to suppose that one’s character® leaving 
aside the generic characteristics eommon to all 'beings ® is 
completely different from the character of everything else®
The oraiDirical source ie the observation that there are other 
bodies in the world similar in structure and behaviour to the 
body associated with one’s own mind®
The empirical evidence is essential if one is to locate 
the other beings in the universe which ax*e similar to oneself® 
nevertheless® the a priori source of the belief in other lainde 
Is top also important, and should not he underrated® One
cannot test directly the influence of the a priori source, since 
it can never he isolated* Mo one can avoid notieing the 
Bimilarity of hie body and the 'bodies of other people and 
therefore the a priori belief that one’b eonseiousneBs cannot 
he absolutely unique never occurs 'by itself* But there are
ways in which its influence may he indirectly detected® The 
common sense 'belief in the existence of other minds would not 
he 3 0 confident as it is, were it not for the influence of the 
belief that somewhere there must he other beings like oneself.
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First, the a3?gmnent from analogy 1b not sufficiently strong 
to justify the extreme confidence of the belief In other minds* 
Secondly® this argument would seem to he too abstract and 
difficult to he the ground of bo natural and widespread a belief® 
if one did not already suppose that the existence of other minds 
was a likely hypothesis* Moreover, there ie fu3?ther evidence 
of this native tendency in the experianeing subject to suppose 
that there are other beings like himself® if we consider the 
reaclinesB of primitive man to attribute personality evën to 
things which do not possess a body analogous to that of human 
"beings. Primitive man personified the wind, the moon, and 
the Bun. It is critical reflection which has restricted 
eoneciousness to ‘beings with Bodies similar to our ovm.
It is not® hov/ever® a matter of great importance to 
determine the actual contribution made by each of these two 
sources to the common sense belief in other minds * What la 
of more importance is to assess the strength of the two 
arguments ivhich may be used® First, what justification is 
there for,# the belief that somewhere in the xml verse there must 
be other beings like oneself? It is unduly arrogant, one 
feels, to suppose that nothing else in the world is at all llHe 
oneself and that no other being has bean accorded the privilege 
of eonseiousnesB* But can this natural feeling be defended 
by an argument which@ even if not conelusive, is at least 
plausible? We must now try to show that It can.
The beings in the world are not all completely different
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in eharaéter. We can infer f3?om the similarity of effects 
produced in conse1onsnes8 that in addition to the general 
charaetGPisticB shared by all real beings, there are other more 
specific characteristics common to the members of certain, groups* 
We often encounter two beings which are radically different in 
character, but it is rare to encounter a being which Is 
completely different from everything else which we have ever 
experienced. Mow® since most beings in the world are members 
of one or another class of roughly similar beings, it is not 
likely that one’s own consciousness ie an exception to this 
general rule and that no other beings like onesillf exist®
We mast now consider the second argument* How close 
is the analogy between the body associated with one’a mind and 
certain other bodies in the vmrld and does the analogy justify 
the conclusion that there are minds associated with these other 
bodies also? It is clear that there are many other bodies in 
the world very similar to our own. in both structure and behaviour* 
There are #any human bodies, including our own, which have 
similar sense organs and a Bimilar anatomical structure.
Therefore® one may spppoee that there is a conscious mind 
associated with each of these bodies« The argument is not 
particularly strong# for the inference depends on a correlation 
observed in only one case. But the argument is g)?eatly 
strengthened if one also takes account of the stoilar behaviour 
patterns exhibited by human beings« The similarity of some 
behaviour patterns, namely purely physlologlcal processes such
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as "breathing, does not acid much to the argument from structural 
Bimilarity, but there are other similarities in human behaviour 
which are of more importance. Human bodies often appear to 
respond to their environment in an intelligent way. In one’s 
own oae©, eueh a response is attributed to the direction of one’s 
conseiouB mind* There is a real connection, and no mere 
accidental correlation, between intelligent^® behaviour and the 
intelligent mind which is responsible® Therefore# in the eaee 
of other bodies too® it would seem that cpnsfilous minds are 
essentially involved whenevea? there is '^intelligent*® behaviour. 
This '^Intelligent*' behaviour can take many fo3?ms, but most 
important are the various kinds of communication. The fact 
that we can communicate succèssiCiilly with other human bodies is 
strong confirmation that associated with each of these bodies# 
there is a conBCiouo mind like our own. From other people# 
we get information which checks show to be fairly I' e^liable# and 
when we communicate with other people, they usually react in a 
wa^ which shows that they have understood what we have said.
But although other people often act in a way which we 
naturally suppose to indicate the influence of a conscious mind# 
the evidence Is not conclusive. For it is always possible 
that the effects we observe are produced in other ways.
Similar effects sometimes have very different causes. One
can never be absolutely mim certain that the intelligent'® 
behaviour which we observe has not been produced without 
anything correspondinf^ to our consciousnesB being involved.
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Robots have actually been devised which can imitate a great 
number of hvmian activities v/ithout possessing hxman 
consc :lou one s s.
Fevertheles8, it is unlikely that we are ever mistaken 
in aE^eertiîigjthat there in a consc loue mind assoc la ted with a 
body whose behaviour we have had the opportunity to observe 
at all closely. And it ie much more unlikely that we are 
always mietaken when we suppose the existence of other minds.
The existence of other minds cannot, indeed# be demonstrated 
on the basis of the evidence available# but the eoriibined 
strength of the two arguments which we have examined is 
sufficient to put the matter beyond reasonable doubt.
But doee one know only that there are other consciotia 
minds# or does one also know, on occasion, the psirtlcular nature 
of the experiences which these other minds enjoy? We often 
suppose that we have some knowledge of the specific character 
of the experienceB of othex" men. We have evidence which 
suggests that certain other men are undergoing experiences 
similar to experiences which we ourselves either have at 
present or have had in the past, uo that we know# to some extent# 
what the experiences enjoyed by those other men are like.
We shall now investigate the nature of this evidence and we 
shall attempt to dlBcover how far it establishes the conolUBions 
which are usually drawn from it.
We have two sources of evidence with x»espect to the 
character of other people’s ejipe.rlenoee. The first kind of
evidence is our m n  expe3?ience of the situations in which other 
people are placed. The second kind of evidene© is the report© 
which other people make concerning the nature of their experience' 
To take an example, we hsive reason to 'believe that a. man 1b 
having the experience which# in our own caBe, we would desei’ibe 
as ''seeing a red patch*' either if we know that there is a red 
object before his eyes or if he announces that he is seeing 
a red patch.
Neither of these two sources of evidence is, however, 
by any means conclusive. Suppose that there is an external 
object which produces in one’s conBoiouBness a eense-datim of 
a certain kind. One may suspect# but one has no means of 
knowing that this object will produce similar sense««»data in the 
eo'nsclouBnese of other observers. And not infrequently# the 
evidence suggests that the Bense^^^data produced are not similar.
A surer indication of the character of the expei^ienoe undergone 
by another subject is the description v/hich he communicates to 
other people® When someone says that he is seeing a red 
patch® we believe that we know the nature of his exper:teice® 
because we have glso seen red pàtehes. But on refleetion# 
we are compelled to recognise that the experlgmee which vfe 
describe as seeing a red patch is not nccessarlly the same 
as the experience which another observer describes as seeing 
a 'red patch* If different observers are to communicate 
successfully with one another and to convey information about 
the external world,® it is not essential that external beings
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should affect different observers in exactly the same way#
All that is required is that objects which produce stollar 
sense'^data in the conFiciousneoB of one observer should produce 
similar sense-data in the consciousness of other observers.
On the basie of the similar sens a-’contents which we find in 
consciousness, we Infer that certain external dbjeets have 
similar qualities. We can provide information which will be 
useful to others# if these similar external beings have a 
similar effect on other observers# even if they do not effect 
other? in the same way as they affect us. A public language 
ie gradually built up to describe the various similarities 
among external objects# and for this language to be accurate 
and successful# it is not necessary for the evidence of these 
Bimilaritiee to be the same in the case of every observer.
A red object in the exte.rnal world may produce one sense-datuBi 
in one observer and a very different sense«"datum in another# 
But so long as this sense-datum was never presented to the one 
observer without the corresponding sense«=^dat%# being presented 
to the other® the two observers could communicate with perfect 
success# and would never suspect any difference in their 
experiences.
33ut although it 1 b  quite eoneistent with the observed 
facte to say that everyone who claims that he is seeing a red 
patch ha8 an exx^erience different from that of everyone e3.se, 
it does not seem a likely hypothesis that there should be so 
great a variety. The a priori argument which suggests that
t i m i m  there are other oonGciouB mincie like 
our own also euggeste that 5.n eirnilax* sitnatione these minds 
have experiences similar to our own# so that we ai*e often 
justified in claiming that we know what other people are 
experiencing. 11 But although it is unlikely that quite) 
different sense«**data are presented to every subject who "sees 
a red patch"# it is not b o  unlikely that there should 'be some 
exceptions to the general rule. We can sometimes detect cases 
where subjects do not see the same colours when confronted with 
the same objecte* Testa have shown that some peoxile® although 
not strictly colour "blind in the sense of seeing everything in 
black and white# cannot diacriminate between certain colours* 
These peoxilo must see at least one of the colours in a different
way from the normal observer* Now, If there are these
differences in cases where we can make tests, is it not likely 
that sometimes there are also undetected differences in cases 
where no tests are possible?
Thus# if we claim that we know the nature of another 
man’s experience# there is a considerable risk that we are 
mistaken# even if we have taken every p??©caution and have 
checked what can be checked* For although it is very unlikely 
that in the same situation# everyone experiences different 
eense-data® it is quite possible that not all observers ex.#
perience the same gense^^datum* tod since we have no means
of telling wdiich observerb will regularly have the same Bense-» 
data as ourselves and which observers will not# there is always
a signifieant risk of error# We cannot ‘be quite b o eomflden# 
that we know exactly what another person ie experiencing on a 
particular occasion as we can when we simply assert the existence 
of other m eons clous minds. But the evidence ie not sufficient 
even to permit an accurate assessment of the risk of error.
VI * The argument of the thesis is now completed and we
shall review briefly the main points which have been made*
The central purpose of this thesis is to vindicate a certain 
fundamental common sense belief which is at the basis of both 
Epietemologlcal Realism and Metaphysical Pluralism* This Is 
the implicit belief of every man that he is a substantial being 
who experiences other substantial beings existing in the same 
universe * The two main positions which we defend# Epletemo-^ 
logical Realism and Bletaphysieal Pluralism# have# approximately, 
an equal importance in this woidc* This means that the subject 
matter of the thesis 1b divided about equally between the 
disciplines of eplstemology and metaphysics® Roughly#
Ohapters II, III, and VIII deal with epietemological problems 
and Ghapters I, IV# V# VI# and VII deal v/ith metaphysical 
problems® But Metaphysical Pluralism and Epietemological 
Realism are very closely connected# since they both depend on 
the same fundamental common sense belief# and one cannot always 
clearly separate what is relevant to the one topic and what ie 
relevant to .the other*
We began by explaining what is involved in Metaphysical
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Pluralism# Then# we defended the oommon sense belief In the 
exietenoe of external objecte against the criticisms which are 
based on the fact that the contents given in eonsoiousnesB 
cannot be real characters of external "beings® We argued that 
even if the eenei^-data presented to consciousness are neither 
external nor independent® this does not preclude the possibility 
that the experiencing subject has an awareness of external 
beings over and above the inspection of sense contents. This 
primitive awareness of external beings Is not a special 
experience which may be Isolated by Introspection: rather® it
Is a factor Involved in ell experience and it is to be detected 
by analysis * An unpi*ejudloed survey of the structure of 
experience reveals that experience is not simply the Inspection 
of Gen8e';^contents# as has often been supposed# e*g# by 
Phenomenallsts* Experience is essentially the reference of 
presented Bense«^contents to an external reality* The only 
mistake of Halve Realism Is the supposition that this reference 
Involves the assertion that the aense^^^eontents are physical 
parts of the external reality*
The next problem was to defend the belief that the 
experiencing subject and the objects experienced are independent 
substances, We examined Bradley’s view that neither subject 
nor object are Independent beings, the only Independent 
substaneaM being the universe as a whole* Then we tackled 
the two most fundamental problems involved in Metaphysical 
Pluralism# namely# "What Is responsible for the uniqueness
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of every “feeing?" and "What is reeponeible for the togetherness 
of all beings in a single universe?" The answer to the first 
problem is that every being is responsible for its own imiqueness® 
We showed that attempts to explain this feature of a being’ a 
existence in other terms are not siieeesefiai®
The second problem Is of particular Importance, since it 
must be solved if one is to anewer the chief remaining objection 
against Metaphyeieal Pluralism from the Monistic point of view® 
Bradley maintains first, that an independent substance cannot be 
related to anything beyond Itself, and second# that a plurality 
of completely unrelated entities is impossible® Our answer ie 
that two beings can be related without damaging their substantial 
Independence If the relation between them Is an asymmetrical 
intemal-^external relation® This abstract poselblllty Is 
given a concrete application by showing that the relations 
between a present being and the beings in its Immediate past 
are lnternal«*external relations* This means that the relation 
which Is responsible for connecting Independent substances In a 
single universe is also responsible for the generation of the 
temporal continuum* An important corollary is that there 
can be no direct relations between contemporary beings*
In the following chapter# we argued that this trans^ » 
temporal relation between a being and its immediate antecedent 
Is also the relation of causality® But although all beings 
are causally affected by antecedent beings# it does not follow 
that the nature of a being is completely and necessarily
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determined ‘by the nature of its antecedent causee«
Our analysis of causality revealed one most important fact# 
that causal connection Is due to the persistence of the 
character of the past cause in the present effect® This 
means that universal characters are essentially Involved in 
the fundamental relations which connect Independent substances* 
Thus B we have established the existence of the identities in 
difference which must he assumed if one is to account for the 
element of permanence in a changing world and for many other 
facts of experience*
In this final chapter® we have shown that the relation 
between experiencing subject and experienced object is identical 
with the fundamental relation between independent beings®
Since this relation is also the relation of causality, we have 
been able to propose a version of the causal theory of 
perception which is not exposed to the usual objection.
Then, we made an examination of our empil^ical knowledge® 
explaining its justification* We noted that empirical 
propositions are never indubitable® but that this was not a 
serious weakness# since the risk of error Is often infinitesimal* 
The metaphysical system which we have constructed is not, 
however® complete and impregnable* We have attempted to 
describe the general character of the world of finite beings, 
but our description suffers from several weaknesses and % 
limitations® In the first place® there are many relevant 
topics which we were unable to diaeuss. What is probably
the moBt important omiseIon Is that we have negleeted final 
causality and purpose: we have treated the human eu'bject as
an observer and not as an agent * We are hopeful that the
factors in human experience which we have not considered can 
he accomodated without any serious modification of the original 
system. The system is certainly incomplete® hut it may he 
accurate as far as it goes* Bul|pnlOB8 one actually shows 
in detail how these features are to he fitted in# one cannot he 
sure that the system will not have to he radically altered 
in order to take account of the new evidence*
Secondlyp many of the topics which we have discussed 
have not been examined in sufficient detail* This is part«% 
icularly true in the case of the present chapter* We have 
been trying to show how the main problems of epistemology can 
be dealt with in terms of our metaphysical hypothesis ^ but our 
account is a mere sketch# and considerable refinements would 
have to be introduced before we could claim that our episterno^ 
logical theory was reasohably adequate and comprehensive *
The third weakness of the system Is that we have had 
to assume certain principles which are not self-evidently true 
and which may be false# The system which we have put forward 
is no more than a hypothesis— a possible explanation of the 
facte of experience* We may claim that the principles assumed 
are usually not Implausible and that the description of the 
universe is fairly satisfactory# but we are not entitled to 
claim that the truth of the system has been conclusively
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eeta^liBhed©
UnleBB one sn'bsor 11368 to the G arte si an view that a 
pîiiloBophical system can ha demonstrated on the 'basis of 
self «^evident first principleeg one will admit that thie i© a 
wealmees Inevitable in any system® A system is to he jtidgecl 
by the coherence and planeIhllity of its asawaptions and by 
its adequacy to explain the facts® But hecause the theory 
which we have suggested is no more than a hypothesis^ a fourth 
weakness in the system must be conceded® If one constructed 
a theory whose truth could be demonstratedp any examination 
of the theories of other philosopher© would beg strictly, 
irrelevant© But If one is advancing what Is only a plausible 
hypothesis^ it is necessary to consider the hypotheses 
suggested by other philosophers and to show that they are less 
and not more plausible than one’s own. At various pointe 
we have discussed at some length positions held by Descartes^ 
Bradleyjj and Kant^ but in the history of philosophy^ there are 
many other alternative systems which we have not even 
consideredo
Having outlined the main defects of the metaphysical 
system developed in this thesis g, we shall end on a positive 
note by drawing attention to what we consider its chief 
recoramendatitn>«t-^th.0 coherence and simplicity of the system 
as a whole© The solution offered to the fundamental problem 
with which a metaphysical pteralist must deal«^ '=^ the problem of 
explaining the togetherness of a nWber of Independent
But)Btaneas--<«*ha8 made possible the solution of several other 
important problems© The relation which connects beings 
without destroying their independence Is responsible for the 
generation of the temporal continuum© The very same relation 
is also the basis of causal connection® And Involved in 
causal oonnectiong there is an identity in character between 
cause and effect which explains the element of permanence in 
a changing world and the universal identities in difference 
presupposed by general c o n c e p t s A g a i n ,  this fundamental 
relation between independent beings is also the basis of the 
relation of experiencing, and it explains the subject’s knowledge 
of an external world©
